FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-94-012
Wednesday
19 January 1994

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-94-012 CONTENTS *19 January 1994*

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Briefing Held on Russian-U.S. Missile Agreement *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 1
- Russian, U.S. Envoys to UN Comment on Moscow Summit *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 1
- Russia, U.S. To Fulfill Uranium Contract *[INTERFAX]* ... 1
- Kozyakov on Scope for Increased Russian-U.S. Trade *[Moscow International]* ... 1
- U.S. Call for Russian Aluminum Exports Curb Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 18 Jan]* ... 2
- Yeltsin Cables Condolences on California Earthquake *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 Jan]* ... 2
- Military Expert Views Dismantling Ukrainian Missiles *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 3
  - Further on Ukrainian Disarmament *[Moscow Radio]* ... 3
  - Military Observer on Dismantling Weapons *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 Jan]* ... 4
- Moscow's Noninterference in Crimean Affairs Urged *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jan]* ... 4
- Vote in Crimea Seen To Strengthen Moscow *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 19 Jan]* ... 5
- Foreign Ministry on Monetary Links With Belarus *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 Jan]* ... 6
  - Further on Ruble Zone *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 18 Jan]* ... 6
  - Monetary Union Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 18 Jan]* ... 7
- Foreign Ministry Reaffirms Belarus' Priority Status *[SEGODNYA 18 Jan]* ... 8
- Kozyrev Stresses Need for Military Presence in Baltics *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Jan]* ... 8
  - Kozyrev Remarks 'Distorted' by TASS *[Moscow International]* ... 8
  - Speech Signals 'Revision' of Foreign Policy *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 19 Jan]* ... 9
- Lithuania's Overtures to NATO Examined *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 18 Jan]* ... 9
- Georgian Prime Minister Arrives in Moscow *[INTERFAX]* ... 10
- Yeltsin, Shevardnadze Confirm Need for Feb Meeting *[INTERFAX]* ... 10
- Russia Supports Achievement of Karabakh Cease-Fire *[INTERFAX]* ... 10
- Russian Envoy Denies Policy Reliance on Armenia *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 18 Jan]* ... 11
- Churkin Meets Milosevic, Tudjman in Geneva *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 12
- Cuban Navy Chief Concludes Visit to Russia *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jan]* ... 12
- Navy Says Subs Sold to DPRK, Japan for Scrap *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jan]* ... 12
- Russian Diplomat Reaffirms Cam Ranh Bay Policy *[Bangkok THE NATION 15 Jan]* ... 13
- Russia To Supply India With Cryogen Boosters *[INTERFAX]* ... 13

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

- Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Meet on Government Composition *[Moscow Radio]* ... 14
  - Disagree Over Fedorov *[Moscow Radio]* ... 14
  - Consultations To Continue *[Moscow Radio]* ... 14
- Fedorov Seeks To Retain Deputy Premiership *[Moscow Radio]* ... 14
  - Has Not Accepted Finance Minister Post *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 14
  - Still No Answer on Letter to Yeltsin *[INTERFAX]* ... 14
  - Resignation Denied *[Radio Rossii]* ... 15
- Government Likely To Be Formed Without Fedorov *[INTERFAX]* ... 15
- Expert Council Head on Fedorov's Resignation *[INTERFAX]* ... 15
- Russia's Choice Official on Fedorov Leaving Party *[INTERFAX]* ... 16
- Implications of Fedorov's Resignation Reviewed *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 19 Jan]* ... 16
- Yavlinskiy 'Would Agree' To Head Government *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 17
- Shakhray, Shokhin View Possibility of Positions *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 17
- Volskiy Continues To Refuse Offer To Join *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 17
- Chubays Vows To Carry On With Privatization *[Radio Rossii]* ... 17
  - Interviewed on Current Issues *[Russian TV]* ... 18
- Shokhin Sees No Sharp Change in Government Line *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 19
- Party Leader Views Reform Program Without Gaydar *[INTERFAX]* ... 19
- Party Leader: Chernomyrdin Wins Opposition Support *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 19

- Volskiy: Gaydar Trying To Escape Responsibility *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 20
- Gorbachev: Gaydar's Resignation Changes Nothing *[INTERFAX]* ... 20
- Premier Seen as Winner After Gaydar Resignation *[SEGODNYA 18 Jan]* ... 20
- 'Naive Ideas' Seen Departing With Gaydar *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jan]* ... 21
- Gaydar Resignation Creates Money Market 'Panic' *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jan]* ... 21
- Two Options Seen for Reformers Following Gaydar *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 19 Jan]* ... 22
- Security Council Discusses Hardware Development ... 23
  - Agenda for Meeting Previewed *[INTERFAX]* ... 23
  - Council Maps Out 'Principles' *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 23
  - Fedorov 'Not Invited' to Meeting *[Radio Rossii]* ... 23
  - Council Procedures Reported *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 23
  - First Meeting Viewed *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 24
- Yeltsin's Work Schedule Undergoes Changes *[Radio Rossii]* ... 24
- Poltoranin Says Chernomyrdin Should Resign *[Moscow Radio]* ... 24
- Democratic Russia Movement To Oppose Government *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 24
- Directive on Implementation of Reorganization *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 18 Jan]* ... 24
- Yeltsin Removes Kuznetsov From Novgorod Post *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 25

Federal Assembly

- Post Created for Presidential Representative *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 25
- Federation Council Approves Creation of 10 Committees *[INTERFAX]* ... 25
  - Heads of Six Committees Elected *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 26
- Deputy Chairman on Federation Council's Independence *[Moscow TV]* ... 26
- Chernomyrdin Meets Federation Council Deputies *[INTERFAX]* ... 26
  - Shumeyko Telephones Rybkin *[Radio Rossii]* ... 26
  - Pledges To Prevent Split in Federation Council *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 15 Jan]* ... 26
  - Briefs Press *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 15 Jan]* ... 27
- Federation Council Ends First Meeting *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 27
- New Deputy Speaker Calls To Defend Federation's Regions *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 28
- Rybkin Comments on Role as Chairman of Duma *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 28
  - To Distance Himself From Parties *[INTERFAX]* ... 28
- Shokhin Warns Opponents May Make State Duma Useless *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 29
- Travkin Calls For Duma To Stabilize Society *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 29
- LDPR To Seek Foreign Affairs Committee Head for Zhirinovskiy *[INTERFAX]* ... 29
  - Further on Zhirinovskiy Aims *[Russian TV]* ... 30
- State Duma Announces Recess Until 17 Jan *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 30
- Parliamentary Factions Agree on Structural Principals *[INTERFAX]* ... 30
- Russia's Choice Likely To Split Into Two Factions *[INTERFAX]* ... 31
- State Duma Continues Work 17 Jan *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 31
- LDPR Will Not Receive Key Positions on Duma Commissions *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 31
  - Zhirinovskiy 'Blocked' in Nominations *[AFP]* ... 31
  - Kept Off Chairmen List *[AFP]* ... 32
  - Invents Own Duma Committee *[Russian TV]* ... 32
- Value of Votes in Duma To Depend on Deputies' Rank *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 32
- Lower House To Have Five Deputy Speakers *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 33
  - Four Duma Deputy Speakers Elected *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 33
  - Duma Committee Leaders Endorsed *[INTERFAX]* ... 33
- State Duma Appointments; Communist Heads Security Committee *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 34
- State Duma Refuses To Discuss Amnesty for Coups *[ITAR-TASS]* ... 34
- Duma Approves Procedures for Election of Speaker, Deputies *[INTERFAX]* ... 34
- Proposed Duma Rules Amendment Targets Zhirinovskiy *[Russian TV]* ... 34
- 'Sunday' Program Carries Zhirinovskiy Address *[Moscow TV]* ... 34
- Ivan Rybkin Chairmanship Viewed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 15 Jan]* ... 35
  - Further on Elections *[IZVESTIYA 15 Jan]* ... 36
- Zhirinovskiy 'Continues To Attract Frenzied Interest' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 15 Jan]* ... 37
- LDPR's Likely Parliamentary Tactics Examined *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 15 Jan]* ... 38
- 'Secret Power Center' Begins To Form *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 18 Jan]* ... 38
- Spirit of Parliamentarianism Not Yet in Duma *[IZVESTIYA 14 Jan]* ... 39
- 'Chaos Management' Will Not Produce Duma Majority *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 14 Jan]* ... 41

Russia's Choice Against New Parliament Building Project *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 15 Jan]* 42

Regional Affairs

More on Luzhkov Letter to Chernomyrdin on Food *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 18 Jan]* 42
Chernomyrdin Meets Regional Heads *[ITAR-TASS]* 43
Chernomyrdin Backs Shumeyko, Pacifies Leaders *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 15 Jan]* 43
North Ossetia Prepares for Elections *[ITAR-TASS]* 44
    Elections Begin *[ITAR-TASS]* 44
    Voters Reportedly Bribed, Pressured *[ITAR-TASS]* 44
    President-Elect Comments *[ITAR-TASS]* 45
    Defeated Premier Resigns *[Radio Rossii]* 45
    Gives Reasons for Resignation *[ITAR-TASS]* 45
    Final Results Issued *[ITAR-TASS]* 45
    Akhsarbek Galazov Named First President *[ITAR-TASS]* 46
Opposition Urges Chechen President To Step Down *[ITAR-TASS]* 46
Tatarstan May Switch From Volga to Ural Region *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Jan]* 46
Tatarstan Proposes Referendum on Neutrality *[SEGODNYA 14 Jan]* 46
Tatarstan President Likely To Run for Parliament *[SEGODNYA 14 Jan]* 47
'Ural Republic President' Rossel Fired *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 14 Jan]* 47
    Resigns From Sverdlovsk Cabinet *[SEGODNYA 15 Jan]* 47
Yeltsin Appoints Samara Oblast Representative *[ITAR-TASS]* 47
Moscow Blast Injures Businessman, Kills Passerby *[IZVESTIYA 15 Jan]* 47
Petersburg City Assembly Election Rules Viewed *[SEGODNYA 15 Jan]* 48

UKRAINE

International Affairs

'Text' of Tripartite Statement, Appendix *[Kiev International]* 49
USSR-U.S. Pact on Strategic Weapons Ratified *[Kiev Radio]* 50
Foreign Ministry Briefing on Russia, U.S. Talks *[UNIAR]* 50
Official: Nuclear Weapons Storage Unstable *[Kiev International]* 51
Defense Minister 'Fully Supports' Agreement *[UNIAR]* 51
Acting Premier Sees Opportunities in Accord *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 Jan]* 51
Defense Official on Nuclear Security Issues *[Kiev International]* 51
Kravchuk on Nuclear Arms Deal, Other Issues *[Moscow TV]* 52
Moscow Paper Cites Mixed Reaction to Accord *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Jan]* 54

National Affairs

Accident at Atomic Plant of 'Local' Significance *[DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA 15 Jan]* 55
Kravchuk Urges Amendment on Crimea's Status *[ITAR-TASS]* 55
Crimean Candidate Holds News Conference *[UNIAN]* 55
'Politically Motivated' Attack on Crimean Deputy *[Kiev Radio]* 56

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

U.S.-Brokered Uranium Deal With Russia Sought *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jan]* 57
Kebich on Prospects for Ties With Russia *[INTERFAX]* 57
Shushkevich Views Monetary Union With Russia *[INTERFAX]* 57
    Views Political, Economic Problems *[ITAR-TASS]* 58
Deputy: Shushkevich 'Gambling' With Security *[INTERFAX]* 58

Moldova

Tension Increases; 14th Army Issues Statement *[Bucharest Radio]* 59
Lebed, Borovoy Accused of Preparing 'Coup' *[IZVESTIYA 18 Jan]* 59

CAUCASUS

Armenia

- Karabakh Foreign Minister Returns From Serbia *[ARMENPRES]* 61
- Edict Changes National Security Agency Structure *[INTERFAX]* 61
- U.S. Allegedly Offers To Buy Fuel From Baku *[SNARK]* 61
- Small Amount of Gas Arrives Via Temporary Pipeline *[ARMENPRES]* 61

Azerbaijan

- Defense Ministry Communique Reported 17 Jan *[Baku Radio]* 61
  - Hostilities Continued *[INTERFAX]* 62
  - Heavy Losses on Both Sides *[INTERFAX]* 62
  - Further Details of Fighting *[INTERFAX]* 62
  - Stepanakert Residential Areas Bombed *[ITAR-TASS]* 63
  - 'Intensive Shelling' Reported *[ITAR-TASS]* 63
- Aliyev Blames Former Leaders for Troop Presence *[INTERFAX]* 63
- Meeting With Armenian President Uncertain *[TURAN]* 63
  - To Meet in Moscow 25 Jan *[TURAN]* 64
- Russia's Peace Plan Draws Mixed Reaction *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 Jan]* 64
- Russia Proposes Joint Free Economic Zone *[TURAN]* 64
- Aliyev's Meeting With UN Representative Reported *[Baku Radio]* 65
- Aliyev, Iranian Envoy Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh *[AZERTAC]* 65
- Aliyev Meets Iranian Ministry Representative *[ITAR-TASS]* 65
- Slovene Foreign Minister Visits Azerbaijan *[Ljubljana Radio]* 66
- Deals With Latvia Signed; Post Contested *[SEGODNYA 14 Jan]* 66
- People's Front Men Arrested; Newspapers Banned *[SEGODNYA 18 Jan]* 66

Georgia

- Yeltsin Postpones Visit; Patsatsia in Moscow *[Tbilisi Radio]* 67
- Russian Peacekeeping Force for Abkhaz Conflict *[Tbilisi TV]* 67
- Shevardnadze Appraises Government 'Negatively' *[INTERFAX]* 67
- Security Minister on Gamsakhurdia's Exhumation *[Radio Rossii]* 67
  - Further Details *[Radio Rossii]* 67
- Parliament Extends State of Emergency *[INTERFAX]* 68
  - Shevardnadze on Extension *[Tbilisi TV]* 68
- Shevardnadze Orders Apartment Return to Russians *[INTERFAX]* 69

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

- 'Rough Ideas,' 'Themes' for Response to Kozyrev *[Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release]* 70
- Laar Says Gaydar Resignation 'Turn Backwards' *[INTERFAX]* 70
- Lithuanian Premier Meets Laar, Views Summit *[INTERFAX]* 70
- Dual Citizenship Seen as Security Threat *[ETA NEWS BULLETIN]* 71
- Legislators Pass Health Care Law *[BNS]* 71

Latvia

- Kozyrev Ideas on Baltics Seen as Threat *[Riga Radio]* 71
  - Birkavs Notes 'Serious Change' *[Radio Riga]* 71
- Ulmanis Regrets Gaydar's Resignation *[INTERFAX]* 72
- Kasatonov Arrives for Naval Withdrawal Talks *[Riga Radio]* 72
- Ulmanis Calls Russian Army Decision 'Uncivilized' *[INTERFAX]* 72
  - Russia Considers 10 Jan Incident Closed *[Riga Radio]* 72
  - Takeover Methods Criticized *[BNS]* 72
- Security Council Favors Partnership for Peace *[Riga Radio]* 73
- U.S. Official, Ambassador Hold News Conference *[Riga Radio]* 73

Environmentalists Worry About Radioactive Waste *[BNS]* 73

Lithuania

Ministry Concerned Over Kozyrev's Remarks *[Vilnius Radio]* 74
Brazauskas: Talks on Kaliningrad Issue To Resume *[INTERFAX]* 74
Brazauskas Comments on NATO Membership Request *[INTERFAX]* 74
Brazauskas, Kravchuk Discuss Nuclear Security *[ITAR-TASS]* 75
Defense Minister Talks With Swedish Counterpart *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jan]* 75
Polish Ministry Responds on Status of Poles *[BNS]* 75

Briefing Held on Russian-U.S. Missile Agreement

LD1801142794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1417 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS analyst Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—The pledge made by the Russian and American presidents at their Moscow summit to target Russian and American missiles away from the major cities of the two countries before May 30, 1994 was largely political and diplomatic in nature, intended to demonstrate a warmer relationship between Moscow and Washington, a briefing in the Russian Defence Ministry was told today.

As concerns the military aspect of the relevant clause in the Moscow declaration, which Yeltsin and Clinton signed last week, the change of targets reduces the first-strike threat, the risk of an unsanctioned launch, and thereby the danger of nuclear war in general, according to Major-General Anatoliy Svetikov, who represented the Russian strategic missile forces at the briefing.

The presidents promised to re-target their missiles not later than May 30, 1994. But in actual fact, target coordinates can be changed within 15 to 20 minutes, the general said.

According to specialists, the procedure is not very complicated—the target coordinates which can guide a missile to the United States or Russia will be replaced in the missile computer memory with the coordinates of one or another deserted areas in the world ocean.

According to American sources, about twenty such areas have been identified to become the main targets in the missile computer memories. Reserve coordinates will be saved in the memory as well. If all coordinates are deleted from memory, the missile can hit land in the same area from which it was launched.

Russian, U.S. Envoys to UN Comment on Moscow Summit

LD1901102694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0808 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations January 19 TASS—Russian Permanent Delegate at the United Nations Yuliy Vorontsov and U.S. Permanent Delegate at the United Nations Madeleine Albright made a joint statement to journalists accredited at the U.N. headquarters on Tuesday concerning the results of the Moscow summit meeting.

The Russian and American representatives drew the attention of world public opinion to an important item of the Moscow declaration, signed by the Presidents of Russia and the United States, in which they have reaffirmed their support to the United Nations Organisation and called for joint efforts to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping role. Vorontsov and Albright stated in part:

"Both presidents have stressed the need to strengthen the U.N. ability to keep the peace and prevent conflicts. They made it incumbent on our two governments to work jointly in order to improve the mechanism in this sphere. We express mutual satisfaction, and this is particularly important, that our two presidents have called for a Security Council meeting at summit level to mark the 50th anniversary of the United Nations.

"It is clear that by making this statement, both Russia and the United States thereby recognise and prize the central role played by the United Nations, particularly, the U.N. peacekeeping operations and efforts to safeguard international peace and security in this increasingly chaotic and unstable world."

The Russian and American representatives also stated that they would cooperate closely in the effort to ensure the success of the U.N. Security Council meeting at summit level, proposed by the Presidents of Russia and the United States.

Russia, U.S. To Fulfill Uranium Contract

LD1801125194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1148 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Russia and the U.S., which signed a contract for deconcentrating highly enriched uranium last week, will fulfill it without Ukraine's participation, a senior official from Russia's Nuclear Energy Ministry told INTERFAX.

The contract for deconcentrating 500 tons of highly enriched uranium was concluded to develop the agreement signed by the two sides last February, the source said. Its implementation will take 20 years.

The contract provides for deconcentrating annually at least 10 tons of Russian uranium, which will subsequently be sold on the American market. Its cost will be 12 Bn dollars.

According to the official, the delay in signing the document was connected with Washington's condition that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan should be involved in implementing the agreement.

However, later it was agreed that the uranium from Ukrainian nuclear warheads will be returned to Ukraine as fuel for nuclear power plants, and will not be despatched to the American market.

Kozyakov on Scope for Increased Russian-U.S. Trade

LD1801193694 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Excerpts] At the Russian-American summit in Moscow last week, almost the most important issue was the question of economic cooperation, aimed at supporting the economic reform in Russia. Vladislav Kozyakov comments. [passage omitted]

One of the most significant results of the latest summit, in terms of economic cooperation, was undoubtedly the agreement on the sale of Russian uranium to America. In the next 20 years, Russia will process some 500 tonnes of weapons uranium. The processed uranium will be shipped to America as fuel for nuclear power stations there, at a cost of 12 billion dollars. This deal is mutually advantageous—Russia will receive the much-needed hard currency, while America perhaps will produce cheaper electric energy by its nuclear power stations—but what seems to be the most significant in this agreement is the overcoming of one of the barriers in the way of Russian goods to America.

The point is that Russia has many more such goods that could compete on an equal footing with others on the American market and on other Western markets, but such trade in those goods is being hampered by different kinds of barriers, or high tariffs, or prohibition law enacted in the past, or antidumping procedures. [passage omitted]

Russia has goods to sell. This is not only space technology or energy supplies, and not only aluminum or uranium. There are other technologies—ferro-alloy and mineral fertilizers, some types of electronics and products of machine-building industries. These are competitive goods, but to break into the markets has been very difficult. This may sound paradoxical, but it is precisely because of their high competitiveness. About 20 types of Russian goods fall within the antidumping procedure by American and Western countries, the aim of which, of course, is to take them out of the markets.

Undoubtedly, to agree on the issue of trade can sometimes be very difficult, but the Russian-American contract on uranium and other accords at the Moscow summit give one the hope that the American market will at long last be open to Russian goods. This would be one more practical confirmation of the successful development of partnership between Russia and the United States of America.

U.S. Call for Russian Aluminum Exports Curb Viewed

PM1801130594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Report by A. Portanskiy under the general heading: "Russia and United States Try To Avoid 'Aluminum War'"]

[Text] The general calls for assistance for the reforms in Russia, often repeated in the West, are one thing, but talk on the entirely specific question of trade with Russia are something else entirely.

The Americans are suggesting to us that we make a commitment to almost the whole world voluntarily to restrict exports of our aluminum to a certain level. This agreement will allegedly be temporary—until the situation on the world market is put right. Here a program of investment in our aluminum industry is offered.

With this option Russian experts believe that the question will soon arise of what we are to do without production—we will have to reduce it. That will not be long in causing a whole range of adverse consequences for us. Export deliveries will be reduced and social tension will be intensified in whole regions where aluminum production is concentrated (let us recall the recent success of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia during the election campaign in Siberia—A.P.).

The likelihood that our profit level will be preserved as a result of the increase in world prices for aluminum after the reduction in the dumping of Russian metal on the external market is in reality not great. Because various countries have accumulated a considerable amount of aluminum, which will immediately be put on the market.

From the political viewpoint in our foreign trade we will acquire a most unpleasant precedent which will subsequently probably be repeated with our other export goods.

But refusing a voluntary limit on aluminum exports will probably mean for us the start of the antidumping procedure mentioned by [U.S lawyer] Larry Friedman. Although it is quite hard to prove dumping in practice, the results of a possible investigation are virtually predetermined—they will not be in our favor.

We are now caught in a sandwich, as the Americans say, or between the hammer and the anvil, as the Russians say. Nonetheless, the Russian side intends to advance at the forthcoming talks in the direction of its main idea—putting the blame for the state of the market on all producing countries and seeking a formula for an overall stabilization of the aluminum market. Within the framework of this formula there can be a number of options for resolving the problem. One of them is investments in our aluminum industry on condition that payments are subsequently made to investors in this metal. The main merit of this option is that it opens up a prospect for the increase in the consumption of aluminum for civilian purposes inside the country—something for which Russia has such a great need—and that will at the same time favorably affect the state of the world aluminum market.

Yeltsin Cables Condolences on California Earthquake

PM1901104994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Report from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, ITAR-TASS roundup: "Condolences to Victims' Families"]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has sent the U.S. President a message expressing condolences to the families of those who died in the powerful earthquake which hit southern California causing deaths, extensive destruction, and material damage. This has been reported by the Russian president's press service.

The message expresses the confidence that such qualities as the determination and fortitude shown by Americans in such emergency situations will help them quickly overcome the aftermath of the disaster.

Military Expert Views Dismantling Ukrainian Missiles

LD1801140794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1325 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—"We are able to remove all nuclear warheads stationed on the Ukrainian territory to Russia within a year for subsequent dismantling them at enterprises at which they were produced," Colonel-General Yevgeniy Maslin, a military expert for nuclear safety and a department chief of the Russian Defence Ministry, told a briefing here today.

He highly assessed an agreement on the removal of nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory, signed by the three presidents. Maslin reminded of the fact that talks on this problem had been going on since 1992 and it was only now that the talks came to a logical end.

Maslin informed journalists that currently, there are 176 launching installations of intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM) in Ukraine, including 130 installations of SS-19 type and 46 of SS-24 type. There are also around 40 heavy bombers Tu-160 and Tu-95 capable of launching air-based long-range cruise missiles. The overall number of warheads stationed in Ukraine includes 1,300 warheads for IBM and over 600 warheads for air-based cruise missiles.

In the opinion of the military expert, nuclear safety in Ukraine causes permanent concern of experts. According to Maslin, ammunition depots are overloaded with warheads and nuclear ammunition removed from combat alert, which resulted in a considerable increase of the radiation level. This was confirmed by experts of the Russian nuclear centre "Arzamas-15" who visited Ukraine in September, 1993.

The designed life of the majority of warheads has expired, while maintenance preventive checks had not been carried out and some missiles are currently in a critical condition. As an example, Maslin mentioned three nuclear warheads which had to be hastily removed from the Ukrainian territory as they were in a critical condition. It is difficult to say how many hazardous warheads are in Ukraine yet because there is a lack of experts exercising control over the safety of nuclear weapons, Maslin said.

The expert pointed out that any delay in removing and dismantling nuclear weapons is inadmissible since it is fraught with unpredictable consequences. However, there are still people in the republic who either do not realise this or are deliberately playing out "the nuclear card," he said.

Maslin pointed out that Russian experts can give Ukraine guarantees of safety of all operations in the process of removal and utilization of strategic weapons.

Further on Ukrainian Disarmament

LD1801160694 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1336 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] A news conference was held at the Russian Ministry of Defense today. The military and political aspects of the Moscow summit meeting were discussed at the news conference. Viktor Levin, our observer, reports.

[Levin] Colonel-General Maslin, chief of a main directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, introduced by the minister's Press Secretary Yelena Agapova as the chief specialist in the area of nuclear safety, dwelt in detail on the issue of the state of nuclear arms in Ukraine.

[Begin Maslin recording] In their statement, the presidents emphasized the importance of ensuring the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons until they are dismantled. However, nuclear safety in Ukraine is continuing to get worse. Storage facilities are more than full with warheads and nuclear ammunition which have been stood down. This is impermissible. Apart from everything else, it has resulted in a considerable increase in background radiation. This is confirmed by the chief design specialists from Arzamas-16 who visited the territory of Ukraine, Pervomaysk, last September.

Guarantees on most spare parts have run out. Regular technical servicing is not being done everywhere. The findings of the chief designers who investigated those three munitions, you remember, the ones which were sent from Ukraine because they were in a very dangerous state, landed on my desk yesterday.

Specialists are neither trained nor retrained in educational centers. Due to a lack of effective control, the personnel's theoretical knowledge and practical skills have been substantially lost and this engenders a great deal of doubt with regard to their capability for getting the work carried out with any degree of quality.

Due to lack of equipment and absence of field training, the special emergency repair crews are not in practical terms ready to carry out tasks dealing with the elimination of the consequences of possible accidents involving nuclear ammunition. Besides, there is a great deal more affecting the servicing and maintenance.

Well, and it is in a situation such as this that proposals emerge within the military circles of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry to have the munitions moved to a former engineer depot, to have them stored there for a so-called interim period. Apart from everything else, this is very dangerous. [end recording]

[Levin] I asked a question whether it is really the case that Ukraine fails to understand that keeping nuclear weapons in such a poor technical state poses a threat to Ukraine itself. Here is General Maslin's reply.

[Begin Maslin recording] There exists...[pauses] Well, I have been in touch with my Ukrainian colleagues practically from the very inception of the negotiating process. There are sensible people there who do understand this. However, there are also people—and I am not afraid to say so—who fail to understand this danger.

For some 50 minutes I had to address some committee—I don't remember what they call it—the Defense and Security Committee of the Ukrainian parliament. For 50 minutes I told them, in great detail, what nuclear ammunition is, what danger it poses, in the first place for Ukraine, but the questions that came afterwards dealt mainly with the costs—how much if we sell it to you. That is to say—I would not like to offend anyone by this—but nonetheless, the statements, you have after all noticed that statements have appeared in the press alleging treachery, well, these are the people who do not understand and they fall into one category.

There is a second category of people who do understand, but who wish to retain their positions in the new structures that emerged there to supervise the nuclear weapons. My former subordinates are there, too, working and unwilling, to some extent, to part with these weapons and probably this can serve as an explanation. [end recording]

[Levin] The trilateral agreement between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States removes financial problems. It is now up to the Ukrainian parliament and its political will.

Military Observer on Dismantling Weapons

PM1801163994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by military observer Vladimir Klimov: "Guarantee—Until February"]

[Text] The guarantee period of certain nuclear munitions located in Ukraine runs out in February. There is no need to explain what a delay in transporting them to Russia for dismantling and processing into nuclear fuel would lead to. This was the subject discussed at a news conference in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Colonel-General Yevgeniy Maslin, Major Generals Anatoliy Lukyanov and Anatoliy Svetikov, and also Boris Gorobets, spokesman for the Ministry of Atomic Energy, spoke about the prospects of the agreement with Ukraine on questions of dismantling nuclear weapons reached during the meeting between Presidents Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and Leonid Kravchuk.

There are 176 missile-launchers currently deployed in Ukraine and around 40 heavy bombers, accounting for around 2,000 nuclear weapons. Some of them are in a potentially dangerous [predavariynom] state. It is vital to transport them to Russia in the immediate future for dismantling.

Russia is prepared to do this. Although the relocation of certain nuclear weapons is dangerous, it will carry out all the commitments it assumed at the summit. By way of compensation Russia will supply uranium for nuclear electric power stations to Ukraine for 10 months.

What if the Ukrainian Supreme Council suddenly refuses to ratify the Moscow agreements? This question was raised at the news conference. The answer that was given maintained that the agreement between the three presidents theoretically does not need ratification.

Furthermore, the people in Ukraine who are involved in handling [obsluzhuvaniye] nuclear munitions understand the full danger of the prevailing situation and will take the necessary measures to implement the agreement. However, there are politicians in Ukraine who will oppose the implementation of the agreement for the sake of achieving their own ends or to keep their long-occupied posts. What may the non-implementation of the agreements lead to? If Ukraine wants to become a nuclear power, the UN Security Council must ratify this decision. It will scarcely come out in favor of the expansion of the world nuclear club. Clearly its expansion would have a domino effect. It cannot be ruled out that the DPRK and other states prepared to make nuclear weapons would want to join Ukraine.

So we will trust in the sensible attitude of the people who decide the state's future.

Moscow's Noninterference in Crimean Affairs Urged

PM1901095594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Report by Maksim Yusin: "Election Results Confront Moscow With Difficult Choice"]

[Text] The first round of the presidential elections held in Crimea last Sunday confirmed that the majority of the peninsula's inhabitants do not want to remain in Ukraine and are seeking affiliation to Russia.

Although the name of the Crimean president will not be known until 30 January, when round two is due to be held, there is hardly any doubt that Yuriy Meshkov, who supports the peninsula's separation from Ukraine, will win. His rival in round two will be Nikolay Bagrov, the present chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, and the only one of the six candidates who has consistently advocated that the peninsula remain in Ukraine. The popularity of this idea among the population there can be judged from the number of votes cast for Bagrov—17.5 percent.

What will happen next? The future president's first step has already been decided—Meshkov plans to organize a referendum on the peninsula's future on 27 March, the same day as the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. The outcome of that referendum is virtually predetermined. After 27 March Meshkov, backed with the people's support, will in all likelihood launch the campaign to change the status of Crimea.

Russian diplomacy is going to have some serious problems to tackle. On the one hand, public opinion cannot be ignored: The majority of Russians cannot accept the loss of Crimea, which was won for Russia by Catherine the Great's military commanders. The State Duma, under the influence of the Communists and liberal democrats, will surely follow the example of Khasbulatov's Supreme Soviet and adopt a resolution taking under Russian jurisdiction not just Sevastopol but the whole peninsula. In Crimea, of course, this will cause an explosion of exultation and will trigger a wave of demonstrations under red flags and tricolors.

At the same time, by casting doubt on the territorial integrity of its neighboring state, Russia will set a most dangerous precedent, canceling out the Helsinki accords and its own commitments within the CSCE framework. In addition, the affiliation of Crimea can at best bring moral satisfaction but will not improve either the economic situation in Russia or relations with the CIS countries, which will interpret this as visible confirmation of Moscow's "imperial ambitions."

Nor should it be forgotten that the agreement on scrapping Ukraine's nuclear weapons has still not been ratified by parliament, and a sharp deterioration of relations between Moscow and Kiev could make President Kravchuk change his position too.

Judging by the initial statements of Russian diplomats, the Foreign Ministry prefers not to draw far-reaching conclusions from the Crimean election results.

Unless it clearly and unambiguously states that it renounces its territorial claims on Ukraine, Moscow could repeat the sorry experience of Belgrade. By giving unconditional support to fellow countrymen in Crimea, Yeltsin runs the risk of becoming a hostage to separatist leaders, as happened with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Moscow's open interference in the emerging conflict between Kiev and Simferopol will do irreparable damage to the reputation of Russian democracy. The question is whether the Kremlin's leaders will manage to resist the temptation of trying to boost their own popularity at their weakened neighbor's expense.

Vote in Crimea Seen To Strengthen Moscow

MK1901104094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 3

[Commentary by Oleg Medvedev: "Outcome of Presidential Elections in Crimea. Kravchuk Gambled on Bagrov and Lost"]

[Text] The elections for president in Crimea are illegal, and Leonid Kravchuk will in the near future detail his position on this question. This was announced on the evening of 17 January by Mykola Mikhalchenko, adviser to Ukraine's head of state. As is known, having come through to the second round of elections are Crimean Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolay Bagrov and Yuriy Meshkov, leader of the pro-Russia Republican Party, who has a considerable edge on his rival and high chances to win in the second round. KOMMERSANT-DAILY observer Oleg Medvedev comments on the new political situation taking shape in Crimea and around it.

Many politicians in Moscow do not hide their satisfaction at Mr. Meshkov's success. "An excellent variant!" exclaimed Sergey Baburin, learning the results of the first round. Presidential Council member Andranik Migranyan thinks that the residents of Crimea have made the right choice, and hopes that Ukrainian leaders would be "wise enough not to make any rash and provocative moves." Yevgeniy Ambartsumov pledged that the Duma will not keep aloof from the Crimea question, adding without any irony that if Meshkov wins, "one may be able to say that now it is Ukraine's internal affair."

Indeed, if the leader of Crimean Republicans takes the presidential seat in Simferopol, Moscow, without visibly interfering in Crimean affairs, would have the possibility of realizing its geopolitical objectives in Crimea with his hands. Meshkov's chances of final victory are high: In line with an understanding reached earlier, four candidates who dropped out of the race after the first round are supposed to transfer their electorate to him.

The men in Kiev fear an escalation of tensions in Crimea, and expect stepped-up territorial claims on the part of Russia. Leonid Kravchuk finds himself in a difficult situation. He had ignored pressing demands by a number of political parties to ban the elections for Crimean president. Kravchuk had hoped for the victory of Bagrov, who is loyal to Kiev, but miscalculated. Now that the success for Russophiles in Crimea is obvious, banning the elections is rather dangerous. But if Bagrov withdraws his candidacy, the second round may not take place: It takes two candidates to hold it.

A new situation is taking shape in Crimea regardless of how the presidential election story in Crimea ends. Nearly 65 percent of the more than 70 percent of all who went to the polls voted for candidates who in one or other form support secession from Ukraine. This voting in fact cancels the results of the 1991 referendum in which a majority of people in Crimea advocated

Crimea's being part of Ukraine. The demonstration of pro-Russia sentiments by citizens of Crimea considerably strengthens the hand of Russia in the talks with Ukraine on the whole range of problems related to Crimea.

Foreign Ministry on Monetary Links With Belarus

PM1801165194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

["Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Statement"—ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA headline]

[Text] Issues regarding relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus have become a topic of discussion in the mass media of both countries in connection with the future of the economic reforms in Russia.

Because of this, the Russian Foreign Ministry would like to state the following. As far as interstate relations between Russia and Belarus are concerned, they are still a priority for us with the objective of strengthening friendship and developing in-depth mutually advantageous cooperation in the military, political, trade, economic, humanitarian, and other spheres.

A good foundation has already been laid for moving toward the strategic objective of bringing our two countries closer together in accordance with decisions made by the highest-ranking leaders of Russia and Belarus.

There is no doubt that rapprochement of this kind would encourage a carefully prepared amalgamation of the monetary systems of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on the basis of the intergovernmental agreement of 8 September 1993. The statement by the Russian and Belarusian heads of government dated 5 January 1994 states that the work that has been done to implement this agreement includes tasking the two countries' ministries and departments with preparing additional documents which will define the mechanism whereby the monetary system will operate once it has been amalgamated, the single mechanism for administering the budget systems of both states, and also questions connected with foreign economic, trade, and customs policy.

The fastest possible coordination of these documents would suit the interests of the people of both countries.

Commenting on this statement for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, said: "The process of establishing bilateral relations is multidimensional and multilayered, and Russian ministries and departments have been directly instructed by the president and the government to work intensively and dynamically in this area."

Further on Ruble Zone

MK1801110094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Grigoriy Selyaninov under the "CIS Integration" rubric: "Russia May Find Itself Once Again Confined to Ruble Zone"]

[Text] Explaining his refusal to join the government currently under reorganization, Yegor Gaydar cited among other things the threat of returning to the situation of 1992, when there was an inflation competition among 12 centers of money creation in the ruble zone. The fears are not without reason. The issue is in the first place the unprecedented preparations for the merger of the money systems of Russia and Belarus, which KOMMERSANT-DAILY reported 12 January. Meanwhile, Andrey Kozyrev has also joined in the Russian Government fray over economic integration. In his message to the president the Russian Foreign Ministry chief argues against both Russia's "isolationism" in economic relations with the former USSR republics, and the stepped-up resuscitation of the ruble zone. The general balance of forces within the government, however, is unfavorable for the ruble so far.

Uncertainty and political infighting in the top echelons of the Russian executive branch have prompted candidates for the leading roles in the cabinet to issue statements that go beyond the scope of their current powers. In his address to the president, Andrey Kozyrev supports integration within the CIS in principle. He believes that Russia can overcome the economic crisis only jointly with the other former USSR republics. On the other hand, Andrey Kozyrev's statement contains a provision saying that the formation of the CIS economic union is running too far ahead. The union is being hastily equipped with documents describing the final stage of economic integration. In other words, the Foreign Ministry chief is diplomatically objecting to the stepped-up creation of a currency union, especially in the form of a ruble zone.

The foreign minister's statement can also be interpreted as follows: While wishing to stay on in the government, Andrey Kozyrev is distancing himself in advance from its fairly likely decisions in favor of the ruble zone's comeback, which may undermine the prospects for Russia's financial convalescence.

On the whole, the balance of forces in the government with regard to resuscitating the ruble zone does not appear to be favoring the ruble. If Boris Fedorov follows Yegor Gaydar's suit in compliance with decisions by "Russia's Choice" ruling bodies, there will be no radical market advocates opposing the ruble zone's revival left in the government. Given that regarding this subject the Central Bank sticks to a view that priority should be given to restoring interrepublican economic ties, not to propping up the ruble, then 1994 may mark a return to a situation of two years ago in terms of Russia's subsidizing former Union republics. Meanwhile, according to available estimates, a total of 8 percent of Russian GDP was siphoned off into the republics in 1992, and 25 percent of Russia's price growth was caused by the inflationary dumping of rubles into Russia from the CIS countries. The year 1993 saw only the beginning in switching economic and especially credit and financial relations to market principles (by using the indexation of Russian Government credits through the current exchange rate of the dollar, setting interest rates on the basis of LIBOR [London Interbank Offered Rate], and making insurance currency deposits). Nonetheless, Russia gave its CIS partners credits to the tune of 5.2 trillion rubles in settling trade accounts.

[Article includes the following boxed passages]

Russian foreign trade with CIS countries in 1993 (billions of rubles in current prices)

Countries	Russian exports	Russian imports	Trade balance
Azerbaijan	167	181	14
Armenia	69	17	-52
Belarus	2.205	1.966	-239
Georgia	42	26	-16
Kazakhstan	2.386	1.414	-972
Kyrgyzstan	208	112	-96
Moldova	402	112	-290
Tajikistan	97	34	-63
Turkmenistan	194	86	-108
Uzbekistan	735	1.026	291
Ukraine	7.365	3.647	-3.718
Total	13.870	8.621	-5.249

Members of the Russian government on merging the money systems of Russia and Belarus

Andrey Kozyrev favors fostering integration within the CIS, but warns against overstepping certain stages in the formation of the Economic Union.

Aleksandr Shokhin signed the 28 December Russian-Belarusian protocol on the readiness to merge the two countries' money systems. He sees the draft agreement prepared by the Central Banks of Russia and Belarus "On the Mechanism of Operation of Belarus' Money System Upon Merging it With That of Russia" as acceptable.

Vladimir Mashits holds a wait-and-see stance. He favors a stepped-up creation of a multi-currency payment union of CIS countries, but he does not object to the ruble zone, either.

Monetary Union Viewed

PM1801151794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Article by Professor Viktor Belkin: "Russians Will Pay Dear for Their Rulers' Political Philanthropy"]

[Text] On the path of the CIS countries' economic integration, the start of the new year of 1994 was marked by a truly notable event. The intergovernment agreement "on the procedure for the unification of the Belarus system with the Russian Federation monetary system and the mechanism for the functioning of a common monetary system" was signed.

Its successful implementation could serve as the start of the ruble zone and raise integration processes in the CIS to a qualitatively new level. Unfortunately, the reverse is also true: Failure could seriously delay these processes. That fear is by no means unfounded. The experience of many of the CIS' good initiatives which have disappeared into the sand requires heightened circumspection and responsibility here.

In assessing the objective chances of success we must highlight the main point—the optimum selection of partners on the basis "of love and calculation," as the saying goes: The mutual sympathy of the two countries' peoples, the contiguity of their territories, their close economic ties. Suffice it to say that Belarus sells nearly one third of its GNP in Russia, acquiring in exchange rolled metal, cement, petroleum products, gas, and other things. But the successful combination of partners and their desire to unite their monetary systems still do not guarantee success. After all, it is a case of a unique step unprecedented in world practice. Consequently, the most serious preparatory work is needed.

The foundation of this work was laid by the agreement of a program nature between Russia and Belarus concluded in September last year. Something has already been done, particularly in the field of coordinating foreign economic, trade, and customs policy. But radical questions of the interaction of the two countries' budgets and in particular questions of the normal functioning of two emission banks with a single currency have not been sufficiently worked out in such a short time.

In addition to unresolved problems new problems have arisen in recent months, complicating the unification of the monetary systems. The first act here is the replacement of Belarusian rubles with Russian ones. In September 1993 the exchange rate was 1.5 Belarusian rubles for 1 ruble. The one for one principle stipulated by the program agreement for the exchange of money did not give rise to any special objections at the time. But since then the market exchange rate of the Belarusian ruble—the "hare"—has declined to 5 for 1 Russian ruble. But in the January agreement the "hare's" exchange rate against the ruble remains the same. Of course the currency exchange rate is determined not only by their purchasing power but also by supply and demand, the saturation of the market, and other factors. Nonetheless the correlation of one to one for the exchange of Belarusian rubles for Russian rubles now seems absolutely unacceptable. The September agreement on the unification of the monetary systems has been approved by a parliamentary majority in Belarus. It must be supposed that the January agreements will also be ratified there. But the Russian Duma will hardly agree to such a disadvantageous exchange of money.

We know the relatively recent experience of the exchange of GDR marks for FRG marks after Germany's reunification. The nonequivalence of the exchange produced many additional difficulties even for that country's prosperous economy. To avoid inflation additional taxes had to be introduced in its western lands. Russia, where tax rates are already excessive, is barred from such a route. Consequently, nonequivalent exchange could intensify inflation.

To determine a rational rate for the exchange of "hares" for Russian rubles regular exchange sales of Belarusian currency are needed—to refine its quotation price; we must also calculate the cost of similar selections of consumer items in Belarusian and Russian rubles—to compare their purchasing power.

The drastic decline of the Belarusian ruble exchange rate in recent months makes concern for the stability of the future joint monetary system—not only statically, at the moment of unification, but also dynamically—particularly topical. And the main thing for this stability is to ensure that market reforms are conducted in synchrony. Hence Belarus' task of accelerating the liberalization of prices and privatization, bringing them up to Russia's level.

In conclusion, it must be admitted that less than four months have not been enough for such a complex and crucial matter. Time out essential for the more thorough working through of the problem is in my view preferable to hasty decisions. But there are grounds for fearing that political motives will yet again prevail over economic expediency and the fundamentally necessary agreement will in practice become a heavy burden to the Russian economy.

Foreign Ministry Reaffirms Belarus' Priority Status

MK1801133094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 1

[SEGODNYA report: "Russian-Belarusian Agreements To Remain Valid"]

[Text] The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement yesterday on Russian-Belarusian interstate relations. The document says that these remain priority relations for Russia, as they are aimed at fostering friendship and comprehensive political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. According to a high-ranking Russian diplomat, the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry's statement is designed to assure the Belarusian side that earlier agreements between the two countries will not be revised depending on political expediency.

Kozyrev Stresses Need for Military Presence in Baltics

PM1901111994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksandr Krylovich and Georgiy Shmelev: "CIS and Baltic Countries Are Focus of Russia's Immediate Vital Interests"]

[Text] The CIS and Baltic countries are the focus of Russia's immediate vital interests, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has told a Russian Foreign Ministry conference on Russian foreign policy issues in this region.

Andrey Kozyrev said that defense of Russians' rights in the former Union republics is one of the main strategic issues in Russian foreign policy. In his opinion, the question of dual citizenship has now become a key element here. The minister stressed that it has of late proved possible to secure greater understanding on this score.

Among other most pressing problems the minister pointed to the need to boost the effectiveness of existing cooperation mechanisms and to create new ones, as well as to develop a short-, medium-, and long-term strategy for forming an economic union.

The minister spoke about military and military-technical cooperation and underlined the need to retain a Russian military presence in this region. "We should not leave regions that for centuries have been spheres of Russian interests. We should not be frightened of these words." The "security vacuum" created as a result of the Russian troops' withdrawal will "inevitably be filled by other forces, by no means always friendly forces, moreover, and in many cases directly hostile to Russian interests," the minister stressed.

Kozyrev Remarks 'Distorted' by TASS

LD1901093894 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] A representative of Russia's Foreign Ministry, Galina Sidrova, has stated that Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev didn't speak out for the continuing presence of Russian troops in the Baltic countries when addressing a meeting on foreign policy in Moscow on Monday [17 January]. Galina Sidrova stressed that the ITAR-TASS news agency has distorted the meaning of what the minister said. According to the ITAR-TASS news agency, Andrey Kozyrev objected to the withdrawal of Russia's troops from those regions.

America's Department of State has pointed out that what minister said, as was quoted by the news media, runs counter to the statements made at the Russian-American summit. A spokesman of the State Department, Michael McKerry, noted that the joint declaration of the Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin speaks about the speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries.

Speech Signals 'Revision' of Foreign Policy

MK1901110094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Georgiy Bovt under the "Russia Revises Its Foreign Policy" rubric: "The Foreign Affairs Ministry Is Ridding Itself of the 'Belovezhskaya Forest Syndrome'"]

[Text] Yesterday a two-day conference on aspects of Russia's policy with respect to the CIS and the Baltic countries opened in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the first time all the ambassadors of the former Soviet republics have gathered in Moscow. Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev made a speech whose keynote was the protection of Russia's interests in the CIS and Baltic countries. The process of the conference itself confirms KOMMERSANT-DAILY's predictions that the more often Russian leaders assure that there will be no revision of the country's foreign policy after the 12 December elections, the more obvious it becomes that this revision has grown urgent. The conference is analyzed by KOMMERSANT-DAILY's commentator Georgiy Bovt.

Andrey Kozyrev stated that as of now protection of the interests of Russians in the former Soviet republics is one of the strategic priorities for Moscow. Meanwhile the Concept on Foreign Policy, adopted by the Security Council in March 1993, in its section dealing with relations with the CIS, makes no mention of this problem whatsoever (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova were simply passed over in silence); the section on relations with the Baltic states does not elaborate on this problem sufficiently. The year 1993, however, can be called "the year of Russian refugees." They have been emigrating in masses even from such seemingly "agreeable" countries as Kyrgyzstan. Their exodus has intensified from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the war-torn Tajikistan, and—as a result of the "policy of soft eviction"—from the Baltic countries. The number of Russian-speaking refugees (defined according to UN criteria) has already reached 2 million people.

The 12 December elections showed that the artful rhetoric of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and the Russian Federation Communist Party has found a response among the greater part of the electorate. The thesis that votes for the Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist Party are votes "against the methods of reforms" is partly a delusion. In fact the disintegration of the USSR is still being painfully perceived by many in Russia—even if at the emotional, everyday level. It seems that the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry also understands this. Although in a recent article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Andrey Kozyrev still maintained that the president is the guarantee of Russia's course and its protection against national extremism, and that this course itself will remain just as predictable, open, and oriented toward partner-like relations with the outside world, the minister's speech yesterday showed that adjustments are already being made.

For the first time he openly articulated the thought that has long been aired in corridors on Smolenskaya Ploshchad [Foreign Ministry] that the former Soviet republics are the sources of "main threats" to Russia's interests. This was followed up with another fundamentally new conclusion: Moscow's strategic task consists in "preserving a military presence" in this region. Because, as Kozyrev now believes, to pull out of the CIS completely is just as absurd as to send tanks there. The minister fears a strategic vacuum that could be filled by unfriendly forces; he did not specify who he has in mind—the mujahedin in Tajikistan, the fundamentalists in the Transcaucasus, the Romanian nationalists in Moldova, or even NATO in the Baltics.

The head of the Foreign Affairs Ministry also touched on the problems of an economic union in the CIS. Noting the risk involved in hasty actions, he nonetheless gave a possible appraisal of Russia's and Belarus' plans to merge their monetary systems. It seems that the wish to get rid of the guilt complex for the Belovezhskaya Forest agreements—even at the price of the ruble's destabilization—is increasingly affecting the politicians who remain in the government. Meanwhile the idea of "Western liberalism" may be replaced, for instance, by the idea of "putting together a quasi-USSR." It is too soon to say yet which motives will prevail: The neighbors' overwhelming attraction to NATO, the wish to win the electorate back from the Liberal Democratic Party, or the intention to divert the Russians' attention from the collapsed reforms.

Lithuania's Overtures to NATO Examined

PM1801165794 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 3

[Aleksandr Nikolayev article under "Security" rubric: "Vilnius Politicians Demand Missile Umbrella for Lithuania From NATO"]

[Text] As you know, the extraordinary NATO Council session in Brussels 10-11 January decided in favor of creating new Euro-Atlantic security structures to include Russia. This notwithstanding, the debate is continuing in Central and East Europe over the question of the unilateral eastward expansion of the North Atlantic alliance and the granting to these countries of bloc security guarantees without heed for Russia's vital interests.

Observing Vilnius officialdom's vigorous political rhetoric at this time over the republic's request to be admitted to NATO and, in particular, the statements on this score by J. Paletskis, adviser to the Lithuanian head of state, you involuntarily imagine yourself at a performance in a provincial theater given by amateur actors who faultlessly mouth the lines they have learned on stage but have a poor understanding, however, of the big picture and the roles of the main protagonists.

Lithuania's desire to come under the NATO defense umbrella, adviser Paletskis explains, is not directed against neighboring states and will not complicate its "good relations" with Russia. The political naivete of these statements, which are evidently designed as a formal apology to Russia, is obvious. Along with the illusory nature—obvious even to a nonspecialist—of the hopes of its request being met at this crucial stage in European history, this does make one wonder about the true motives behind this Lithuanian move.

Let us leave aside the domestic factors that brought about this decision. Even a fleeting glance at Vilnius's foreign activity indicates that the eternal desire to publicly combat a small state's inferiority complex, a desire which has repeatedly played a negative role over the last few years in the most recent history of Russian-Lithuanian relations, causing the republic considerable economic damage, has once again prevailed over the tendency to organize relations with its neighbors in a well-considered manner, without excessive emotion.

Amid the intensive dialogue under way in Europe over partnership strategy in the postbloc era and the vigorous formulation of fundamentally new security structures, Lithuania's desire to act at the expense of third countries evokes feelings of profound surprise and hostility. How can it speak of "good relations" with Russia and at the same time openly disregard the latter's pressing legitimate concerns which it has set out on various occasions—to Lithuania among others.

These concerns are quite clear and understandable: Russia will not put up with any steps by its neighbors that hint at the possibility of its isolation and the resurrection of its former image as the potential adversary of "civilized Europeans."

In today's conditions Lithuania's declaration on joining NATO cannot be interpreted otherwise. Vilnius clearly realizes this, which evidently accounts for the desire on the part of top Lithuanian officials to hide the obvious and call black white. However, people here seem to be disregarding the fact that another division of Europe into blocs which would result from attempts to bar Russia from taking part in European security structures and NATO's expansion in direct proximity to Russia's borders may, given the Kaliningrad factor, create in the future unacceptable risks for Lithuania itself.

It only remains to hope that an honest, realistic approach to relations with Russia will prevail in Vilnius, along with a correct understanding of the interests of Vilnius's own security and prosperity, factors which, as it transpires, Lithuania must and can develop by acting with Russia rather than against it. Only then will the historical mutual mistrust between the two countries give way to a desire for partnership, only then will Russian-Lithuanian cooperation become natural and mutually beneficial and our relations be described as good without any diplomatic latitude.

Georgian Prime Minister Arrives in Moscow

LD1801202794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1808 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] A Georgian government delegation led by Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia arrived in Moscow later in the day on Tuesday, Georgian embassy officials told Interfax.

The two sides are expected to discuss economic cooperation with each other and how to clear the ground for President Yeltsin's visit to Tbilisi early next month.

The Georgian team includes the ministers for industry, trade, and supplies, the heads of railway, oil and gas departments, the deputy minister for the agriculture and food industry, and the first deputy foreign minister.

Yeltsin, Shevardnadze Confirm Need for Feb Meeting

LD1801211494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1805 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" No. 11 feature]

[Text] Monday evening President Boris Yeltsin had a telephone conversation with Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, Shevardnadze's press secretary, Zaza Kandelaki, told Interfax.

According to him, the two leaders confirmed the need for holding a meeting in Tbilisi in early February (Interfax's note: about the 3rd or 4th of February).

Russia Supports Achievement of Karabakh Cease-Fire

LD1801191094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1552 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Russia stands for achieving "a cease-fire in the area of the Armenian-Azeri conflict at any price," the political adviser to the head of Russian diplomacy, Galina Sidorova, told Interfax on Tuesday after a meeting between Andrey Kozyrev and his Azeri counterpart, Gasan Gasanov, in Moscow.

Kozyrev and Gasanov, she said, discussed the possibility of a cease-fire and signing an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan as soon as possible.

As Sidorova said, negotiations between the two sides are progressing with difficulty, since many grievances and suspicions have built up between them during the conflict.

According to Sidorova, "a further escalation of hostilities is dangerous not only for the two nations which are actually engaged in annihilating each other: It poses a threat to stability in the region as a whole. That is why foremost importance is attached to the need to stop military actions," she said.

The head of Russian diplomacy may also confer with Armenia's Foreign Minister, Vagan Papazian, in Moscow in the near future, Sidorova said.

It is possible that the Presidents of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - Boris Yeltsin, Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Geydar Aliyev, will meet in Moscow before the end of this month.

Russian Envoy Denies Policy Reliance on Armenia

PM1801141594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 94 First Edition p 6

[Interview with Vladimir Stupishin, Russian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Armenia, by Karen Topchyan in Yerevan; date not given: "Our Countries Are Allies, the Russian Ambassador to Armenia Believes"]

[Text] The topic of conversation between ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's own correspondent in Yerevan and Vladimir Stupishin, Russian Federation ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Armenia, was the relationship between the two countries in the context of Moscow's geopolitical interests in the Transcaucasus.

[Topchyan] Is it possible to speak of relations of alliance between Armenia and Russia?

[Stupishin] Of course, and this is why. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Security between Russia and Armenia was signed back in December 1991. Although it has not for various reasons been ratified, our two states are nonetheless implementing many articles of this treaty in other agreements. In addition, state delegations are functioning highly actively in order to conduct talks between the two countries and to prepare bilateral agreements on specific questions.

Further, Russia and Armenia are parties to the Collective Security Treaty concluded among certain CIS member countries. It is a treaty of alliance and provides precisely for alliance commitments. In addition, a treaty has been signed on the status of the Russian troops in Armenia—Russian troops are stationed in this country, serve here, hold exercises.... This treaty also governs certain parameters of our military cooperation. Finally, in accordance with the Treaty on the Status of the Border Troops, Russian border guards guard the common borders of the CIS in this area along with their Armenian colleagues.

[Topchyan] Mr. Ambassador, there is a quite widespread opinion that Russia, which has perfectly explicable geopolitical and strategic interests in the Transcaucasus, relies in its policy in this region on Armenia as its traditional ally. Does Moscow really have priorities in the Transcaucasus?

[Stupishin] As a region which for long years was incorporated in the Russian Empire and then in the Soviet Union and as a region inhabited by peoples who have built a joint life over centuries, the Transcaucasus is undoubtedly a sphere of Russia's state interests. I believe that it is not quite accurate simply to say that Russia relies on one republic. Rather, we are relying on new treaty relations. It so happens that Russia was one of the first to start building such relations with Armenia. Owing to the different nature of the regimes which have been established in the Transcaucasus and the different approaches in their attitudes to Russia and the CIS, new relations have been established juridically with other Transcaucasian republics either later or somewhat differently.

Quite honestly, your question contains a somewhat frightening expression which can be understood as...: Russia relies on just one country in the Transcaucasus. Does this mean with it against the others? Russia's policy is not quite like that; it is different, in fact. It means with this country, but not against the others. We also seek to organize good-neighborly relations with the others. For Russia has an interest in ensuring that its closest neighbors are able to build their lives under peaceful conditions. The normal development of Russia itself depends on this. The bloody conflicts in various parts of the former USSR damage our economic interests as well as those of others. Russia therefore seeks to help everywhere and to be of service in settling conflicts.

[Topchyan] Incidentally, please tell us about Russia's role in settling the Karabakh conflict.

[Stupishin] Obviously, in seeking to help find political means to resolve that conflict Russia acts in the role of a go-between. As the experience of the past few months shows, it is precisely these peacemaking efforts and the readiness shown last summer by both Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan to come to the negotiating table that have, in fact, brought the first positive results in the form of a cease-fire.

[Topchyan] Many people believe that Russia is interested only in "freezing" the Karabakh conflict—and not just the Karabakh conflict....

[Stupishin] Russia sets itself no such goal. What does "freezing" mean? A cease-fire—and everything is postponed indefinitely? Our aim is to bring all conflicts, at least those on the territory of the former Union, to a peaceful political settlement. A genuine settlement implies using a cease-fire as a means of creating favorable conditions for a process of negotiation.

[Topchyan] What is the state of Russian-Armenian relations, and what are the prospects?

[Stupishin] They can be described very positively. They are developing normally. The existing difficulties are primarily of a technical nature. They are also connected with the fact that we are living through a period of the breakup of the Soviet structure and the building of new relations both within the CIS framework and on a bilateral basis.

Churkin Meets Milosevic, Tudjman in Geneva

LD1801224294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2115 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Geneva, 18 Jan—Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian president's special representative, met in Geneva today with Serb President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman; Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen, cochairmen of the coordinating committee of the conference on the former Yugoslavia; and Charles Redman, representing the U.S. Administration. The consultations enabled a wide range of problems relating to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be discussed.

Vitaliy Churkin told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that the current round of talks on the Bosnian settlement, which started in Geneva on Tuesday [18 January], "is progressing with difficulty." "The aggravation of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina provides unfavorable conditions for the negotiating process," said the Russian representative. "Nevertheless, there are some bright spots. It seems that we have managed to resolve the problem of replacing Canadian blue helmets with the Dutch in Srebrenica, the UN security zone. We are satisfied with this development and expect no further problems."

Cuban Navy Chief Concludes Visit to Russia

PM1801145594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 3

[Russian Navy Press Center report under the "News" rubric: "Made a Tour of Russia"]

[Text] Rear Admiral Pedro M. Betancourt, vice minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and commander of the Revolutionary Navy of the Republic of Cuba, has paid an official visit to the Russian Federation. In Moscow he met with Colonel General M.P. Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, and Adm. F.N. Gromov, commander in chief of the Russian Federation Navy.

During his tour of the country Rear Adm. Pedro M. Betancourt visited the Baltic Fleet and Leningrad Naval Base. He boarded warships in the city of Baltiysk and visited Kaliningrad Higher Naval School, the Central Naval Museum, and the Navigation and Oceanography Main Directorate of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry in St. Petersburg.

Navy Says Subs Sold to DPRK, Japan for Scrap

PM1801203194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Report by Aleksandr Sychev: "Pacific Fleet Sells Written-Off Submarines and Is Happy"]

[Text] The Asia-Pacific Region is panicking slightly. Following the four written-off "Foxtrot" class Russian submarines (IZVESTIYA No. 9), the Pacific Fleet has apparently sold another 10 "Golf-2" submarines, capable of carrying three SS-5 sea-based ballistic missiles, to North Korea.

The unease in the countries in the region neighboring North Korea is entirely explicable. Pyongyang does not allow the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to monitor Korean nuclear reactors, thereby reinforcing the world community's suspicions that secret plans exist in North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. "Nodong" missiles, copied from the famous "Scuds," have been flying out of the country's military test sites.

Reports obtained by IZVESTIYA at the Navy Press Center provide no grounds for suspecting the Russian military of having an frivolous attitude. A contract has been signed by the Russian Ministry of Defense, which, by an edict of the president, has been authorized to sell written-off warships for scrap.

An agreement has been signed with the Japanese firm "Toen [name as transliterated] Trade Inc." for the sale of 12 diesel submarines manufactured in the period between 1961 and 1968. They have outlived their service life and, so we were told, it is no longer safe to go to sea in them—indeed, it is now quite impossible to do so. Under the contract, all the submarines have been brought to a condition which rules out the possibility of restoring them for naval use. All weapons, basic equipment, and precious metals have been removed from them. The "Toen Trade Inc." firm will receive only the hulls, which it will supply itself to a ship-cutting enterprise.

Under the terms of the contact the company does not have the right to re-sell the submarines for purposes other than in the form of scrap, and it is obliged to supply documents confirming that the hull has been cut into pieces. Defense Ministry experts will be on site to monitor the fulfillment of the contract.

The Japanese company has so far collected only one submarine. The contract does not stipulate where the submarines will be cut up or who will finally get the scrap. The Navy Press Center refused to name the sum involved in the contract, saying merely that the fleet did not get a bad bargain.

Russian Diplomat Reaffirms Cam Ranh Bay Policy

BK1501093994 Bangkok THE NATION in English 15 Jan 94 p 6

[Text] Moscow still nurtures the vision of developing Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, strategic deep-sea port in Southeast Asla during the Cold War, into an international commercial port, a Russian diplomat said yesterday.

Mr Andrey Tatarinon of the Russian Embassy in Bangkok told a seminar at Chulalongkorn University that Russia still maintains a limited presence at Cam Ranh Bay, after withdrawing most of its forces in 1992.

"Some limited presence still remains as a factor of stability in the region," he said in response to a question from guest speaker Dr Michael Share of Hong Kong University.

Dr Share has been giving a series of lectures on the collapse of the Soviet Union, its implications to World Commumsm, and Russian foreign policy in Southeast Asia which have been organised by the university's Institute of Asian Studies.

"ASEAN does not talk about it (the limited Russian presence), and Vietnam doesn't insist on our total withdrawal," Mr Tatarmon said.

He said the Russian military and Vietnam continued to negotiate a lease of Cam Ranh Bay, which America had developed during the Vietnam War.

However, the issue is not a priority in bilateral relations.

"There are bigger problems—Vietnam's debts (estimated US$8 billion) joint exploitation of petrochemicals and other things," he said.

The development of Cam Ranh Bay into an international commercial port was first proposed by then Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev at the annual meeting of the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Manila, in July. Russia was then invited as a guest of ASEAN. "We are not necessarily rushing to leave Cam Ranh," he told reporters.

Mr Kozyrev proposed the transformation of the facilities at both Cam Ranh Bay and Subic—the naval base in the Phihppines controlled by Cold War enemy, the U.S.—into logistics support centres for naval activities.

"What is important is to transform this arrangement into one that exudes the new strategy of stability and cooperation in this region," Mr Kozyrev told reporters.

Mr Tatarinon added that the proposal may be taken up by ASEAN itself in the next few years.

Cam Ranh Bay is said to be one of the region's best natural deep- sea ports.

Russia To Supply India With Cryogen Boosters

LD1801190294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1632 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Russia continues to actively cooperate with India's National Space Agency and is prepared to supply it with seven contracts, the Director General of Russia's Space Agency, Yuri Koptev, told Interfax.

According to him, the $220 Mn contract signed with the former USSR remains virtually the same amount, even though Moscow had to give up the supplies of booster technologies stipulated in the contract.

According to Koptev, Russia agreed to shoulder some of the commitments connected with India's space program. For instance, it is prepared to supply cryogen boosters (i.e. the last stage of the booster rocket) for India's Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicles.

In addition, Russia has signed a contract worth $28 Mn for the production and supply of equipment to service cryogen booster systems.

Political Issues

Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Meet on Government Composition

LD1801162694 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Perkina]

[Text] Good evening. The latest from our correspondents: The working meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, which had lasted six hours, has just ended in the Kremlin.

Our agency's correspondent has been told by very well-informed sources that issues connected with finalizing the composition of the government were debated during the meeting, along with other questions.

The composition of the government has for the time being not been made public.

Disagree Over Fedorov

LD1801195494 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] The subject of the main disagreement during the meeting in the Kremlin between the president of the Russian Federation and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, at which they discussed the composition of the government, was Boris Fedorov. An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this from a high-ranking source in the president's apparatus.

The prime minister offered Boris Fedorov the post of finance minister in the reshuffled government. In response, Fedorov stipulated his conditions: the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha and Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko. According to the same source, Viktor Chernomyrdin and First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets did not accept Boris Fedorov's demands. As a result, Boris Fedorov announced his resignation. Thus, the composition of the government remains unknown.

Consultations To Continue

LD1901145294 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Consultations between the Russian president and the prime minister on the composition of the reshuffled government may continue until the end of this week, INTERFAX was told today by a source within the administration of the head of state which wishes to remain anonymous.

The source maintains that differences between Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin on a number of candidacies for key Cabinet posts presented to the prime minister have somewhat delayed a decision on the Cabinet's personal composition.

The source offered the following rough forecast: Chernomyrdin as the prime minister, Oleg Soskovets as the first deputy prime minister, Chubays, Fedorov, Yarov, Zaveryukha as deputy prime ministers, Grachev, Yerin, and Kozyrev as ministers in charge of decision-making ministries, and Gerashchenko, as chairman of the Central Bank.

Fedorov Seeks To Retain Deputy Premiership

LD1801164694 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Boris Fedorov, on whom so much attention was focused today, the meeting between the Russian leaders included, told Valentin Sergeyev, head of the Russian Government press service that he had not resigned from the post of Deputy Prime Minister, but only from the post of Finance Minister.

Has Not Accepted Finance Minister Post

LD1801180194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1731 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Tamara Zamyatina and Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—Russia's new government composition is still unclear after six hours of non-stop talks between President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

According to a reliable source, no documents shaping out a new cabinet have been signed yet.

Conflicting media reports on Boris Fedorov's stance were clarified to some extent by Valentin Sergeyev, chief of the governmental press service. He quoted Fedorov as telling him by telephone at 15:30 today that he has "not formally asked to resign as a vice-premier". But he has "not accepted the prime-minister's offer to hold the post of finance minister in the reformed cabinet", Fedorov was quoted as saying.

Still No Answer on Letter to Yeltsin

LD1901130794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1221 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Vice Premier Boris Fedorov has still not received an official answer to his rejection to occupy the post of Finance Minister in Russia's new government.

In his interview with INTERFAX, Fedorov reaffirmed that the day before, on Tuesday, he forwarded a letter to President Boris Yeltsin in which he called the proposal to head the Finance Ministry as "unacceptable."

He also reported that he disagrees with the turn in economic policy which has become quite obvious. Fedorov is against Aleksandr Zaveryukha occupying the post of vice premier and Viktor Gerashchenko the post of the Central Bank of Russia's chairman.

The letter also contains several other explanations regarding his refusal about which Fedorov decided not to inform "for the time being."

On Tuesday neither the prime minister nor the president gave their answers to this letter. At the same time, Fedorov underlined that he had not presented any letter regarding his resignation.

Sources close to Fedorov believe that the final issue on his participation or non-participation in the government has not been solved yet.

Nevertheless, a well-informed source in the Russian Government reported to INTERFAX on Tuesday that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin made a decision not to include Fedorov in the composition of Russia's re-organized government as Finance Minister "according to Fedorov's provisions."

This source asserts that President Yeltsin shares this opinion.

On Tuesday during their working meeting in the Kremlin, Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin did not sign any decree on the composition of the reorganized government.

Resignation Denied

LD1801184194 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] INTERFAX has reported the end of the meeting between the Russian president and the head of the government, at which the question of the make-up of the new cabinet of ministers was discussed in particular. The meeting lasted six and a half hours, but no decision on the personnel composition of the government was taken.

From the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin went off to their dachas.

Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin, INTERFAX reports, told journalists today that Viktor Chernomyrdin had offered him a choice of two posts in the new government—minister for CIS affairs or economics minister. Shokhin is going to announce his decision tomorrow.

Today too, Sergey Shakhray, another deputy prime minister, stated, according to the POSTFAKTUM agency, that he had been offered the post of minister of nationality affairs and regional policy. It is not yet known whether he has accepted the offer.

Meanwhile Boris Fedorov's press secretary denied a report that he has resigned. In a RIA interview, the press secretary said, literally, the following: Boris Grigoryevich has not accepted the prime minister's proposal that he should retain just the post of finance minister, but neither has he resigned.

Government Likely To Be Formed Without Fedorov

LD1801210694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1805 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" No. 11 feature]

[Text] According to Interfax's sources, President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin are now discussing the set up of a new Russian government.

The president had accepted the resignation of Yegor Gaydar who told Interfax that he more or less knew who would be serve in the government. In his view, Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays, a member of Russia's Choice, should not resign while Vice Premier and Finance Minister Boris Fedorov should.

Officials in Fedorov's secretariat told Interfax Tuesday that he had rejected the prime minister's offer to stay as finance minister in the reorganized government but had not resigned either of his positions.

When he met Chernomyrdin Monday, Fedorov demanded special powers in pursuing his financial and economic policy "in line with what he was promised when he was appointed vice premier in 1992."

Fedorov told Interfax that he could stay "as just the finance minister" if there was just one first premier, Oleg Soskovets, but not if there are four or five vice premiers.

He confirmed that he had also demanded that Aleksandr Zaveryukha should not be a vice premier and Viktor Gerashchenko, governor of the Central Bank of Russia.

Fedorov's aides told Interfax that he sent a letter to Yeltsin Tuesday morning outlining his view of the situation and conditions on which he would agree to stay in the government.

Meanwhile, an informed source in the government told Interfax that Chernomyrdin had decided not to have Fedorov in the government "on his conditions."

The same source says that this opinion is shared by the president.

Expert Council Head on Fedorov's Resignation

LD1801212294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1924 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] "Boris Fedorov's possible resignation as finance minister does not mean a sharp softening of Russia's credit and monetary policies," the head of the experts' council under the Russian government, Yevgeniy Yasin, told Interfax today.

In his opinion, "the premier does not seem to be very fond of uncontrolled budget spending," while the government on the whole will sooner or later face the need to choose between stricter budget and monetary policies for the sake of preserving the budget and an additional emission in order to prevent the industries from falling to pieces.

Yasin admitted that intentionally maintaining the ruble's stable rate and regular stepping back on promises "on the whole could not but exhaust themselves." "It is even more understandable that Fedorov fall victim to his own persistence and his well-known relations with the country's chief banker, Viktor Gerashchenko," he added. The head of the experts' council "fails to see anything terrible in the fact that the dollar will trade at 200-300 rubles more if it corresponds to the pace of inflation." According to his prognosis, the inflation rate in January will amount to 22-24%, "which is comparable with recent months."

Speaking on Fedorov's possible successors, Yasin pointed to the current Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Dubinin as having the highest chances to replace Fedorov.

"Sergey Konstantinovich has great professional experience with budget issues, and what is important as well is that he is not inclined to give away money right and left either," Yasin said.

As Interfax learned from Dubinin's staff, no talks of his possible appointment had been held.

Russia's Choice Official on Fedorov Leaving Party

LD1801161594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1454 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Sergey Yushenkov, secretary of the faction Russia's Choice, has disapproved of the decision of Finance Minister Boris Fedorov to leave this faction of the State Duma and to join the deputies group "Union of December 12" (leaders—Aleksandr Braginskiy, Irina Khakamada, and Viktor Bushmin).

During his conversation with journalists Yushenkov underlined that "there is an ethical aspect in Fedorov's decision because he has been elected on Russia's Choice federal list and has not informed members of the faction about his decision."

Commenting on rumors stating that Gennadiy Burbulis also intends to leave the Russia's Choice faction, Yushenkov indicated that Burbulis faces the same ethical problem because Burbulis was also elected to the State Duma from the list of the Russia's Choice bloc. There will be quite another situation if the Russia's Choice faction itself adopts a decision to be divided into two factions in order to receive an additional vote in the State Duma Council and in order to help the deputies group Union of December 12 receive the necessary number of members (not less than 35) so this association can be registered.

Yushenkov reported that a session of the bureau of Russia's Choice faction had discussed this issue but Sergey Kovalyov, Boris Zolotukhin, and several other prominent members of this faction opposed its division into two factions. As a result of this discussion, Yushenkov reported, the faction has increased the number of its members from 76 to 78. However, now its number is 77, as Fedorov has left the faction.

Yushenkov underlined that there exists such a point of view which was expressed yesterday that after Yegor Gaydar leaves the government, many members of the faction would deem themselves free of any obligations to Russia's Choice and can adopt a decision to leave this faction.

The same day prominent lawyer Andrey Makarov, a member of Russia's Choice, reported to INTERFAX that he had left the faction and joined Union of December 12. Makarov refused to explain his move, stressing that an official message would be made public on Tuesday evening.

Implications of Fedorov's Resignation Reviewed

MK1901121094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 2

[Ivan Zasurskiy report under the "Results" rubric with the general headline: "Ruble Falls Following Gaydar. Yeltsin Proved To Have Not Been Ready for Gaydar's, Fedorov's Resignations, Although Both Could Have Easily Been Predicted"]

[Text] Now that Boris Fedorov has left the Russian Cabinet of Ministers, the only ideological figure still in the government is Anatoliy Chubays. His fate is unlikely to be subject to change before check privatization is completed next summer.

Both Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov managed to leave the government nearly gracefully. This should not be misunderstood, though: Yegor Gaydar made a wrong move last September, and Boris Fedorov, an ideologist of pragmatism in economic policy turned "stubborn" monetarist, proved unable to tackle inflation. Moreover, the excessive strengthening of the ruble, which has undermined the domestic industry's export capacities, does him no credit either. This factor could be an example for the former minister's address in an American university on the occasion of the complete and final defeat of inflation in Russia, but at this stage it makes almost no sense at all.

Boris Fedorov's political clout, which was heavily undermined in the provinces (by delayed wages and nonpayments for production delivered under state orders), will apparently be boosted by the significant fall of the ruble's exchange rate. This fall, however, should not be perceived as a clear sign of Russia's "Ukrainization." Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that after Gaydar's resignation was accepted, the Finance Ministry was interested in having the ruble follow the reformer.

Unfortunately, according to the pendulum theory, the government is indeed doomed to a certain increase in expenditures once a less prominent bureaucrat takes Fedorov's place.

What is curious is that Boris Fedorov, like Yegor Gaydar, did not have an actual reason for resigning, so he presented an ultimatum that could not be fulfilled and even went from a relatively strong faction, "Russia's Choice" (whose representative could expect to become a government member following Gaydar's departure at least as a compensation), to a relatively weak one, as if he were deliberately trying to make sure that his terms would not be taken seriously.

Yavlinskiy 'Would Agree' To Head Government

LD1901113694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1126 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS corespondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—Russian economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy said on Wednesday he would agree to head a government "oriented to overcome an economic crisis" which he predicted would occur in March.

Yavlinskiy told reporters that in his government current Finance Minister Boris Fedorov would chair the Central Bank, while Anatoliy Chubays would remain the privatisation supremo.

The leader of the Yabloko parliamentary faction said he had not received any offers to join the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin, but had there been any he would have "submitted a programme of extreme anti-crisis measures in three weeks".

However, Yavlinskiy added that he would assume the responsibility "only on condition that the president exerts no pressure and does not interfere".

Yavlinskiy believes that First Deputy Premier Yegor Gaydar had resigned because of the economic situation which had sharply aggravated of late.

Shakhray, Shokhin View Possibility of Positions

LD1901112094 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1052 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Jan—Sergey Shakhray, who is a member of the State Duma, told journalists during a break in today's session of the lower house that he will probably agree to head the Ministry of Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy. This is because he feels that 1994 will be quite a difficult year as far as interethnic relations are concerned. He voiced confidence that he would be able "to at least minimize" the consequences of interethnic conflicts and help resolve them.

Sergey Shakhray expressed the wish that, even if he does lose the post of deputy prime minister, he should at least be able to have direct access to the prime minister and deputy prime minister.

Asked by an ITAR-TASS correspondent about the prospects for his joining the new government, Deputy Aleksandr Shokhin said: "I cannot tell you anything new. I have not yet decided. The number of offers I am getting is increasing."

Volskiy Continues To Refuse Offer To Join

LD1901092394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0819 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—Arkadiy Volskiy, the president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, turned down the offer to join the government which was, evidently, made to him by First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets who attended the Tuesday meeting of Volskiy's union.

"I am repeating for the 37th time that I will not work in this government", Volskiy told TASS on Wednesday. He did not deny the fact that he had received the offer.

Volskiy's election bloc, the "Civic Union", lost the last parliamentary election completely which proved that directors of state enterprises which it united have no social support because of the failure to ensure the minimum subsistance level to their workers and to pay wages in time.

However, it is clear that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his First Deputy Oleg Soskovets want to rely on heads of state run enterprises and farms in their future work. This explains the offer to Volsky and a resolute support to Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha who protects the interests of collective and state farms.

President Boris Yeltsin, who has accepted the resignation of Yegor Gaydar, the major reformer in the government, now insists on keeping another reformer, Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, in the government. This caused a major disagreement with the prime minister, as Fedorov insists that Zaveryukha be dismissed.

The decision on the final government composition is thus delayed. The presidential press service announced on Wednesday that consultations will continue today and in the coming days.

Chubays Vows To Carry On With Privatization

LD1801211194 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Excerpt from interview with Anatoliy Chubays, deputy prime minister and chairman of the State Committee for State Property, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Chubays] It is hard for me to speak about the whole government or forecast its destiny. But I can speak for myself personally, especially as my mind is made up. I am sure I am obliged to bring to completion the job for which I stood for election. Privatization will be brought to conclusion and the commitments that were made will be fulfilled.

Interviewed on Current Issues

LD1801224694 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1725 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays by commentator Nikolay Svanidze; place not given; from the "Details" program—live]

[Excerpt] [Svanidze] [passage omitted] After heavy rearguard fighting in the form of desperate attempts to issue ultimata to the government, the Gaydar team has retreated into the State Duma, and its retreat not been very organized. The personal mutual understanding between Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov has clearly broken down, and taking account of the major tactical disagreements between Gaydar and Gennadiy Burbulis, this points to a serious split within Russia's Choice.

It was natural and inevitable that political relations would have to be clarified after the blow of the 12 December election results. Russia's Choice is now becoming what amounts to a constructive opposition to the government, and is entering new and very complex relations with the president. A key role will be played in Viktor Chernomyrdin's new government by professionals with centrist views, close to directors' circles. In a new spiral, and in different conditions, a government of experienced managers is being set up which is ideologically related in many ways to the Ryzhkov-Abalkin cabinet.

Only one person is left in the government today from the government of the first Yegor Gaydar cabinet of two years ago—Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays, chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property.

Anatoliy Borisovich, you have found yourself in proud and romantic isolation, alone among strangers. What will you do in a government without Gaydar and Fedorov?

[Chubays] Well, first of all the decision on Fedorov has not yet been adopted, so I would not draw such unequivocal conclusions, let us wait a little. Second, I do not entirely agree that Chubays has been left alone in the government, it must be said that I have been working with these people for more than a year now. Relations have certainly not always been simple, and there are serious difficulties as well, but nevertheless there has been real work on privatization with these people in this government, and everything that has been done on privatization has been done in this line-up. So we have experience of work in a friendly environment, a not entirely friendly environment, and an entirely unfriendly environment.

[Svanidze] How is the environment now?

[Chubays] I am ready to answer that question as soon as the new government line-up is announced.

[Svanidze] Anatoliy Borisovich, do you see yourself now more as deputy prime minister or as a member of the Russia's Choice bloc?

[Chubays] Both, to an identical degree. Furthermore, I think it is important that Gaydar's actions too—I think it has not yet been fully understood, but they must be regarded not as the actions of Yegor Gaydar personally but as the actions of the leader of a major political bloc. I remind you, by the way, that today Russia's Choice has the most seats in the State Duma, significantly more than either Zhirinovskiy or the Interregional group. Gaydar as an individual perhaps might have followed some other line, but as leader of the bloc, he is acting as a leader should act.

[Svanidze] Anatoliy Borisovich, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is a firm man. How do you find working with him?

[Chubays] I don't think it would be proper for me to assess my own actions, but I have worked and work in the government only as long as I follow the line which I consider to be the right one, which I can answer for. That means that I have followed that line until today, and it is that line which I can answer for.

[Svanidze] So the character of the leadership does not worry you in this instance?

[Chubays] No, why do you say that? The character of the leadership is very important for me, and I think that the premier of the government has to be a firm man, that is his duty. Otherwise there is nothing underpinning you, otherwise it is simply impossible to work.

[Svanidze] In that respect Viktor Stepanovich's personal qualities suit you?

[Chubays] From the point of view of the firmness of his character, undoubtedly.

[Svanidze] Anatoliy Borisovich, we have a triangle here: Viktor Chernomyrdin and his government, President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and the reformist party bloc. Which of them do you plan to be guided by the most?

[Chubays] Things have worked out in such a way that the job I do would be impossible without the president's personal support. It would be impossible without the personal support of Gaydar, and everything Gaydar did back in the first government from 1990. It would be impossible without the present government as well. Relations have been quite complex within the government, but in spite of that, the line has been maintained, and I remind you that my version of the privatization program was adopted at a session of the government a month ago. Therefore it is, if you like, the work of several authors—the president, the government, and the Russia's Choice bloc, probably to varying degrees.

[Svanidze] You are answering about your work, but I am asking about you, whom do you as a politician intend to follow? After all, the president, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the reformers, let us say in Russia's Choice, do not occupy the same positions on all issues.

[Chubays] I intend to follow the fulfillment of those duties which I personally as a member of the government took on before the people when I began the issue of privatization checks on 1 October 1992, and I am compelled to discharge these duties in full, all the more so as our program is fully supported by Russia's Choice, and in the Russia's Choice program there is a whole section on privatization, which I wrote myself.

[Svanidze] What stance do you think the president should now be adopting: father of the nation, the supreme arbitrator, or a person persistently following a definite line?

[Chubays] Undoubtedly the president is unable to choose some kind of black or white position for himself. So it is a question not of either one or the other, but of finding correlations between degrees or measures. I am convinced that the president will remain president as long as he remains the guarantor of reform in Russia.

[Svanidze] But for how long will he be the guarantor of reform in Russia, if we are talking about Yeltsin? At the moment it is a question of whether he should weigh up all positions, like the statue personifying justice, or whether he should have political preferences of some kind.

[Chubays] He must undoubtedly have political preferences and be guided by the reforms, but at the same time, he must of course weigh up the balance of political forces.

[Svanidze] But he must demonstrate preferences?

[Chubays] I think so.

[Svanidze] Thank you. I remind you that you were watching Anatoliy Borisovich Chubays live on Russian television on the "Details" program. Goodbye.

Shokhin Sees No Sharp Change in Government Line

LD1801202894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1845 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—Russian Vice Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin said on Tuesday it is unlikely that the government will sharply change its line, if its core remains intact.

At the same time, he admitted that it would be hard to resist the pressure from the industrial and regional lobby especially after the inflation spiral was wound tightly in the last four months. Now it is beginning to unwind, forcing the government to pay off the debts which were not paid in November-December, Shokhin said.

Even if former First Vice Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar decided to stay in the government, this process would continue anyway, he said. It is hard to imagine that under Gaydar inflation would be smaller in January-February than in December, Shokhin said.

Party Leader Views Reform Program Without Gaydar

LD1801131994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1148 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Chairman of the All-Russia Union "Renewal" Aleksandr Vladislavlev believes that in principle Yegor Gaydar made the right choice. He noted, however, that Gaydar had explained his move by "wrong reasons." He told Interfax that Gaydar's real problem was disagreements with the people, not with the Cabinet members.

"The people had their say during the election and the president heeded the people's voice," said Vladislavlev. As the only guarantor of social stability and further reforms, the president must propose a more reasonable and acceptable rate of reforms," he said.

The withdrawal of an "architect who built the future of the country on the sand of naive beliefs will make it possible to put the reforms on a more stable footing," he continued. He is also convinced that the president and the prime minister will carry out the reforms in the interests of the state and the people.

Vladislavlev favors the idea of forming up a new team of realistic-minded reformers capable of leading the country out of the crisis.

Party Leader: Chernomyrdin Wins Opposition Support

LD1801141094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1234 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yulia Kantor]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—The resignation of First Deputy Premier Yegor Gaydar means that communists and other opposition blocs will now cooperate with the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin, according to Sergey Baburin, the leader of the hard-line "Russian Path" parliamentary group and a staunch opponent of President Boris Yeltsin.

"I believe the resignation of Yegor Gaydar signals the end of the transfer of the (pro-Yeltsin) Russia's Choice bloc into opposition", Baburin told TASS on Tuesday.

Now the communists and other opposition factions in parliament will "take under patronage Chernomyrdin and his government", he said.

Volskiy: Gaydar Trying To Escape Responsibility

LD1901071894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0648 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow, January 19 (TASS)—Arkadiy Volskiy, president of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, whose Civic Union Bloc lost parliamentary elections completely, accused Yegor Gaydar, the architect of Russian reforms, of trying to escape responsibility for the failure of reforms.

The resignation of Gaydar "is an attempt to avoid responsibility for failures in economic reforms and a desire to put the burden on the shouldres of those people who could not allow themseleves the luxury to abandon the leadership in the difficult moment", Volskiy told a meeting of regional leaders of his union on Tuesday.

He also said that the December 12 elections had shown that the Russian people "do not accept unreasoned experiments in politics and economy".

According to Volskiy, Russia now faces two alternatives: whether to join industrially developed nations or remain their raw materials appendage with cheap resources and skilled manpower.

First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets addressed the meeting and said he would "strengthen constructive cooperation" with the union."

Gorbachev: Gaydar's Resignation Changes Nothing

LD1901133994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1221 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Gaydar's resignation, and even a possible walk out of other "shock therapy symbols," will not change anything since the government does not have a clearly-defined line of development. That was declared in an interview with INTERFAX by Mikhail Gorbachev, the ex-Soviet president.

In his opinion, no one in the government is thinking about what should be done next to advance the country, and for this reason "we are doomed to political and economic drifting with all the ensuing consequences."

He warned that if the country's leaders "disregarded the popular mood, Russia would surely get into new serious political troubles with adverse social effects."

However, he spoke out against returning the country to the old system. In his words, the course towards a market economy should be continued but substantially corrected.

He suggested for one that market relations should be intensified at the small and medium business level and urged passing tough anti-monopoly legislation.

"But there is nothing more important than to teach people how to live under market conditions, otherwise transition to a market economy will be violent," Gorbachev stressed.

Premier Seen as Winner After Gaydar Resignation

MK1801121094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 1

[Aleksandr Bekker article under the "Prospects" rubric: "A Purely Soviet Government. Strong Economic Managers Getting Their Way in Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Yegor Gaydar did the last thing he could for President Yeltsin: He announced his resignation when Bill Clinton's plane was approaching the United States. Whereas for Boris Fedorov, Gaydar's economic policy and parliamentary bloc comrade-in-arms, his decision came as a "total surprise," Viktor Chernomyrdin, according to his secretary, had been ready—meaning that the prime minister had well realized where his actions were leading. As of November, Gaydar had been virtually barred from making decisions on the republic's budget on instructions of the head of the government. On 10 November, Viktor Chernomyrdin issued personal instructions transferring export quota responsibility to Oleg Soskovets; he himself completely took over the sharing out of centralized credits. All these were indications that the Council of Ministers was going back to the Soviet style of work.

As early as the end of last year, several decisions were made which were clearly not backed by the budget's resources: subsidies for a number of economic sectors, and the indexation of minimum wages and pensions by 1.9 times. To the rejoicing of officials in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the sphere of export licensing has been widened; meanwhile, the dragging of Tajikistan and Belarus into the ruble zone spells a serious threat of price hikes in Russia. Thus, even the presence of Gaydar and Fedorov did not prove a serious constraint for the prime minister lately: He has achieved control of the cabinet of which he is in charge. An attempt to do the same on the scale of the Russian economy is seen as less than productive.

Even assuming that Fedorov stays "on the promise" to fight inflation by all means, his good intentions would soon be swept away by the wave of demands from the agro-industrial lobby, while he would become a decorative symbol of reforms. The finance minister cannot but realize that, hence he would hardly agree to the role of scapegoat. Without him the government's Credit Commission, which in one way or another somehow filtered the thousands of requests for centralized credits from regions, sectors, and enterprises, would soon die.

Viktor Chernomyrdin cannot be thought as totally ignoring the danger of inflation. Ukraine's example has long been for him a warning sign. And he would not have dared to oust monetarists from the government without having some idea, or program, in his name. He has such a program today, and he is quite enthusiastic about it. This is the concept of selective support for key enterprises of the national economy. Elaborated by Professor Yasin, it would not have drawn any objections from Gaydar, Chubays, or Fedorov had it contained reliable mechanisms to implement it. They are extremely weak at the moment. As a result of selective financing for the "points of growth," the thread of inflation will be stripped.

It is good in a sense that "strong economic managers," "pragmatists," will work in Viktor Chernomyrdin's cabinet of ministers in an undiluted form. The purity of the experiment, as they say, is guaranteed. One unpleasant thing is, they are going to experiment with a living country.

It is historically clear what hyperinflation ends in for a country. The more so because the old-new communists and the president's "best friend" who once a month "plays chess with him" are already vibrating with impatience.

'Naive Ideas' Seen Departing With Gaydar

PM1801200094 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Editorial office report: "Industrialists and Agrarians Do Not Lend Any Special Significance to Gaydar's Departure"]

[Text] Yesterday we published the viewpoint of a number of financiers about Yegor Gaydar's resignation from the post of government first vice premier. Chiefs of banks, exchanges, and investment companies are sorry about this decision, and they are concerned about the upcoming changes. Other IZVESTIYA readers express a rather different point of view. We considered it possible to acquaint you with their stance too.

Aleksandr Vladislavlev, vice president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs:

"Yegor Gaydar has theoretically made the right choice by leaving the government, but he gave the wrong reasons for his step. His problem is not a difference of opinion with other government members, but a difference of opinion with the people. It is a good thing if both he and his supporters understand this now.

"The president, it seems to me, cannot fail to take into consideration the undoubted fact that today the 'ruling party,' so to speak, associated with Gaydar's team is a source of public allergy. This team has made reforming the economy its own exclusive right.

"Now it appears that this team is prepared to shed responsibility, transferring it to those who have tried to display common sense and avoid national disillusionment in the reforms. The departure of the 'architect' who built the country's future on the sand of naive ideas gives us a chance to place the reforms on a more solid foundation."

Viktor Gulov, chairman of the "Kuzminichi" joint stock company in Kaluga Oblast:

"Any changes in the government are painful to those of us who are involved in agricultural production. Because amid the half-market economy we are nevertheless forced to be involved in finding our way, blazing a trail, and so on. The newly reformed farms (the former sovkhozes and kolkhozes) have their own specific development programs. But their implementation depends entirely on various government officials. Gaydar promised the agrarians a great deal at the end of last year. It will be disappointing if, with Yegor Timurovich's departure, his promises are forgotten.

"In principle this is not even about Gaydar. Before and during his time, attention paid to the agricultural producer has always been all talk, and unfortunately it will be the same after his time. Exorbitant credits, debts which the state is not paying off, the daunting prices of industrial goods. Was Gaydar able to change this situation? No.

"And anyway it is not Gaydar who is giving us a headache. He will not disappear... But the spring sowing is just around the corner. We need to have plenty of fuel and seed, we need equipment to be repaired... I am sorry, but 'Gaydars' come and go, whereas the grain has to be sown every year. Under any government."

Gaydar Resignation Creates Money Market 'Panic'

PM1901115994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Ivan Zhagel article: "Money Market Responds to Chief Monetarist's Departure With Panic"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It is obvious that the personnel changes in the government are the reason for the current panic in the money market. What has had most effect here is the voluntary resignation of Yegor Gaydar, who has personified the policy of tough financial stabilization. In this situation banks and other money market players have started actively buying up currency, simultaneously stretching the deadlines for the compulsory sale of 50 percent of their currency earnings in the hope of making a huge amount of money from an increase in the dollar rate. There is information that considerable resources are now also being transferred from the short-term state bond market to the currency market.

It is important to note another aspect. Since the beginning of the year nine auctions have already taken place at the Moscow exchange, at which over $1 billion has been sold. Around 1.5 trillion rubles was needed in order to pay for it. The latter figure throws doubt on the argument of advocates of state support for enterprises that the Russian economy needs additional injections of credit. As we can see, enterprises and banks do have money. How these resources are utilized is another question.

I think the current situation in the currency market is giving monetarists some points in their long-standing dispute with supporters of state regulation. This situation unambiguously says that money will not be channeled into a structural reorganization of industry until it becomes possible to achieve financial stabilization,.

At any rate, it is not clear how those who are fighting for additional injections of credit and those who are now acquiring decisive influence in the Russian Government can respond. It would be a great pity if they bank on tight control over the exchange rate and on abandoning market mechanisms of regulating the currency market. This would be not just a step back but effectively the abandonment of reforms.

Two Options Seen for Reformers Following Gaydar

PM1901151594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 1

["Commentary" by Andrey Vladimirov: "Two Tactics for the Reformers. To Remain in Government or Go Into Constructive Opposition?"]

[Text] Whatever the end of the "rotation" of cadres saga which began as a result of Yegor Gaydar's resignation statement Sunday, the very fact of this "incident" already speaks volumes. It feels like a new revolt or coup, or Zhirinovskiy's final victory at some future elections, has just been announced. And this is despite the fact that, even without Gaydar, the government managed to maintain its reformist course in the first nine months of last year. But now is not September 1993 but January 1994.

Last fall it seemed that the market coordinates had finally been plotted and that the government's policy had been entirely formalized in this sense. The elections in December 1993 confirmed the forecast of virtually all sober analysts that opposition in society could not be eliminated through coercive methods and the situation of September-October 1993 would be repeated more than once according to the same pattern. And therefore it would be just as difficult to carry out a liberal economic policy as before the October events and the elections. As it turns out, it is even harder.

Can it be that Gaydar, whose intellect is equal to the sum of all three presidential analytical centers now undergoing reform, did not realise this? Can it be that his resignation was predetermined even before the December elections?

Let us suppose that Gaydar will stay in the government, or return to it. What will this change? It is extremely difficult to carry out a liberal economic policy today given the present composition of the government. The combination of Gaydar, Zaveryukha, Soskovets, and Chubays produces, in Yegor Timurovich's own words, "an indeterminate state." Economically irresponsible decisions—for which, as always, no one knows who answers—brought about the "breakdown" of this politician, dubbed in journalists' circles "the Iron Winnie the Pooh." Even "iron" politicians have emotions.

It is quite another matter that the presence of Gaydar in the government, given his entirely understandable unwillingness to take responsibility for inflationary decisions, in itself might have become a factor maintaining the reformist line in a more or less acceptable form. But Gaydar is going to the Duma. And here there is an element not only of emotions but normal political tactics. However, will the economic price of this tactic—a budget deficit—not be too high? And has not too high a price for the elections already been paid in a political sense?

As Gaydar himself once remarked, a government of like-minded individuals is a rare phenomenon. Such a government arises in specific situations, such as, for example, the situation of November 1991. Is not Gaydar preparing to return to the government in precisely such a situation—but to a homogeneous rather than a coalition government?

There are two fundamentally different tactics for the reformers. The first is to remain in the government and carry out their promises: 5-7 percent inflation by the end of the year, financial stabilization, ensuring a favorable climate for investments, slowing the production slump and gradually boosting production—but not by printing money.

Taking account of the emerging composition of the government, the hints of a soft reorientation of economic policy, and the gamble of the cabinet's conservative wing on economic populism, the reformers cannot be confident that it will be possible to fulfill this program. Naturally, they have no desire to share responsibility for economic failures with the proinflationists. Which means that they have to leave the government—that is the second tactical option. And not simply leave, but become parliamentary oppositionists and criticize expenditure decisions, pumping money into production sectors, growing hyperinflation, and other such socialist "measures" that will inevitably follow their resignations.

No one knows how events will develop. Which of the reformers will remain "hostages" in the government is also not yet clear. It cannot be ruled out that the logic of reforms will again return key reformers to Chernomyrdin's cabinet, as happened in 1993.

In the final analysis, it is too early to speak about a reorientation of the policy and the views of the incumbent premier—after Yeltsin the second most notable political figure of the past year. It also cannot be ruled out that another team of reformers will take over the executive levers—we all know which team I am talking about.

Complex political horse-trading lies ahead. All the same, the last word will probably belong to the president.

Security Council Discusses Hardware Development

Agenda for Meeting Previewed

LD1801162194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1454 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] INTERFAX has learned that a session of the RF [Russian Federation] Security Council to be chaired by Russian President Boris Yeltsin is to be held on Wednesday, January 19. Well-informed sources assert that the agenda will include several issues related to the development of Russia's military doctrine confirmed by the Security Council last November. In particular, it is to consider several military-technical aspects of the doctrine.

This document contains a model of the defensive-industrial complex activity under the system of market relations. Competitive development of arms proclaimed by the doctrine must rule out harmful parallelism in creation and development of various kinds of armaments and to provide for rational spending of allocated funds.

High quality of the Russian army's military equipment should enjoy priority. The document stresses that military equipment of the Russian army should obligatorily correspond to world standards.

The session to be held behind closed doors is to consider several issues regarding recent reshuffles in the supreme echelons of power.

Council Maps Out 'Principles'

LD1901124994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1222 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—A meeting of the Russian Security Council was held in the Kremlin today under the chairmanship of President Boris Yeltsin. In light of the "Basic Principles of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", the council discussed programmes for developing and producing perspective types of armaments and military hardware. The Security Council mapped out the key directions and principles on which this work is to be organised. The implementation of these programmes will allow Russia to keep the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at the necessary and sufficient level, to guarantee Russia's dependable security by rationally using the country's scientific, technological, defence, and industrial potential with the optimal expenditure of forces and resources.

The president of the Russian Federation issued concrete instructions to implement the decisions adopted by the Security Council, the press service of the Russian president reported today.

Fedorov 'Not Invited' to Meeting

LD1901103194 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] A meeting of the Russian Security Council, chaired by Boris Yeltsin, is today discussing a program for development and production of new armaments and military hardware.

Observers note that not all the members of the Security Council are attending the meeting. Those absent are Defense Minister pavel Grachev, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, as well as Yegor Gaydar and Finance Minister Boris Fedorov.

Interfax reports that Fedorov arrived for the meeting, but, having learned he was not invited, left again. He told journalists in an interview that he had not expected such a development.

Council Procedures Reported

LD1901124394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1218 GMT 19 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—A regular meeting of the Russian Security Council was held in the Kremlin here today under the chairmanship of President Boris Yeltsin.

The agenda of the meeting, the first this year, included only one item: "On the programme for developing and producing perspective types of armaments and military hardware".

Reports on this subject were delivered by Andrey Kokoshin, first deputy defence minister of the Russian Federation, Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the Russian State Committee for Defence Sectors of Industry, and Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister for atomic energy.

The meeting was attended by Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Government, Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council, and other council members. Taking part in the meeting also were Oleg Soskovets, first vice-premier, and Yuriy Baturin, presidential assistant for national security, who was appointed to this post early this January. The latter two, are not members of the Security Council.

Absent from the meeting were such members of the Security Council as Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, and also Yegor Gaydar. As to Vice-Premier Boris Fedorov, he came to the Kremlin in the morning, but unexpectedly left it before the meeting began.

A statement on the results of the meeting is expected to be released by the presidential press service later in the day.

First Meeting Viewed

LD1801164294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1433 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 18 ITAR-TASS—The first meeting of the Inter-Departmental Commission of the Russian Security Council, formed by presidential decree, was held here today.

The meeting of the commission, headed by Deputy Interior Minister of the Russian Federation Aleksandr Kulikov, has discussed problems linked with the elaboration of a public security concept. It also endorsed the commission's procedural rules and working plan, envisaging the study of such problems as political extremism, migration of the population, and Russia's hot spots.

Taking part in the meeting were representatives of the Procurator-General's office, Justice Ministry, Defence Ministry, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Social Protection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Migration Service, and other federal executive bodies.

The public security commission is faced with the task of determining the priorities of state policy and drawing up proposals for the Russian Security Council on ways to ensure the vitally important interests of the Russian society, human rights, as well as forecasting events and preparing recommendations to prevent inter-ethnic and social conflicts, political extremism, and various emergency situations.

Yeltsin's Work Schedule Undergoes Changes

LD1801144494 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] INTERFAX has learned that Boris Yeltsin's work schedule for the next few days has undergone some changes. In particular, it is expected that tomorrow the president will have a meeting with Chairman of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko. The head of state will have a meeting with Chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin on 20 January. Next week Boris Yeltsin is to visit St. Petersburg where the president will take part in the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the full liberation of the city from the blockade. In connection with this, the Russian president's visit to Kyrgyzstan, scheduled to take place some time between 20 and 29 January has been postponed.

Poltoranin Says Chernomyrdin Should Resign

LD1901140994 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1330 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Mikhail Poltoranin, deputy for the Russia's Choice bloc, believes that the best way out of the current situation in the top echelons of power, which he described as a deadlock, would be the resignation of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. He said this while talking to journalists today in the lobby of the lower house of parliament.

Democratic Russia Movement To Oppose Government

LD1801133494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1305 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—The leaders of the Democratic Russia movement declared that they are moving across to the antigovernment camp. Following ultimatums on the membership of the government, the Coordinating Council of Democratic Russia announced today that it will act "as an opponent to the course of the government headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin."

The statement says that Russia is leaving the course of reform. The leaders of Democratic Russia believe that this is borne out by Yegor Gaydar's refusal to join the new government. "Gaydar's departure is in line with events and confirms the general tendency toward curtailing the course of reform in the country," the statement says.

The leaders of Democratic Russia are threatening to organize statements in the press, and also to hold mass acts of protest against the government's policies. The first meeting of Moscow's public has been set by the leaders of Democratic Russia for 22 January.

Directive on Implementation of Reorganization

PM1801151594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Russian Federation Government Directive no. 43-r, dated Moscow, 13 January 1994, and signed by V. Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the Russian Federation Government]

[Text] In order to implement the Russian Federation president's edict No. 66 of 10 January 1994 "On the Structure of the Federal Organs of Executive Power":

1. The deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation, in accordance with their duties, will within one week:

confirm the chairmen and compositions of the commissions responsible for winding up the federal organs of executive power which are due to be abolished;

submit proposals on the transfer of the functions of the federal organs of executive power due to be abolished and not mentioned in Point 6 of the Russian Federation president's edict No. 66 of 10 January 1994 "On the Structure of the Federal Organs of Executive Power."

2. It is prescribed that the term of work of the winding-up commissions shall run through 10 April 1994.

The chairmen of the winding-up commissions:

will, within one week and in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, confirm the estimate of expenditure on the implementation of winding-up measures;

will, within the prescribed time, ensure the fulfillment of all the measures connected with the abolition of the federal organs of executive power and submit to the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance a report on the use of the budget appropriations allocated for the implementation of the winding-up measures;

will, within one week and in accordance with current legislation, give notice of impending dismissal to workers of the federal organs of executive power which are due to be abolished;

and will adopt the necessary measures to find employment for workers who are being made redundant, ensuring for state employees the guarantees envisaged by current legislation.

3. It is prescribed that, until the completion of all the organizational measures pertaining to the abolition and reorganization of the federal organs of executive power, the leaders and other officials of these organs will continue to exercise their previously assigned functions and be accountable for the state of affairs in the spheres of administration assigned to those organs.

4. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property will, before 1 February 1994, submit to the Government of the Russian Federation proposals on the use of the property of the federal organs of executive power which are due to be abolished and also on the allocation of premises to the reorganized and newly-formed federal organs of executive power.

5. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor and with the participation of the federal organs of executive power will, before 1 February 1994, submit to the Russian Federation Government proposals on the maximum number of workers of the central apparatuses of the federal organs of executive power, on the wages fund, and on other conditions for supporting the activity of these organs and their workers.

6. The leaders of the newly formed and reorganized federal organs of executive power will, within one month, submit to the Russian Federation Government draft proposals on these organs. The leaders of other federal organs of executive power will prepare proposals on making the necessary amendments to the statutes on the corresponding organs arising from the redistribution of functions as envisaged by the Russian Federation president's edict No. 66 of 10 January 1994 "On the Structure of the Federal Organs of Executive Power."

7. The Russian Federation Ministry of Justice will, before 1 February 1994, submit to the Russian Federation Government the following proposals:

on amendments to legislative acts of the Russian Federation arising from the Russian Federation president's edict No. 66 of 10 January "On the Structure of the Federal Organs of Executive Power";

on bringing the decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation into line with the aforementioned edict of the president of the Russian Federation.

[signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

Yeltsin Removes Kuznetsov From Novgorod Post

LD1801172194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1449 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—Anatoliy Kuznetsov has been removed from post of presidential representative in the Novgorod region due to the results of his certification (Item 2, Article 33 of the Russian Labor Code), the presidential press service reports.

Federal Assembly

Post Created for Presidential Representative

LD1801143794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1417 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—A decree of Russian President Boris Yeltsin introduced today a post of presidential representative in the Federal Assembly, parliament, the presidential press service reports.

The decree does not specify the person to occupy the post.

Federation Council Approves Creation of 10 Committees

LD1401220094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] The Federation Council has approved 10 committees which to work within the framework of the parliament upper house. They include the committee for matters concerning the Federation, the federal treaty and regional policy; for constitutional legislation and judicial and legal issues; for budget, taxation, financial, currency, credit and customs regulation; for monetary emission; committees for economic reform, ownership and property; for CIS affairs; for international affairs; for security and defence; for social policies; as well as committees for agrarian policies and for science, culture and education. Also created was the temporary commission for parliamentary procedure and time limit.

Heads of Six Committees Elected

LD1501142894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1424 GMT 15 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 15 TASS—Chairmen of six committees of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament, were elected here today.

Isak Kostoyev was elected chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Legislation and Legal Issues, Vitaliy Zelenkin was elected chairman of the Committee for Economic Reform, Vadim Gustov was elected chairman of the Committee for International Affairs, Yevgeniy Stroyev was elected chairman of the Committee for Science and Culture and Galina Karelova was elected chairman of the Committee for Social Policy.

Heads of the rest four committees will be elected at the next Federation Council meeting.

The Federation Council session goes on. It is likely to end today.

Deputy Chairman on Federation Council's Independence

LD1401232494 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev] The press is starting to say that this chamber [the Federation Council] may become tame and end up in the president's pocket. Are you not apprehensive about that possibility?

[Valeryan Viktorov, Federation Council deputy chairman] Oh no, I am not apprehensive. You must have noticed that we have very independently-minded people sitting in this hall, and I believe it would be difficult to put them in someone's pocket. For instance, the head of our chamber is Vladimir Filippovich Shumeyko, who is also a very independent person. He will not blindly follow instructions, be it from the president or from the head of our government, but on the other hand I am absolutely convinced that he will not enter into unnecessary confrontation between the president and the government.

Chernomyrdin Meets Federation Council Deputies

LD1401210594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] At a meeting with a group of Federation Council deputies, leaders of regional executive bodies, held on Friday [14 January] in Moscow, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin declared that the presidential decree on personal appointments to the composition of the country's government under re-organization would be made public next Tuesday, one of the parliamentarians who participated in the meeting and who asked not to be named told Interfax.

According to well informed sources, the draft document is almost ready. The source believes that Chernomyrdin has recommended the president to confirm Oleg Soskovets and Yegor Gaydar as first vice premiers. The decision concerning candidates for vice premierships is expected to be adopted on Monday.

Shumeyko Telephones Rybkin

LD1501094094 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 15 Jan 94

[Text] Both chambers of the Russian Federation Assembly will work in harmony and in close cooperation. This was stated today at the morning session of the Federation Council by its Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko. He said that this morning he had a telephone conversation with Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the State Duma. The deputies of the upper chamber sent a telegram to the chairman of the State Duma congratulating him on his election, the Russian Information Agency reports.

At today's session of the Federation Council the deputies will continue to form the committees which yesterday's session decided to set up. The upper chamber of the Russian parliament will have 10 committees.

Pledges To Prevent Split in Federation Council

PM1701154394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Report by ITAR-TASS observer Lyudmila Aleksandrova under the general heading "Speakers Elected": "In the Federation Council"]

[Text] The upper chamber of the new Russian parliament—the Federation Council—has finally acquired a chairman. As expected, he is First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko.

True, the intended plan somewhat "misfired": Vladimir Shumeyko was one vote short in the first ballot, and a whole five votes short in the second (the minimum necessary being 86 votes). In the second round he was only two votes ahead of his main rival Petr Romanov. According to observers, this stance by some Federation Council members who refused to support Vladimir Shumeyko was largely due to the fact that he is viewed by many, if not exactly as "the president's man," at least as a representative of the president's team who is called upon to fulfill the will of the head of state, imposing it on parliament.

Nevertheless, in the course of last night the attitude of some Federation Council members changed sufficiently to allow the first vice premier to muster even more votes than necessary—98.

From the very beginning the newly elected chairman drew an implied distinction between the Federation Council and the State Duma, hinting that the upper chamber should positively differ from the lower when it comes to constructive approach and the absence of political confrontation. In particular he highlighted the fact that he would not permit any "lobby intrigues" or split in the upper chamber. For this purpose Vladimir Shumeyko asked for a time-out until the following morning in order to carry out consultations before the election of deputy speakers. In his words, preliminary discussion of the candidates is needed so that the vote should not lead to a split in the chamber and political polarization. He refused to tell journalists the names of possible candidates for the posts of his deputies, but obliquely intimated that one of them should be a representative of the Communists or their sympathizers.

Of special interest is the concept of possible relations with the State Duma as voiced by the chairman of the upper chamber. All the signs suggest that the president's team has already "rehearsed" the scenario of actions in the event of nonconstructive forces ultimately gaining the upper hand in the Duma. At any rate Vladimir Shumeyko stated literally the following: Under the Constitution, the Federation Council as an organ and its individual members possess legislative initiative. The same goes for members of the State Duma. And "in an extreme case," he went on, it will be possible "in cooperation with Duma deputies, who really desire to do something, to elaborate legislative acts in joint committees and commissions and adopt them straightaway right here."

Briefs Press

PM1701132994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "Vladimir Shumeyko: Intrigues Will Be Excluded"]

[Text] Vladimir Shumeyko has given his first press conference as chairman of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly Federation Council.

Replying to journalists' questions, the speaker of the upper house called the situation which had arisen during the ballot "routine teething troubles." In his opinion, they were due to the fact that, on the one hand, members of the Federation Council did not want to bring matters to the point of confrontation, but, on the other hand, there are people among them with different, at times diametrically opposed, political views. The speaker stated that he would seek to exclude various lobby intrigues from the Federation Council.

Vladimir Shumeyko also dwelt on the question of relations between the upper house and the State Duma, in particular, in the event that the lower house adopts, for whatever reasons, an unconstructive stance. He recalled that, under the Constitution, in addition to the president, the government, and State Duma deputies, the Federation Council as a whole and individual members of the Federation Council also possess legislative initiative. In that case, he stressed, it is possible, in cooperation with Duma deputies who really desire to do something, to elaborate legislative acts in joint committees and commissions and adopt them straightaway right here. Vladimir Shumeyko clarified that he was talking of "an extreme case" and "bitter necessity."

Federation Council Ends First Meeting

LD1501165094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1601 GMT 15 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 15 TASS—The first meeting of the Russian Federation Council, the upper parliament chamber, ended here today after a five-day work.

The deputies have elected the council chairman and his two deputies, decided to form ten parliament committees, approved their structure and elected chairmen of six committees. Regulations on maintenance of Federation Council deputies and other documents were adopted.

The next meeting of the Federation Council will be held on January 31.

Kalmyk President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov told ITAR-TASS the first meeting of the Federation Council was calm and businesslike. "There is no hysteria, confrontation or sharp division between the center and region, administration heads and other deputies as some had predicted," he stressed.

The president denounced attempts to oppose the State Duma to the Federation Council. The more they try to separate the Federation Council from the State Duma and present it as pro-presidential, the more negative reaction of the Federal Council members they will provoke, he noted.

Federation Council member Boris Nemtsov told ITAR-TASS the newly- elected leaders of the upper chamber "quite correspond to the level of authority given to the Federation Council by the Constitution". The Nizhni

Novgorod administration head shared fears the Federation Council may become a pocket pro-presidential body.

"If the Federation Council chairman is a wise man he will try to get rid of this image in the near future," he added. In the opinion of Nemtsov, the upper chamber should form the 1994 budget, monitor the implementation of the federal treaty and complete the formation of constitutional, arbitration and supreme courts in the immediate future.

Opposition-minded member of the upper chamber Aman Tuleyev told ITAR-TASS "approximately 60 per cent of Federation Council members vote to a command and some 40 per cent have their own opinion". But "there will be less differences when the Federation Council starts to discuss specific economic and legislative issues, the common sense will win," he added.

New Deputy Speaker Calls To Defend Federation's Regions

LD1801070194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0640 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentina Ivanova]

[Text] Cheboksary, January 18 (TASS)—The newly elected deputy speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Parliament, Velerian Viktorov, former head of the government of Chuvashia, said in an interview with ITAR-TASS that he intends to defend the interests of Russian regions.

He pointed out that it is necessary to pay attention to equal development of all regions of the Russian Federation, and primarily, to the creation of a legal basis adequate to economic reform to enable it to go ahead. Viktorov is against radical changes and welcomes an evolutional development of society.

According to preliminary reports, Viktorov will be in charge of economic issues in the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament. He came out in support of principally new relations expected to be established between the centre and the subjects of the federation in the second quarter of 1994 when regions begin to contribute a definite amount to the federal budget, spending the remaining funds on their own needs.

Rybkin Comments on Role as Chairman of Duma

LD1401174994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1645 GMT 14 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Jan—"The chairman of the State Duma absorbs the opinions of all the deputies and no proposal made by a deputy should be left unnoticed," Ivan Rybkin, the chairman of the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly, stated today at a news conference. "The speaker should rise above his party allegiance, otherwise he is simply not ready to occupy this post," he added.

In Rybkin's opinion, the chairman of the Duma should organize the work of the lower chamber in such a way as ensure that the most topical problems receive sufficient legislative support. He believes that our legislation does not keep pace with life.

The speaker of the Duma said that putting our economic legislation in line with realities of life should become its priority task. He also stressed that it is necessary to study proposals prepared by the Commission for Legislative Proposals attached to the Russian President. "It made many valuable proposals," believes Ivan Rybkin. Apart from that, the chairman of the Duma sees its task in solving the question of the state financing of the parties via their factions in the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly, as well as maintaining interaction with those parties whose representatives were not elected to the parliament.

"The main committees of the Duma should be formed in proportion to factions' numbers," believes Rybkin. At the same time, he noted that "leaders of the deputies' associations today are unlikely to agree to act as heads of the committees because they already have enough organizational work to do in the factions and deputies' associations."

Speaking about the economic reform in the country, Ivan Rybkin stressed that they need some corrections. "We should be searching for more intelligent solutions that suit the Russian realities," he believes.

To Distance Himself From Parties

LD1401215894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] Using his constitutional authorities, the State Duma speaker must "accumulate the opinions of all deputies" and "should distance himself from all political parties and movements." Ivan Rybkin, Speaker of the Federal Assembly's lower chamber, expressed this position at his first press conference on Friday. He said he "opposes any coercive methods to solve problems."

When asked about his party activity in Volgograd, he recalled that 4 out of the 30 years of his service was spent engaged in party work and before that he headed a chair at the institute.

In his opinion, the State Duma must focus its attention on a package of economic decrees because legislative activity in this sphere "is far behind the real life."

He believes that "there is much of value" in the plan of legislative activity prepared by the presidential commission on legislative proposals.

The State Duma speaker must, to quote Rybkin, cooperate with all public organizations and parties, including those which have appeared outside the parliament. At the same time he stressed the necessity to cooperate with the president and government.

Rybkin expressed hope that along with extreme factions "a center will inevitably appear" in the parliament on the basis of the greater part of the Agrarian party faction, deputies of the Civic Union who were elected in one-mandate districts, and representatives of industrial regions and districts.

At the same time analysis of pre-election programs demonstrates that representatives of all blocs understand "the price of reforms" which the citizens have to pay, that "this should be lowered and we must look for cleverer decisions."

Responding to a question regarding his bad habits, the 47- year old speaker reported that he gave up smoking in 1975, although "he started to smoke earlier than he began to walk." In his words, he is almost a tee-totaller, enjoying just a glass of champagne at New Year. He likes to be busy with his car as he knows it very well as an engineer-mechanic. He has driven for 30 years and prefers a "fast ride with a tail wind."

Shokhin Warns Opponents May Make State Duma Useless

LD1401215294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1705 GMT 14 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—"The major threat to the State Duma is the State Duma itself," Vice-Premier Aleksandr Shokhin told correspondents here today.

He said the Russian Constitution requires two thirds of votes to adopt a law. According to the Fundamental Law, regular laws should be adopted by the majority of State Duma deputies, which is 223 Duma members in its current composition.

A law can be returned for improvement if the upper parliament chamber does not approve it or the law is vetoed by the president. The veto can be annulled by only two thirds of votes. Thus, the deputies should learn to overcome faction differences.

"The State Duma may be turned by the opponents into a useless body, and the constitution carries a mechanism of its dissolution," said the vice-premier.

He is sure the lower parliament chamber should turn into a "normal efficient body and abandon extremism". Cold War elements evident in the very second day of Duma functioning should be stopped. "If the Duma manages to overcome faction ambitions and learns to predict behavior of the upper chamber, it will be able to influence the legislative power," he stressed.

Shokhin stated with regret some factions did not manage to protect interests of the Duma minority. A proposal to organize 20- deputy factions was voted down. The vice-premier expressed the assurance the more independent territorial deputy groups are formed they would be considered potentially conciliatory mechanisms.

In the opinion of the vice-premier, some small factions have agreed with large ones on certain distribution of posts in the lower chamber. "This cannot be viewed as a mere expression of will, it is rather a normal parliamentary agreement between factions. It is a good lesson to other parties in the ability to reach an agreement," said Shokhin.

Travkin Calls For Duma To Stabilize Society

LD1401154094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1512 GMT 14 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—The potential for self-organisation of the State Duma is much higher than that of the previous parliament. The Duma has already shown effectiveness by electing speaker, Nikolay Travkin, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, said at a news conference on Friday.

Travkin believes the Duma can have a stabilising effect on society.

He said his party has not entered and is not going to enter any blocs, but members of the Democratic Party would be gratified if their interests coincide with those of other factions.

Travkin said the Democratic Party objects to possible construction of a new parliament building, believing that this would only discredit the new legistative body.

He added that a regular congress of the Democratic Party of Russia will be held on February 18-19. He said the purpose of the congress is to make the party less amorphous and impart to it a more rigid structure.

LDPR To Seek Foreign Affairs Committee Head for Zhirinovskiy

LD1401205994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1911 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] The LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] will battle for the post of head of the Foreign Relations Committee to be given to its leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Deputy party Chairman Stanislav Zhebrovskiy told Interfax.

In the meantime, Speaker-Elect of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin speaking late on Friday [14 January] described Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin as the only candidate professionally fit to take the post. Shokhin belongs to the Party of Russian Unity and Concord.

At the same time, the Speaker called for committees to be formed on a proportional basis so that none of the factions remained unrepresented.

The Russia's Choice Party [RC] will not allow extremists from the Zhirinovskiy-led faction to take control of the key committees, and above all, the foreign relations committee, RC spokesman Kirill Ignatyev told Interfax. He said Zhirinovskiy's chairmanship of the committee would mean instability and probably war to Russia.

The faction will stick to its position in talks with other groups, Ignatyev said. Leaders of the parliamentary factions and Rybkin-led New Regional Policy group are due to meet at 14:00 on Saturday to discuss the sharing of committees among them.

Further on Zhirinovskiy Aims

LD1501115894 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 15 Jan 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] faction in the State Duma has nominated four of its representatives for the posts parliamentary committee chairmen. It also aspires for the posts of deputy chairmen of 12 committees. This has become known to Interfax from sources in the provisional secretariat of the Duma. In particular, LDPR Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy intends to chair the committee for international affairs.

State Duma Announces Recess Until 17 Jan

LD1401174394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1610 GMT 14 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Jan—Deputies in the State Duma have adopted a decision to hold a recess in the sessions of the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly until 17 January.

Opening the evening session, Ivan Rybkin, the elected chairman of the State Duma, said that he believed the Duma's main task was "to finish structuring itself and begin lawmaking work."

Boris Zolotukhin, who spoke next, informed the people's deputies of a coordinated decision by leaders of deputies' associations to hold a recess in the plenary sessions of the Duma to allow for the work of factions and deputies' groups. During the recess "the nominations for and the number of Duma deputy chairmen are to be agreed upon, as well as the nominations for the posts of heads of State Duma committees."

The composition of the Duma Credentials Commission was also approved before the recess. The commission must now elect its own head.

Parliamentary Factions Agree on Structural Principals

LD1601181894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1605 GMT 16 Jan 94

[Text] Speaker of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin and leaders of the parliamentary factions ended five hours of intensive talks on Saturday [15 January] by reaching agreement on the shape of the lower house of Russia's new parliament.

Speaking afterwards, Rybkin said all factions had agreed to his proposal for a Russia's Choice candidate to become his First Deputy and the RC is expected to inform him about its choice by 11:00 on Sunday.

Four other Deputies to be elected from the LDP, Women of Russia, Communists and the New Regional Policy alliance are yet to be named.

It was also agreed that the Duma council would compromise all faction leaders, each of them having one vote, as well the Speaker and his Deputies, Rybkin said. Heads of the parliamentary committees may also attend council meetings.

There will be as many as 21 committees but the dispute is over the four main committees: international affairs, defence, security and economics, Rybkin said. He hopes that some sort of compromise can be struck as the factions meet on Sunday.

The Speaker believes that the two chambers of the Federal Assembly must work in the same building but "once this did not happen", they will have to stay put at their present locations rather than spend time and energy to reverse things.

Rybkin has also called for a single staff to the Federal Assembly. But once the Federation Council has created its own staff, the Duma will have to follow suit, he said.

For his part, Democratic Party leader Nikolai Travkin said there was no objection to the candidacy of Mikhail Mityukov as First Deputy Speaker.

In his words, the Communists and Women of Russia may nominate Valentin Kovalyev and Alevtina Fedulova for the posts of Deputy Speaker. The LDP may name either its leading member Viktor Kobeleyev or former Soviet Deputy Prime Minister in the Ryzhkov government Vladimir Gusyev.

However, it is not ruled out that the party may nominate Vladimir Zhirinovsky as its choice, Travkin said.

The DP leader says that if agreement is reached on electing the candidates in a package, this can be done within a day's work. Failing this, he said, the Speaker will hold a series of consultations with the representatives of each faction over the weekend.

The council of factions will meet at 12:45 on Monday to try to resolve the issue before the Duma goes into session at 14:00, Travkin said.

Russia's Choice Likely To Split Into Two Factions

LD1601174094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1602 GMT 16 Jan 94

[Text] The State Duma's Russia's Choice faction is likely to split up into two factions, this faction's secretary Sergey Yushenkov told journalists. He said that behind his faction's decisions was the wish to secure an additional vote in the State Duma, not inner rifts. The principle of forming up the State Duma's Council were preliminarily discussed by the leaders of the parliamentary factions and State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin on Saturday.

The Council is to consist of the speaker and his deputies, and the faction leaders. Each faction will have one vote irrespective of its membership.

The State Duma's biggest faction Russia's Choice has 76 members. The minimal number of members required for the registration of a faction is 35. Some of the Russia's Choice members believe therefore that Russia's Choice centrist and more radical members may form up two independent factions, said Yushenkov.

It is not ruled out that some of this faction's embers will join the Union of December 12 faction, led by Moscow's Vice Mayor Alexander Braginsky and entrepreneurs Irina Khakamada and Viktor Bushmin. This group has only 23 members for the moment and needs a replenishment of 12 members to get registered.

State Duma Continues Work 17 Jan

LD1701091294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0802 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 17 TASS— The State Duma will continue its work today. Its session will begin at 14.00. The lower chamber of the Russian parliament is expected to discuss issues dealing with the election of deputy chairmen of the Duma and heads of parliamentary committees.

Last Saturday those issues were tentatively discussed at a conference of chairman of the State Duma Ivan Rybkin and heads of parliamentary groups, held behind closed doors.

The planned number of deputy chairmen and the names of candidates to those posts remain a secret. The names of candidates to the posts of heads of parliamentary committees (there are going to be 18 of them) are not known either.

In the opinion of observers, the main struggle will develop over the posts of heads of the committees on international affairs, defence and security.

LDPR Will Not Receive Key Positions on Duma Commissions

LD1701125994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1245 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—The Liberal Democratic Party [LDPR] of nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy will not get key positions in the State Duma and Zhirinovskiy himself will not head the Foreign Affairs Commission which he planned to do, according to Kirill Ignatyev, a member of the Russia's Choice bloc.

He told reporters on Monday [17 January] that all factions, including the LDPR, had agreed that Zhirinovsly's people will not head the commissions on foreign affairs, on defence and security, on federation affairs and the budget.

In response Zhirinovskiy proposed to create a special commission for him which would deal with geopolitical issues, according to Ignatyev.

"We could not react to it in any other way than with sarcasm", he added.

Zhirinovskiy 'Blocked' in Nominations

AU1701171394 Paris AFP in English 1629 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (AFP)—Russian parliamentary leaders have blocked ultra-nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy from heading the influential foreign affairs commission, a position which he had wanted, handing him instead the chairmanship of a newly- created "geopolitical" commission. It was not immediately clear what the geopolitical commission would do.

Zhirinovskiy and fellow members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who took the second largest number of seats in the lower house of parliament, also failed to get the key security and defence parliamentary chairmanships.

The nominations for four deputy speakers of the State Duma—as the lower house is called—and heads of 21 parliamentary commissions, were released early Monday prior to voting on the appointments by the lower house of parliament later in the day.

The 444 State Duma lawmakers are due to vote on the key posts Monday evening. The nominations were published after discussion between the various parliamentary factions over the weekend.

Zhirinovskiy had said he hoped to be nominated to head the foreign affairs commission in the parliament. That commission chairmanship is expected to go instead to Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to Washington and a member of the reformist Yabloko party of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy.

Security is expected to go to communist Viktor Iliyukhin, formerly an official in the dissolved parliament, while the nomination for chairman of the defence commission went to a member of the reformist Russia's Choice grouping, who was not immediately named.

Zhirinovskiy's party did win some nominations. Viktor Kobeliyev, the party's number two, was proposed as one of the four deputy speakers in the Duma, whose speaker was earlier named as former communist and anti-reformer Ivan Rybkin.

LDP member Mikhail Lemeshev was nominated to head the parliamentary ecology commission. The ultra-nationalist party is the second largest in the Duma, with 70 deputies. Russia's Choice, which backs the government, has 96 and the communists have 65.

The post of first deputy speaker was expected to go to reformist Mikhail Mityukov, former head of the legislative committee of the dissolved parliament.

Alevtina Fedulova, head of the Women of Russia faction in parliament, was proposed for another deputy speaker's post. The nomination for the fourth deputy speaker's position was not immediately known.

Reformist candidates Mikhail Zadornov of Yabloko and Mikhail Poltoranin of Russia's Choice were respectively nominated to chair the budget and press freedom commissions.

Two members of deputy premier Sergey Shakray's centrist Party of Unity and Accord party were nominated—Constantin Zatulin to head the commission on relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States and Shakrai himself to head the regional policy commission. The legislative commission nomination went to communist Vladimir Issakov.

Monday evening's vote by the State Duma deputies will be on the nominations as a whole rather than individually.

The nomination announcements came after the resignation Sunday of Yegor Gaydar, first deputy premier and the architect of Russia's reforms. The resignation was accepted by President Boris Yeltsin earlier Monday.

Kept Off Chairmen List

AU1701173094 Paris AFP in English 1716 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, Jan 17 (AFP)—Communists and reformers of the Yabloko coalition will dominate key Russian parliamentary committees after a vote in the Duma on Monday [17 January] sidelined ultranationalists into less important technical groups.

Right-wing firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky was kept off the list of chairmen while one of his supporters was elected to head a specially established commission on geopolitical affairs.

The deputies approved by 290 to 63 votes with eight abstentions a package of positions that gave the key legislative, security, social and religious commissions to communists.

Reformists were elected to the vital budget and foreign affairs commissions while Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party took the commission for industry, transport energy and public works and a group that will look into natural resources.

Invents Own Duma Committee

LD1701211794 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Correspondent's report from State Duma; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Excerpts] The State Duma continued its work today. [passage omitted]

It is curious that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, probably thinking that he would not be appointed to head any key committee, has invented a new committee especially for himself: a committee for geopolitical matters.

Value of Votes in Duma To Depend on Deputies' Rank

LD1701105294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1007 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—Heads of factions of the Russian State Duma decided at their session today that each vote cast in the Duma will be assessed in points. A vote cast by the speaker will be estimated at five points, first deputy speaker - four points, a committee chairman - one point, a deputy committee chairman - 0.5 points. During vote-counting, every point will be considered equal to 7 deputies' votes.

The "Russia's Choice" bloc which received 11 points in the Duma council will have the best advantages. It is followed by the "New Regional Policy" faction which collected 9.5 points, the faction of the Liberal Democratic Party (9 points), the Agrarian Party (8 points) and other factions in hierarchy depending on the number of points they collected.

The council of the State Duma will consist of 15 members, including the speaker and deputy speakers, heads of factions and deputy groups, committees, chairmen of vote-counting and mandatory commissions and a human rights commissioner.

The "weightlifting categories" of factions and parliamentary groups are expected to play a decisive role when adopting draft bills.

Lower House To Have Five Deputy Speakers

LD1701145194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1419 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—Russian lower house speaker Ivan Rybkin will have five deputies, one of them will be first deputy, decided the lower house at its session on Monday [17 January].

Russia's Choice faction nominated Mikhail Mityukov for the post of first deputy speaker.

Mityukov headed the committee on legislation for a long time at the disbanded Russian parliament.

Later in the day, the lower chamber approved the temporary regulations of the lower house council to be set up for "the preliminary discussion of organisational decisions on the procedure of the chamber's activities".

The council includes speaker as well as leaders of parliamentary factions and groups. The speaker informs legislators of all decisions by the council at the nearest session of the chamber.

The chamber may abrogate any decision taken by the council which meets every week. Any member of the lower chamber has the right to attend the council's meetings.

Four Duma Deputy Speakers Elected

LD1701163194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1623 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow January 17 Tass—Noted Lawyer Mikhail Mityukov from the Russia'a Choice Bloc was elected Monday first deputy speaker of the State Duma.

Aleksandr Vengerovskiy from the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], Alevtina Fedulova from the "Women of Russia" bloc and Valentin Kovalev were elected deputy speakers.

One post of a deputy speaker remained vacant.

Mityukov chaired the commission on legislature in the former Russian parliament and was sacked by former Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov.

Speaking before the vote, Mityukov said he would work to ensure real parliamentarism in Russia. This can be achieved through an unconditional observance of the constitution and in close interaction with the president and the government, according to him.

Duma Committee Leaders Endorsed

LD1701221294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1956 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] The list of vice-speakers and Duma committee leaders, agreed with the Duma Council, which comprised the House Chairman and faction leaders, was endorsed on Monday in a single "package". 290 Duma members voted for the list 63 voted against and 8 members abstained from voting.

Most posts of committee chairmen (5) were secured by the Liberal Democratic faction (led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy). However, these committees—on work and social support, on environment, on industry, on natural resources, on agriculture, and on geopolitics—are not the key committees. As Arkady Murashev, a leader of "Russia's Choice" has explained to INTERFAX, the Committee on Geopolitics was set up specially for the liberal democrats so that Zhirinovskiy would not claim the post of Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

"Russia's Choice" takes over 4 committees, including that on defence to be led by the faction's Executive Secretary Sergey Yushenkkov, earlier the First Assistant to the Federal Information Center's President. The former information center's chief Mikhail Poltoranin is in charge of the Information Policy and Communication Committee. Besides, the "Russia's Choice" controls the Committee on Health and the Committee on Duma Management.

The "New Regional Policy" faction is responsible for 3 committees—on education, on property, privatization, and economic activity, and on ethnic affairs.

The Agrarian party gets two parliamentary committees—on agriculture and legislation and on a judicial reform. The latter structure is led by Vladimir Isakov, an opposition leader in the dissolved Supreme Soviet.

Communists control the Committee on Security and on Public and Religious Organizations. This body is led by Victor Ilyukhin, sacked from the Procurator General's Office in 1991 after starting a legal case against Mikhail Gorbachev (the then USSR President) on treason charges. During the rebellion in Moscow in October, Ilyukhin was in the White House through October 4.

The Unity and Concord Party takes three committees—on CIS affairs and contacts with compatriots (led by Kostantin Zatulin), on Federation affairs, and on local self-government. The Committee on Local Self-Government is headed by Anatoliy Sliva, a deputy chief of the president's legal department.

The "Apple" faction controls committees on budgets, taxes, banks, finances (led by Mikhail Zadornov) and on international affairs. The Chairman of the International Affairs Committee is Vladimir Lukin, Russia's former Ambassador to U.S., who before his departure for Washington led a similar committee in the previous Russian parliament.

A legislator from Russia's Democratic Party Sergey Glazyev, the former Minister on Foreign Economic Ties chairs the Economic Policy Committee.

A representative of the faction of "Russia's Women" leads the Committee on the Affairs of Women, Family, and Youth.

The posts of vice-chairmen of committees were distributed this way: six went to "New Regional Policy", five to "Russia's Choice", four to the Democratic Party, and the Unity and Concord Party, "Apple", the Communist and Agrarian Parties got two posts each.

State Duma Appointments; Communist Heads Security Committee

LD1701170694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1630 GMT 17 Jan 94

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, 17 Jan—Communist Party representative Viktor Ilyukhin, who at one time tried to get Mikhail Gorbachev prosecuted for "betrayal of the motherland," was elected chairman of the State Duma Security Committee today.

Another key parliamentary post, that of chairman of the Defense Committee, went to Sergey Yushenkov of Russia's Choice.

There will be 23 committees in the Duma in all. Vladimir Isakov from the Agrarian Party has been elected chairman of the Committee on Legislative and Judicial Reform. In the last parliament he was one of the main opponents of presidential policy.

The Committee on the Budget, Taxation, Banking and Finance is headed by Mikhail Zadornov from the Yabloko bloc. Sergey Glazyev, who was recently forced to quit the post of minister for foreign economic relations, is chairman of the Committee for Economic Policy. He now represents the Democratic Party.

Vladimir Lukin, former Russian ambassador to the United States, from the Yabloko bloc, has become chairman of the Committee for International Affairs.

State Duma Refuses To Discuss Amnesty for Coups

LD1701125194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1221 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—The Russian State Duma, the lower house of the parliament, turned down by a narrow margin on Monday [17 January] the proposal to include into the agenda the issue of an amnesty for organisers of the 1991 Soviet abortive coup and of the armed opposition revolt in Moscow in October 1993.

The proposal, made by lawmaker Vasiliy Lipitskiy, was supported by 205 votes and lacked just 18 votes for approval.

Duma Approves Procedures for Election of Speaker, Deputies

LD1701205894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1956 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] The State Duma has approved temporary regulations defining the procedure for electing the speaker, deputy speakers and their powers.

According to the regulations, the parliament elects one first deputy speaker and four deputy speakers.

The Duma Council consists of the parliamentary speaker and the heads of the parliamentary factions and deputies' groups. The council outlines a program for the session's work, a one-month timetable for consideration of issues included in the agenda and sends draft laws and resolutions to parliamentary committees.

The chairman of the chamber informs the deputies of all decisions made by the council. The State Duma may annul any decision made by the council. The Duma Council holds daily sessions. Any deputy of the State Duma is entitled to attend to the council's meetings.

Proposed Duma Rules Amendment Targets Zhirinovskiy

LD1701222494 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2020 GMT 17 Jan 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Russia's Choice faction in the State Duma intends to submit to deputies the following amendment to the provisional standing orders:

A deputy who undermines the dignity of the State Duma through his speeches or actions will—by the decision of the chamber—be banned from participating in 10 of its sittings.

The faction has made this decision because on 13 January Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, used his speech from the podium to insult and directly threaten deputies.

The Russia's Choice amendment also states that if a deputy banned from participating in the chamber's sittings does not obey the decision, the chairman will be able to summon help from the security services.

'Sunday' Program Carries Zhirinovskiy Address

LD1601234394

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1900 GMT on 16 January, as part of the "Voskresenye" program, carries a video compilation of statements made by Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. The recorded excerpts come from a Zhirinovskiy address to the State Duma on 13 January.

Zhirinovskiy is shown standing at the State Duma podium saying: "One of our party's representatives has said that a psychiatric examination is required here. I agree. On one side of this parliament there are quite a lot of candidates for it, and I'll certainly see to it that it's done in the next two years, through our intelligence services. And in two years we'll have papers indicating which ones of you have had which diseases, and for how long."

The video cuts to a later portion of Zhirinovskiy's address: "Don't interrupt while.... [shouts] Shut up! [Bangs fist on the podium] I am speaking here now. Do you expect me to let you make all this noise while I'm speaking? So get out of the hall, get out! All of you, get out!" An unidentified voice calls out to Zhirinovskiy. He continues, "All the candidates for lunatic asylum." A different unidentified voice says, "Turn the microphones off, enough of that."

Zhirinovskiy continues: "Go on, stay in your seats. You haven't spent long enough in prisons under communists! Just look at you, how many of you there are!"

The video cuts to another portion of Zhirinovskiy's address: "In the autumn of 1995, most of the people who will be sitting here will be representatives of real democratic parties, who will never interrupt a speaker. Yes, that's exactly what I mean, people repeating 'time is up' all the time, and you, Mr. Chubays, you'll be making this sign when you're in the cell, in Lefortovo prison. You'll be making this sign [Zhirinovskiy taps himself on the wrist] in the cell, asking for your lunch."

The video cuts again. Zhirinovskiy says, "I have a different role, and the party believes we are destined for something different. We are waiting for other elections."

The video cuts and Zhirinovskiy continues: "I would gladly have agreed to carry out the functions of leader of the Russian parliament as it would have been an example, not just for this country, not just for Europe, but for the whole world. After all, just two days that I spent in Europe sent the entire planet reeling, all the diplomats, all the ministers."

The video cuts to Zhirinovskiy saying, "The entire Russian nation—not those with guttural speech or dual citizenship—need me to be in good health."

In the final excerpt of the speech Zhirinovskiy says, "I am waiting for presidential elections in Russia. And rest assured that I'll have enough to speak to you about after that."

Ivan Rybkin Chairmanship Viewed

PM1801092994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Report by Robert Minasov, Yevgeniy Skukin, and ITAR-TASS under the general heading "Speakers Elected": "In the State Duma"]

[Text] By way of an introduction to the report on the 14 January morning session of the State Duma, we would like to return to the events of the previous day.

At his press conference Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communists, stated that the "Russia's Choice" faction has in effect already disintegrated, and hence no longer represents any serious counterweight to the recently formed bloc of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Agrarian Party, and the Democratic Party of Russia, which numbers 115 deputies.

Deputy Mikhail Poltaranin did not agree with Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov's assertion of a split in "Russia's Choice":

"All that happened is that two candidates for the post of Duma chairman were discussed inside the faction. As a result Sergey Kovalev was nominated."

"But in that case, Mikhail Nikiforovich, what in your opinion is the reason for the democratic blocs' failure in the preliminary ballot?"

The correlation of forces in parliament is very complex. And it is not constituted in our favor. But it is the cross section of society which we have and which we received in our parliament. In addition, just like before the elections, the democrats are uncoordinated. We reach agreements with other groups, but when we look at the breakdown of the vote, in general one-half of the votes go astray, as the saying goes. When there is no overall majority, we cannot afford to blow hot and cold in this way: Every man counts. Especially since there are less of us than the "Zhirinovskiyites," Communists, and agrarians.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's "coronation" speech 13 January roused the indignation of the majority of deputies. Let us cite excerpts from this offensive speech by the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, which reached hysterical proportions. Addressing deputies he uttered the following: "You are not yet mature enough for a normal parliament.... I agree to undergo psychiatric examination.... My two-day visit to Europe made everyone sit up.... I am not suitable for the role of parliament's traffic controller (in other words chairman of the State Duma). My health will be spoilt by Chubays, Kozyrev, Fedorov.... But my health is necessary for the entire Russian people. Mr. Chubays (addressing Chubays), don't look at the clock, you will have time to look at it in your cell in Lefortovo.... Quiet! (taps with his heel on the rostrum). Get out of the hall, out, all of you! I am waiting for the presidential elections. Then I will show you!"

The mood of the majority of those present was expressed by Sergey Shakhray, who spoke directly after Zhirinovskiy: "Our parliament could be economically self-sufficient if we start selling tickets for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's performances."

Everyone was pretty much bored stiff by the wait for the results of the election of the State Duma chairman. But it became known in the lobbies before it was announced officially that 47-year-old engineer Ivan Rybkin had been elected State Duma chairman.

From our files: Ivan Petrovich Rybkin was born in 1946; he is Russian, has higher education, and is a member of the Russian Agrarian Party and deputy chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Agriculture Main Administration of Water Supplies.

Further on Elections

PM1801090194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Leonid Nikitinskiy article: "The Communists Won the Struggle for the Post of Speaker of the State Duma"]

[Text] By the time this issue was being signed to press the final, official results of the secret ballot for the election of State Duma chairman had still not been announced. However, news agencies have already reported that the election has been won by Ivan Rybkin, the candidate from the agrarian and communist bloc and former leader of the "Communists of Russia" faction in the former Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

The elections for the chairman of the chamber began with the nomination of 10 candidates and it is highly unlikely that this was a surprise to any of them. Nevertheless, four of them refused to stand.

Top of the list was Zhirinovskiy, who used his allotted few minutes on the platform to issue insults and threats against his rivals. Zhirinovskiy's reason for his withdrawal was, he said, his unwillingness to work as a "traffic controler." This argument does not stand up to criticism. The chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] himself could not stand for the post of parliament's "traffic controller" but any other member of that faction could.

However, the awesome LDPR is clearly not overendowed with potential speakers. The experience with Georgiy Lukava, whom Zhirinovskiy had already tried to direct from the provinces, demonstrated that the chairman's place must be occupied by someone who is at least more competent. Is there one in the LDPR? If there is, will he not use the protection of the independence guaranteed by the post of speaker to move away from the fuehrer's influence, thus splitting the falange and creating a second center of gravity in it?

Zhirinovskiy undoubtedly asked himself these questions before taking the platform. But they were meaningless in view of the main fact that today an LDPR candidate has no real chance of putting together either a relative or—even less—an absolute majority in the Duma. That is why the faction's general secretary gave the order to support a different candidate—Yuriy Vlasov, it soon emerged. This is also interesting because Zhirinovskiy decided to back not a weak and ultimately manageable candidate but a strong and probably unmanageable candidate.

Anatoliy Lukyanov, apparently, was the only candidate who withdrew honorably because he was tired and we forgive him this little ruse, which is that he did not ask Nevzorov to simply not nominate him. The same cannot be said about Valentin Kovalev—a nonparty candidate from [ot] the communist party, who withdrew his candidacy before the vote in favor of Ivan Rybkin, the nominee from the agrarian party, which was clearly agreed in advance.

The reasons for the withdrawal of Sergey Shakhray, a politician skilled in affairs of this kind, are not so simple: He clearly realized that neither he nor any other members of his faction had a chance of making a breakthrough in the first round but he has hardly abandoned the idea of occupying the speaker's chair once and for all. Most probably, Shakhray (like the Women of Russia faction) weighed the situation up and came to the conclusion that the first round of voting would not bring anyone success and that therefore it was better not to enter the fray until round two.

The election speeches of the remaining candidates were similar in that everyone (with the exception of Yuriy Vlasov who had bluntly stated to the Russia's Choice representatives in the hall: "I have opposed you and will continue to do so") tried to emphasize their commitment to parliamentarism and respect for the rights of minorities and to a greater or lesser extent declared that they would be apolitical if elected to the post of chairman of the chamber. For all the craftiness (greater or lesser, depending on the candidate) of these assurances they can all serve as testimony to the fact that the guiding principles of the deputies' corps, when compared with the Supreme Soviet, have indeed switched to some extent from political confrontation toward the ideas of cooperation and a desire for compromise in the spirit of true parliamentarism.

The finest and most tragic performance as a candidate speaker was undoubtedly the rearguard action fought by Sergey Kovalev. Soberly assessing the potential of its faction, Russia's Choice decided not to nominate from its existing reserves a candidate whose chance of success looked more realistic. Sergey Kovalev, a man who is by no means as naive as some of his opponents would arrogantly like to think, ascended the platform like Golgotha and as expected was insulted by the mob (using the term here in the sense that even the most respectable and highly organized meeting can turn into a mob at times) and fully demonstrated the meaning of the commandment to turn the other cheek.

Understandably in the table of the overall weighted voting [reytingovoye golosovaniye], Kovalev was second from last (138 votes). But third from bottom was Vladimir Medvedev, leader of the "New Regional Policy" faction formed the day before and consisting of independent deputies, and this rating demonstrates more the inability of the democratic factions to carry out organizational work in the parliament: The 15-minute recess before the voting, I felt, could have substantially altered that result and possibly have taken Medvedev into the semifinal as an alternative to the communist Ivan Rybkin.

As these notes are being made up for print, the finalists on the platform at the former CEMA [building] will be Ivan Rybkin (233 votes) and Yuriy Vlasov (200 votes) who, in the political sense, are certainly not alternatives to one another. It is possible to forecast with a good deal of confidence (although by the time this newspaper is signed to print this result will be known accurately) that neither of the contenders will secure 223 simple [zavetnyy] votes in a conventional (rather than a weighted) ballot.

Under the rating vote it is possible to support several candidates and thus, if you consider the overall disposition of the three major blocs, the votes of the democrats the day before became "black balls" for the two finalists while the votes of the Communists and Zhirinovskiy's supporters were "white balls" again for both candidates. In the final, however, complicated by the secret procedure of voting via booths when you can only vote for one or the other [alternativno], Rybkin must lose the votes of the LDPR faction and Vlasov the votes of the Communists.

We can take the length of time that the Duma needs to collect 223 votes for a candidate speaker as a measure to some extent of the standard of its "parliamentarism," taking this term to mean first and foremost the ability to move toward a mutual, constructive compromise which takes into account the right of minorities. At the moment the Duma is split into three parts in which each of the three sectors with less than 50 percent is in the minority no matter what the disposition of forces is.

In the near future, under the catalyzing influence of the process of elections of the speaker in the Duma, a fourth quite powerful sector will be structured and it seems that this faction will be the "New Regional Policy." It is seeking to occupy the political center where it can absorb Shakhray's Party of Russian Unity and Accord because of a coincidence of main program aims, and become a center of attraction for other small associations of deputies and independent deputies. Clearly Russia's political destiny will depend to a considerable extent on whether this new political force operates as a center-right or center-left organization.

Zhirinovskiy 'Continues To Attract Frenzied Interest'

PM1701091594 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Jan 94 pp 1, 2

[Nadezhda Garifullina report: "There Are Two Speakers"]

[Excerpts] A report on the registration of deputies' factions and groups was delivered at the [State Duma's] Thursday morning session by Sergey Stankevich, leader of the interim Duma Secretariat. But, of course, the main matter of the day was the election for the lower house speaker. After the adoption at the evening session of three articles of the State Duma Interim Standing Orders pertaining to the chairman of the chamber and his powers, candidates were nominated for the post. There were 10 of them. [passage omitted]

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy appeared first. It has to be said that his presence in the Russian parliament continues to attract frenzied interest from the press. If during a recess a hurricane of journalists tears down a corridor sweeping all before it and chasing after someone, you will soon find it was Vladimir Volfovich. The only person so sought-after by the press at the first Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies was Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin], who was then running for chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Times change, and journalists now have a new and odious "idol."

Speaking as a candidate for speaker, Vladimir Volfovich put the chairman in his place: "Under the new Constitution and the statute on our Duma your task is to let people speak—that is all. We have had enough lectures! The left wing, the right wing, who said what.... You yourself carry the burden of the old parliament. And you have the tanks and the Special Purpose Militia Detachment behind you. You are leading things in that direction, whereas the speaker's role is like a dispatcher—he presses a button for the next item on the agenda, we discuss it, and that's it." He was supported by Deputy Mironov, who proposed psychiatric checks for deputies. "I agree. On the one hand, there are very many contenders for this role" and he promised to do this within two years "through our special services." But at the same time he voiced a grievance of his own: "Under all the laws of international practice nobody ever discusses the question of whom to appoint as head of government or parliament. The position throughout the world is the same—the [leader of the] party that wins the most votes in the election is automatically invited by the head of state to form a government or automatically becomes the head of the parliament."

Basically, recounting a speech by Vladimir Volfovich is a thankless task. It has to be seen—it is a theatrical performance by a single actor. Admittedly, sometimes he pushes so hard that he generates furious hostility and indignation. And you again wonder—just who are you, Mr. Zhirinovskiy? You get shameless bragging ("in just two days my visit to Europe stunned [postavilo na ushi] the planet, all diplomats, and all ministers"), self-confidence ("I have a different role, a different calling"), downright rudeness that does not become a member of parliament ("Don't interrupt! Shut up! Get out of the hall! All the candidates should be sent to mental hospitals!"), and peremptoriness ("Our time has come. Your time has passed. On 12 December Russia's voters said you, 'Russia's Choice,' are my main rival. You are 30 percent down on me. By this spring you will be 60 percent down, and by the fall 90 percent down, and your voice will finally be silenced in the entire Russian political firmament.") In short, Vladimir Volfovich has "temporarily withdrawn his candidacy" and is waiting for the Russian presidential elections. [passage omitted]

LDPR's Likely Parliamentary Tactics Examined

PM1801092194 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 15 Jan 94 p 2

[Andrey Kolesnikov article: "'Party of the Street' Can Only Lead to a Dead End"]

[Text] The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] is the party of the street. The arrogance of urban teenage louts and losers has taken parliament by storm. The seats in the hall are occupied by standard-issue street riff-raff who have somewhat outgrown the romantic age of hooliganism for its own sake. There are some doubts whether the street "barons" should be represented in the lower chamber of the new parliament. However, the voters, having sent the "delegates of the lower depths" to parliament, have perhaps thereby expressed their attitude to the Russian parliamentary system.

Zhirinovskiy's lieutenants, who will act as catalysts in the State Duma, will, as is clear from the behavior of deputies of the extreme left and extreme right "wings" of various parliamentary factions, be augmented by representatives of a moribund caste of the Soviet people. They may be dubbed social constructivists. These deputies, who as a rule are of the age of vague anti-liberal convictions (I stipulate for the last time not anti-liberal as regards the LDPR), inscribe nightly—until cockcrow—in grubby, thick exercise books, in their uneven, old woman's hand, global plans for the revamping of Russia.

In the blessed times of perestroyka, efforts were made to prevent their getting within firing distance of the USSR. They laid siege to the theoretical and political journals in accordance with all the rules governing the art of war, bent on seeing the fruits of their lucubrations published. They ransacked the classical tomes of Marxism and found there words and expressions unused at party congresses and sought to impart their discoveries to the world. This author, who worked during those years on a sociopolitical journal, would take cowardly refuge in the mazy corridors of the editorial office from the abundant drivel spouted by the transformers of society on the pretext of a "summons from the leadership." The names of certain of my clients now adorn the pages of PRAVDA, to which in better times they were denied access by the militia.

Now the social constructivists will try to test out their crazy, hare-brained schemes on the country. Of course, their action won't go beyond empty parliamentary rhetoric, but they will be able to stymie some fruitful work. It is no wonder that the instinct of self-preservation is quite unerringly forcing the representatives of Russia's Choice to fight for leading positions on the financial and economic committees.

From the emotional standpoint, the refusal of Russia's Choice representatives to negotiate with the Communists, the agrarians, and the LDPR is understandable. One can understand Russia's Choice's action in human terms, but not politically. The alarm bell tolled too loudly during the elections, and too little time is allocated the liberals to implement their economic program. If the program is to be implemented they have to be real politicians for a while and play the most diverse, sometimes unpleasant, political games with their ideological opponents. Political fastidiousness could cost dear.

Is it necessary to beat one's breast and shout in advance that it is impossible to cooperate with the "Communists"? It is not difficult to see (and if the democrats have not noticed this they will **always** remain a minority in the State Duma) that at the present political stage the extreme left-wingers and extreme right-wingers are still, as it were, getting accustomed to one another again, they are having to work out a new code of relations—they can no longer play according to the rules of the National Salvation Front of blessed memory. The LDPR plays without rules—that's why it is a party of the street. The Communists and agrarians by their very nature need rules of the game. And one can and must cooperate with them on particular questions of legislation where there should in principle be no antagonism. Nationalities policy and the protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population could be such an area of contact—otherwise the democrats will be unable to seize the initiative here and it will be impossible for anyone to prove that it was Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev rather than Komsomol member Dima Rogozin who really helped the Russians living in the former Soviet Union.

Is there any point in frightening oneself yet again? Fear can become chronic if you don't get rid of it promptly and start engaging in normal work and normal politics.

'Secret Power Center' Begins To Form

MK1801104094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 3

[Dmitriy Kamin report: "Secret Power Center Begins To Form in State Duma"]

[Text] Differences between the State Duma factions hampered the process of approval of the heads of the parliament's lower chamber committees yesterday. This, however, had no impact on the intention of deputies of various political orientations to play together the leading role as the primary legislative organ. Notably, a statement made by Vladimir Shumeyko, recently elected chairman of the Federation Council, about a possible shift in the lawmaking center of gravity to the upper chamber of the Russian parliament met with a negative assessment from Duma members of the most diverse party affiliations.

Vladimir Shumeyko's aggressive position toward the Duma is caused by rather well-founded fears: the economic consequences of an active influence in the lower chamber by the left-wing populist forces may prove more appreciable than were the opposition moods of the Supreme Soviet that the president disbanded. On the other hand, Shumeyko's point of view was apparently corroborated by the expectation of serious opposition to the Duma's left wing by Russia's Choice supporters, something that could have dragged out work and given cause to accuse the chamber of inefficiency during the organizational stage (the elections for speaker, the formation of the committees leadership).

Much as could have been expected, Shumeyko's statement was adamantly opposed by members of the Duma. Independent grouping leaders Irina Khakamada (the 12 December group) and Vladimir Medvedev (the "Independent Regional Policy" faction) noted that it held no water from the constitutional point of view. Yabloko's head Grigoriy Yavlinskiy called it "nonsense." Aleksandr Pochinok, a Russia's Choice supporter and more experienced in parliamentary ways, stressed that "Shumeyko is a strong guy, but bypassing the Duma at the time of forming the budget would not succeed at all."

At the same time, the outcome of the elections for the heads of Duma committees showed that the positions of the democratic blocs are not all that weak—the committee for budget, taxes, banks, and finances is lead by Mikhail Zadornov ("Yabloko") with Aleksandr Pochinok ("Russia's Choice") as his deputy, and Gennadiy Kulik, former vice premier of Russia, having been elected as his other deputy. Besides, representatives of the democratic wing have filled the deputy positions in the economic policy committee, the privatization committee, and the industrial committee, of which, however, Vladimir Gusev of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia has become chairman. The opposition has also taken over the offices of the heads of committees for agrarian questions and for economic policy.

As a result, the alignment of forces does not indicate a preponderance of supporters of one economic view or the other. The apparat experience of Duma members such as Anatoliy Lukyanov, however, around whom an informal center of opposition leadership is already taking shape, affords a supposition that the left-wing populists in the Duma may score a success in voting on fundamental economic questions. Attesting to this is also a higher level of organization of the opposition supporters that was already demonstrated during the struggle between factions last week.

Spirit of Parliamentarianism Not Yet in Duma

PM1401125494 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1, 4

[Leonid Nikitinskiy article: "Will the 'Spirit of Parliamentarianism' Take Root in the New Russian Parliament?"]

[Text] Ushering in a new epoch in the development of parliamentarianism in Russia, Georgiy Lukava, elder of the Duma and of civil aviation, very soon saw for himself that it is harder to control parliament than an airliner. Without having had time to gain height, the State Duma seems to have already gone into free-fall....

Behind the outwardly chaotic nature of the events during the first days of the State Duma's work two trends can, nonetheless, already be divined and merit our attention. These are the Duma's desire to structure itself internally in a somewhat different and more complex manner than the preprogrammed presence of the eight victorious election blocs seemed to suggest, and the fact that its possibilities are limited by the framework of the Constitution adopted in the referendum.

Viktor Chernomyrdin reminded the Duma deputies of this in his brief speech and defined the Duma's tasks with a characteristic verb: to "finish building," referring to the edifice whose foundations have already been laid and whose parameters were set in advance by the Constitution. Boris Yeltsin was still more terse: He simply did not come to the Duma.

1. Purport of the Structuring of Factions

The question of the size of the factions and deputies' associations was the first stumbling block and attested that a compromise in this hall will be difficult.

The line of the three largest factions on this question depends on their assessment of their own strength and of that of their rivals: whether they hope to "drag asunder" competitors (which is easier with a minimal threshold for the creation of alternative associations), or fear an internal split of their own and seek to prevent it with the help of a high threshold. The unequivocal support by the followers of Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy for a maximal numerical qualification for the creation of new factions (50) attests, rather, to their leaders' lack of confidence in their own strength and to their orientation not so much toward parliamentary persuasion as toward rigid party-factional discipline.

Before the break the Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist Party, which had united on this question, succeeded in securing 220 votes in favor of their version of a solution against 189, and some people were already on the point of celebrating victory. But then Sergey

Kovalev delicately reminded them that in the Duma it would no longer be possible, as previously in the Supreme Soviet, to experiment in the matter of a quorum, which is rigidly defined by the Constitution itself. His quiet retort sounded like a warning shot to the parliamentarians, who have developed a taste for debate.

After the break Zhirinovskiy attempted in a highly despotic manner to "squeeze out" the few missing votes, but here the obverse side of tough party tactics became clear: Almost 200 deputies refused to register, and wrecked the quorum. Since the number of obstructionists is twice the size of "Russia's Choice," this attests, rather, to a protest by independent deputies.

Attempts should soon be expected in the Duma to implement the principle of the so-called imperative mandate, which consists in the right of a faction to recall its deputies and replace them with others in the event of a vote in defiance of the faction's fundamental decisions. But the Constitution could once again rise up in the way of the "imperative mandate."

Intermediate versions of a "semirigid" mandate are possible, but any decision which prevents or hinders the possibility of voting in defiance of the line of one's own faction will also mean little prospect of a further struggle for the votes of individual deputies.

There remains far less room for a power struggle in the State Duma than was the case in the Supreme Soviet. In particular, with the best will in the world, it will be difficult to blow up the speaker of the Duma into a figure like Khasbulatov: The Constitution will not permit this. The president has also ensured in advance that in financial and technical respects the apparatus of the Federal Assembly is dependent on the president's administration, and this also makes a struggle for apparatus posts in parliamentary structures less attractive.

2. Legislating for Purposes of Self-Publicity

The creation of new factions in the Duma or the rejigging of existing ones and also the struggle for the posts of speaker, vice speakers, and chairmen of parliamentary committees—posts which in themselves do not have very good prospects—are not an end in itself but a means of occupying positions a little closer to the microphones. They will be the cause of a decisive game, in which the prize will be better chances in the 1996 presidential election and also in the new parliamentary elections due in the foreseeable future.

For these purposes there is absolutely no need of real power, within whose framework it is necessary to resolve specific everyday problems, leaving little chance of pleasing the voters; nor is there any need for real control over the government, which is tantamount toassuming responsibility for its unpopular decisions.

But the Duma's legislative powers, like the initiatives of its individual factions, might be used not so much for positive legislative work as in the hope of preelection propaganda. The submission of draft laws which are deliberately populist and beautifully packaged but devoid of any inner meaning and real substance could serve as the most convenient and safe form of struggle for the votes of the electorate—a form approved repeatedly in the former Supreme Soviet.

But the rigid framework of the Constitution will constantly inhibit the State Duma not only in resolving its own internal problems but also in legislative improvisations. There will be two methods of struggle against the Constitution, which promise undoubted publicity success regardless of whether real amendments to it are made or rejected. These are, conventionally, the "frontal attack" and "sabotage in the rear."

Zyuganov's bloc will evidently make it a rule to remind people that the Constitution was adopted illegally and is invalid ("Carthage must be destroyed"). Zhirinovskiy's bloc, which, out of tactical considerations, rather, tied itself to preelection approval of the constitutional draft, retains the possibility of torpedoing the Constitution by means of extending borders or, conversely, sabotaging current legislation. The field for such activity, in which all the blocs opposed to the government—from extreme right-wing ones to extreme left-wing ones—can graze widely and freely and put on weight, is marked by the totality of draft laws which the government intends to propose to the Duma: the Civil Code, the Fundamentals of Land, Labor, and Housing Legislation—approximately 100 draft laws in all.

Finally, the defense of the provisions of the Constitution and of the draft laws in the "package" which conform with it—this is the bridgehead marked out by fate itself for the legislative publicity campaign of the pro-government "Russia's Choice," from which it cannot retreat without running the risk of losing face with that part of the electorate which supports it. But it is so disadvantageous tactically that the process of desertion could start from here. We are afraid that the government itself will go over "in opposition" to "Russia's Choice."

3. Digression on the "Spirit of Parliamentarianism"

The first days of the State Duma's work, like the preparatory period, have been quite symptomatic but do not enable us to make more precise operational forecasts. Therefore we will yield to the temptation to discourse a little on broader topics—parliamentarianism in general, for example.

No one, in actual fact, can explain exactly what "parliamentarianism" or the "spirit of parliamentarianism," which is in general use, is. Therefore it is harder to point to an example of its presence than its absence. There is no need to prove that this very "spirit of parliamentarianism" did not even exist fleetingly in Khasbulatov's Supreme Soviet, at least in its last phase of development. Comparing, in hindsight, the congresses of Russian and Union deputies, we conclude in amazement that the latter were more in keeping with this very "spirit of parliamentarianism," although they were sincerely reviled by as yet unfledged parliamentary journalists. Therefore, on meeting Anatoliy Lukyanov, for example, in the lobby of the State Duma, these same journalists, but now with experience (for politicians come and go, but journalists remain), have nostalgic feelings, as if the "spirit of parliamentarianism" had suddenly materialized before them—not in its entirety but in one of its guises.

Parliamentarianism, in actual fact, is not form but content, a system of concepts and relations which entails, above all, cooperation, partnership, compromise, and deference to another's opinion. The outward "architectural" devices of the constituting of power, such as the system of "checks and balances" or the very sophisticated electronic voting system, are designed merely to make the physical house of parliament more comfortable in the hope that the "spirit of parliamentarianism" will finally settle here as a welcome guest. But parliamentarianism has evidently had a parting of the ways, for a little while, from those institutions which we call "parliamentary" primarily on the basis of their outward form.

In the former Supreme Soviet it was frightened off by the clear predominance of politics over law. Expressed as a fraction, this correlation, which actually characterizes the level of parliamentarianism in each specific parliament, was approaching zero. If the laws which were produced there sometimes took into account the vector of the public good, it was only by virtue of a chance coincidence with the factional interests of individual groups captivated by the struggle for power.

Will the "spirit of parliamentarianism" get on with the new deputies in the State Duma? At present there is very little hope of this, and the reasons, in general, are the same. The factions' preparatory maneuvers already attest that the new generation of parliamentarians is at once starting where the previous generation left off: with a struggle for power and influence waged by apparatus methods, instead of at least outlining a list of priority law-drafting and legislative work.

And yet, however great the temptation to turn the new parliament, following the former one, into a showground of political struggle, the rigid constitutional limitation of the possibilities of waging that struggle "under the carpet" will suddenly cool the interest in it and make the most sober members of the State Duma turn their attention to positive legislative activity. Of course, this routine work will not suit everyone: It requires skill and patience and outwardly is by no means as effective as appeals from the parliamentary microphone to wage war in the interests of great Russia on, let us say, Kuala Lumpur.

In my view the deputies of the State Duma, as of the Federation Council and also of all other conceivable and inconceivable parliamentary institutions, should be responsibly aware of their role in Russia today, neither belittling it nor, on any account, exaggerating it. Russia is certainly not a democratic country, at any rate not in the sense of the form of rule, at any rate not at the present phase of its historical development.

Russia today has become presidential in form or, rather, authoritarian in terms of the inner content of power not thanks to nor despite the rather illogical actions of Yeltsin and his team but by virtue of the circumstances which have taken shape and which obey different, not subjective, natural laws of historical development.

The State Duma will also have to obey them. The Duma has a worthy occupation which conforms with both the demands and the opportunities of the present day: to improve legislation from the viewpoint of its form, not its political content, without trying to confront the presidential structures in this area. Attempts to go against the tide (apparently against Yeltsin, but essentially against the vector of history) could end, most likely, only in the Duma's sharing the fate of the Supreme Soviet.

But even if Boris Yeltsin suffers defeat in another clash with pseudoparliamentarianism and with "factions" which actually aspire to still more monopoly power, this certainly will not be a victory for true parliamentarianism. Any leader who replaces him (at what price?) in this or another post designated somehow differently, except in a presidential election, will be doomed to become a dictator—what kind of dictator and how cruel a dictator will depend, inter alia, on his personal qualities and the promises with which he has managed to bind himself.

'Chaos Management' Will Not Produce Duma Majority

PM1401171794 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by Feliks Babitskiy: "Duma: Who Will Implement Chaos Management"]

[Text] The State Duma devoted the whole of 12 January to intra- and interfactional consultations. It was a kind of time-out taken by the sides in view of the first break in their work. And there is some consulting to be done. All the contradictions were on display at the general sitting—not only the established ones, but those that were vigorously developing in the course of the negotiating period prior to the opening of the session.

As is known, at the very start of the process the moderate conservative deputies' majority had the chance to organize its faction properly. It was to comprise Zyuganovist Communists, supporters of Travkin, Agrarians, and, perhaps, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, women, and the part of the body of deputies that chooses to be nonfactional. This kind of majority would have been able not only to block any initiatives by "Russia's Choice," but also to implement its own. But the alliance did not come about. Instead the four biggest factions—the Russian Federation Communist Party, the Agrarian

Party of Russia, Russia's Choice, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—sat down to negotiate the allotment of spheres of influence in the Duma. At first glance this is inexplicable. The position of Zyuganov and Lapshin enabled them to manage without any negotiations, while Gaydar and Zhirinovskiy had always appeared to them to be the least desirable partners (simply odious to them). Actually, it was the quadripartite negotiations that made the Communists' and Agrarians' potential allies ill-disposed toward them.

What made the conservatives commit such a fatal error?

We have learned from reliable sources that information has filtered down to the Duma from circles close to the president that the four major factions will be authorized to participate not only in the formation of the presidium and the committees but also in the reorganization of the Cabinet of Ministers. If this is to be believed, then it is clear what kind of bait the Communists and Agrarians have taken. Actually, their ideological inspiration—V.I. Lenin—taught that opportunism would bring no dividends and that no one would voluntarily share power. So they have themselves to blame.

The quadripartite negotiations broke down, of course. "Choice" never really made any secret of the fact that its true aim was not to join Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy in allotting spheres of influence but to prevent them from exercising influence on the Duma. The sole result of the roundtable was that all four big factions were cut off from their potential allies—the small factions and independent deputies. Now the former are obviously gravitating toward an alliance with Shakhray, whose hopes of getting the speaker's chair have therefore now undergone a revival. Now, that is the problem: even if something turns up for themm, this alliance will not have even a relative majority without the Communists and Agrarians, but will merely be the fifth large faction. The former will try, of course, in the very near future to return to the original idea of creating a moderate conservative majority faction. Except that the old confidence they used to command will no longer be there. Things have moved on, so to speak.

It is true that Russia's Choice, as a member of the "big four," is also isolated from its potential allies in the reformist camp—the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin, and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms. But its leaders hardly had any illusions on this score before. Their complaints about a lack of unity among the democrats are clearly a pretense, except perhaps in the case of S. Kovalev, who is far removed from the larger political arena. Even during the election campaign they knew that this unity would not exist, and they are merely seeking to shift their share of the responsibility for this onto the remaining democrats. Their real objective, at least at the present state, is not to create a united democratic front but to prevent any of their opponents (be they left-wing or right-wing) from forming a Duma majority. This was the aim behind their demand for the minimum size of deputies' group necessary for registration to be as small as possible. This would have made it possible to break up the body of deputies into a multitude of small groupings and "drown the Duma's work in verbal diarrhea," as N. Travkin put it in his own inimitable manner. These tactics have already been dubbed "chaos management" by our political scientists. One of the Russia's Choice leaders, Sergey Yushenkov, was blatantly demonstrating them at his recent press conference.

Russia's Choice Against New Parliament Building Project

MK1501105094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 15 Jan 94 p 2

[Unattributed untitled report under the "Round the Clock Nonstop" rubric]

[Text] The Russia's Choice deputy faction is speaking against the construction of a new parliament building that would cost $588 million from state coffers. According to Russia's Choice, this sum is quite sufficient to take care of military conversion on a Russia- wide scale for one year.

Regional Affairs

More on Luzhkov Letter to Chernomyrdin on Food

PM1801152394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 94 First Edition p

[Report by Nikita Lyutyy on open letter from Mayor Luzhkov of Moscow to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin: "Will There be Bread for Muscovites?"]

[Text] Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov has written Viktor Chernomyrdin an open letter. The capital's chief is worried about the fact that certain members of government are trying to "push through" a plan for the elimination of federal food stocks, introduce high customs duties on food, put a stop to preferential credits, and abolish foreign food subsidies.

It is for the State Committee on Antimonopoly Policy to decide whether or not there is a deal between the organ of state power and the major economic bodies. But the fact remains that the adoption of these decisions can only benefit our food lobbyists—the monopolists—and will hit the pockets of practically all strata of the population hard. For example, Russian sugar magnates are greatly irked by the fact that imported sugar retails at 600 rubles [R] per kg, whereas sugar leaves our refineries at a price of R900 per kg. But since they do not want the bother of cutting production costs and so on, the monopolists dream about using their own sector ministers' hands to strangle foreign competitors.

Moreover, the open letter points out, given the current decline in agricultural production, Muscovites can rely neither on Russia's regions nor on the CIS countries. For instance, in the first six months of 1994 the proposed volumes of purchases of vegetable oil for the capital are only 7 percent of what is required, while the equivalent figures for meat and meat products are 35 percent, for butter 41 percent, and for powdered milk 63 percent.

"By informing you of this," Yuriy Luzhkov writes, "we hope, Esteemed Viktor Stepanovich, to secure your assistance and support and ask you to prevent the situation from becoming critical by immediately adopting the Russian Federation Government draft decree, elaborated by the ministries and departments in conjunction with the Moscow government in accordance with your instructions, on providing the population of Moscow with food. The examination of it by the Russian Federation Economics and Finance Ministries has been delayed for no reason since last November."

Rather long-winded, but very urgent and timely. The ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA editorial office, which, for obvious reasons, lives in Moscow, fully endorses its mayor's request.

Chernomyrdin Meets Regional Heads

LD1401180994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1558 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has met heads of executive power bodies from republics within the Russian Federation, territories, regions, autonomous formations and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, head of the government press service Valentin Sergeyev said here today.

On proposal of Viktor Chernomyrdin, the meeting set up a commission to elaborate new principles of social-economic policy and forms of its implementation in Russian regions. The commission will be headed by Vice-Premier Yuriy Yarov and include Sergey Shakhray and representatives of all regional associations.

The commission will work to elaborate efficient mechanisms of interaction between the government and federal and regional authorities on principle of greater independence and expansion of rights of administration heads.

The commission's proposals will be considered by the government and reported to the Russian president.

The meeting showed Federation Council deputies are ready for active cooperation with the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Chernomyrdin Backs Shumeyko, Pacifies Leaders

MK1501130094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Jan 94 p 2

[KReport by Radik Batyrshin in the "Federation Council" column: "Shumeyko Now Has Deputies. Viktor Chernomyrdin Has Had a Lunch With Senators]

[Text] Ramazan Abdulatipov, first deputy chairman of the State Committee on Federal Affairs and former speaker of the House of Nationalities in the former Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, has become deputy head of the Russian senate. He received 117 votes out of 156 in the Federation Council. Informed sources say that there was covert agreement between Ramazan Abdulatipov and Vladimir Shumeyko whereby the former speaker of the House of Nationalities must not obstruct the first deputy premier's taking the chairman's spot. It is no wonder that after his victory Vladimir Shumeyko offered Ramazan Abdulatipov the post of his deputy on nationalities affairs. The second deputy chairman of the Russian senate (in charge of industry and agriculture) is Valeryan Viktorov, chairman of the Chuvashia Council of Ministers. For him the new post is an opportunity to avoid a highly likely resignation which could follow the inauguration of Chuvashia's first president, Nikolay Fedorov.

The post of the third deputy chairman of the Federation Council was contested by Vladimir Shumeyko's main rival for the chair of speaker in the upper parliament chamber, Petr Romanov, director of the Krasnoyarsk-based Yenisey chemical plant; and Aleksandr Kovalev, head of the Voronezh Oblast administration. Neither of them polled the requisite number of votes. Therefore Vladimir Shumeyko proposed that the election of his third deputy be moved to the next session of the upper parliament chamber. In between the election of the deputy the Russian senators discussed a list of committees in the upper house. At 1340 the session was interrupted. Government chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin invited the heads of the Russian regions to lunch. It will be recalled that on 13 January Viktor Chernomyrdin had lunch with the heads of the krays, oblasts, and republics, persuading them to vote for Vladimir Shumeyko as speaker of the Russian senate.

The meeting between the regional leaders and the chairman of the Russian Government lasted for two hours. According to one of the participants in the meeting, Victor Chernomyrdin stated that all the requisite powers must be transferred to the regions. He told the heads of the republics that especially to this end, a government commission is being set up headed by Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov which is to discuss and map out ways to address the problems involved in relations between the center and regions, primarily those concerned with the budget and finances. According to another participant in the meeting, the Yarov commission will include two representatives from eight interregional economic associations. In a goodwill gesture Viktor Chernomyrdin said that as of now the institution of the Russian Federation president's representatives in the krays, oblasts, and republics is abolished. A corresponding edict will be promulgated shortly.

Viktor Chernomyrdin told the regional leaders that the composition of the new government will be announced on 18 January. Apart from the ministries five committees will remain in the government, including the State

Property Management Committee. Responding to complaints by the regional leaders about the state's debts and problems of mutual financial settlements and payments, Victor Chernomyrdin said that a draft decree on the agriculture sector is pending whereby the state will settle its debts with agricultural producers (400 billion rubles) and make available credits for spring field work. Furthermore Viktor Chernomyrdin promised to set up a special commission to speed up settlements within Russian's banking system and thereby resolve the problem of mutual clearance. It is noteworthy that Viktor Chernomyrdin did not say a single word about the election of Vladimir Shumeyko as chairman of the upper chamber.

North Ossetia Prepares for Elections

LD1501204594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1724 GMT 15 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz January 15 TASS—Northern Ossetia is getting ready for the elections of its first president on January 16.

Sources at the Central Electoral Commission told ITAR-TASS everything has been prepared. The ballot sheet includes names of two candidates—that of North Ossetian Parliament Speaker Akhsarbek Galazov and Prime Minister Sergey Khetagurov; the rest four candidates quit the election campaign.

According to information of the North Ossetian Humanitarian Research Institute's sociology service, Galazov has the highest rating.

North Ossetian mass media circulated today a decree of the Russian president "on suspension of the state of emergency regime on part of territories of Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia."

The decree says the Russian president has decided to suspend from midnight of January 16 through midnight of January 17, 1994, the validity of the state of emergency regime on part of Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia that has been prolonged by the Russian president's decree of November 30, 1993. A reason for this is the need to ensure citizens' right to vote during the elections of the North Ossetian president.

Allied forces attached to the temporary administration on territories of the Mozdok, Prigorodnyy regions and adjoining areas of Northern Ossetia and the Malgobek and Nazran regions of Ingushetia shall take measures to protect citizens and ensure order in public places.

The North Ossetian situation is relatively calm. Not a single inter-ethnic armed clash has been reported over the past 24 hours. The Russian peace-makers together with the local law-enforcement bodies fully control the situation in the security zone.

Elections Begin

LD1601095594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0926 GMT 16 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz January 16 TASS—North Ossetia is holding its first ever presidential elections on Sunday. At 7:00 A.M., 300 polling stations located in cities, regional centres and remote mountainous villages opened to receive first electors. The voting will continue until 20:00 P.M.

Two candidates have been put on ballot papers, including chairman of the North Ossetian parliament Akhsarbek Galazov and head of the North Ossetian government, Sergey Khetagurov.

For the time being, Galazov has the highest rating, according to the results of a sociological poll, ITAR-TASS learned from the Central Electoral Commission. The turn-out as reported by 10:00 A.M. was average. The people are casting their ballots in a calm atmosphere and no violations of the franchise have been reported.

Galazov has already voted at polling station No. 189 in Vladikavkaz. Asked by a journalist which candidate he had crossed out from his ballot paper, Galazov said "one of the two".

Talking to representatives of the mass media, Galazov said that "the elections of the first North Ossetian president should consolidate the multinational population of the republic and give a positive impetus to reforms in economy and a political life."

It was earlier reported that in connection with the elections of the North Ossetian president a state of emergency in North Ossetia and Ingushetia had been suspended for twenty four hours in accordance with the Russian president's decree. Russian peace- keeping forces have been instructed to maintain law and order in public places during this period of time and take measures to ensure citizens' safety.

Voters Reportedly Bribed, Pressured

LD1601130294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1241 GMT 16 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz January 16 TASS—About 25 per cent of electors put on electoral lists had voted by 13:00 p.m. at the presidential elections held in North Ossetia today.

Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, Taimuraz Cheidzhemov, told ITAR-TASS that over 412,000 electors were registered in North Ossetia. Cheidzhemov said that the turn-out was average, with the highest turn-out reported in rural areas, including the Dogorsk, Ardon, and Kirov regions. In Vladikavkaz, the best turn-out was registered in the industrial area.

According to the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, there were no outrageous violations at polling stations. However, it was reported that in a number of settlements definite circles had been putting pressure on electors at polling stations, persuading them to vote in favour of one of the candidates. Incidents of bribing electors with alcoholic beverages were reported.

Cheidzhemov said that today's weather in North Ossetia is fine and added that he hopes that the elections would be successful.

President-Elect Comments

LD1701100094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0907 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz January 17 TASS— "I am grateful to the multinational people of North Ossetia for supporting my candidature during the election campaign and for voting for me at the January 16 elections," North Ossetian President-Elect Akhsarbek Galazov said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today. "The winners are above all, the sound forces who cherish the interests of peace and concord", he said.

"The elections of the president of the republic must consolidate the republic's multinational society, they must provide a positive impulse for the active implementation of reforms in the economy, social sphere and political life. Much work lies ahead, primarily associated with reforming state structures and local government bodies, the adoption of a new constitution of the Republic of North Ossetia. Everything must be done for the benefit of the people".

The Central Electoral Commission is now summarising the final results of the vote. According to preliminary data, about 160,000 voters, or 66.3 per cent cast their ballots in favour of Galazov, while than 81,000 people (33.7 per cent) voted for his rival, government leader Sergey Khetagurov.

According to local observers, Akhsarbek Galazov was mainly supported by the masses of working people, veterans, teachers, scientists and cultural personalities. Sergey Khetagurov was mainly backed by industrialists, entrepreneurs and commercial structures.

Akhsarbek Galazov was born in 1929 in an old Ossetian village of Khumalag in the Pravoberezhniy district of North Ossetia. After graduating from a teacher-training institute, he taught Russian to schoolchildren. He then worked as an education ministry inspector, head of the teacher-retraining institute, the minister of education of North Ossetia and the chairman of the council of ministers.

From 1976 Akhsarbek Galazov worked as the rector of the North Ossetian State University. He is a professor who has written scientific works, manuals and monographs devoted to teaching and linguistics. From 1990 to 1991 Akhsarbek Galazov was the first secretary of the North Ossetian regional committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From 1990 he was chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic (now the Republic of North Ossetia).

Akhsarbek Galazov has consistently advocated the concord and consolidation of all branches of power and a peaceful settlement of relations between North Ossetia and Ingushetia.

Last december he was elected to the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia's new legislature, the Federal Assembly.

Defeated Premier Resigns

LD1701110694 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] Sergey Khetagurov, the head of the North Ossetian Government, announced his resignation at today's meeting of the Council of Ministers. He did so after the results of the election to choose the republic's first president were announced, RIA notes. Over 60 percent of the electorate cast their votes for his election rival, Akhsarbek Galazov, chairman of the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet. In accordance with the law on the president, Galazov is also head of the executive branch. He will shortly submit a new cabinet list to parliament.

Gives Reasons for Resignation

LD1701143194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1337 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 17 Jan— Sergey Khetagurov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic of North Ossetia, who stood for president of the republic and lost in yesterday's election to the parliamentary leader Akhsarbek Galazov, resigned today. He explained his decision saying that "in the republic of North Ossetia, the president is the head of executive power and there cannot be two top figures of executive authority. It is a matter of honor for the loser to give way to the winner".

Sergey Khetagurov asked the members of the republic's Cabinet of Ministers to remain in their posts and carry out their duties until the new government is formed.

It is not yet known whether Akhsarbek Galazov, elected on 16 January as the first president of the republic of North Ossetia, has accepted the resignation of Chairman of the Council of Ministers Sergey Khetagurov.

Final Results Issued

LD1801141594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1247 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz January 18 TASS—159,793 people (64 per cent of the turnout) voted to elect Akhsarbek Galazov as president of the Russian Caucasian Republic of North Ossetia. 81,386 people (32,6 per cent) voted for his rival Sergey Khetagurov, according to the final results of the election published on Tuesday.

Galazov held today a working meeting with lawmakers, members of the government and heads of the city and rural executive committees. He appealed to the members of the government to continue their duties until the new government would be formed. Khetagurov resigned as the prime minister.

The inauguration of the president is scheduled for January 28, in accordance with the election law.

Akhsarbek Galazov Named First President

LD1701050694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0411 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 17 Jan—Akhsarbek Galazov, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, has become the first president of North Ossetia. The ITAR-TASS correspondent has just learned this from reliable sources.

Approximately 55 percent of the total number of the electorate took part in the elections that were held on 16 January. More than 60 percent of the voters entered in the lists for the secret ballot voted for Galazov.

Opposition Urges Chechen President To Step Down

LD1601183194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1630 GMT 16 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Groznyy January 16 TASS—Yaragiy Mamodayev, head of the Chechen Government of popular confidence, called upon the republic's President Dzhokhar Dudayev to admit that his rule had no prospects, to immediately report back to his people and step down. Mamodayev's open letter with this appeal was published on Sunday by Chechnya's only independent newspaper "SPRAVEDLIVOST."

The opposition leader claimed that Dudayev's two-year rule had led the republic to a deadlock. But now, he said, "the people has begun to see clearly, it seeks to build a free state not to only shut itself off by borders and customs from the rest of the world. It does not want to quarell with its neighbours, both close and distant. It does not want to be treated with suspicion or estrangement." And if the present leaders cannot understand this, it is better for them to resign, Mamodayev stressed. The more so, that neither Dzhokhar Dudayev nor the Chechen people brought to the verge of national disaster have much time left, the head of the government of popular confidence.

Tatarstan May Switch From Volga to Ural Region

PM1401142394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 2

[Leonid Pozdeyev report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Tatarstan May Leave Volga Region and Join the Urals"]

[Text] Tatarstan President Mentimer Shaymiyev said at the inauguration of Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov that Tatarstan may join the Ural Association in the future.

The reason is the ineffectiveness of the activity of the analagous structure of the Volga region to which Tatarstan currently belongs.

Tatarstan Proposes Referendum on Neutrality

MK1401135094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 2

[Unattributed report]

[Text] Kazan—The People's Assembly held in Kazan under the aegis of the All-Russia Tatar Center (VTOTS) and the National Assembly has made a decision to hold a referendum on three questions: "Do you agree that Tatarstan be proclaimed a neutral state?," "Do you agree that Russian Federation citizenship should be given priority in Tatarstan with Russian Federation passports being issued?," and "Do you agree that the population of the republic of Tatarstan do its military service on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan?" Not less than 180,000 signatures must be raised for the referendum to go ahead.

A session of the Kazan branch of the ITTIFAK Tatar party of national independence has expelled from its membership Flera Zaynullina, party secretary, who recently was awarded the title of "Valorous Daughter of the Tatar People." Observers believe that one of the reasons for this was her statement at the World Assembly of Turkic People (Washington, 2 through 5 December 1993) which abounded in attacks on Russians and representatives of other ethnic groups living in the republic.

Meanwhile the first Russia-wide Tatar newspaper, BERDEMLEK (Unity), founded by the Tatarstan Government and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, has been launched; this is the first ethnic publication in the Russian Federation with nationwide status (circulation over 1 million copies). BERDEMLEK will come out in Russian once a week as a supplement to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and will be distributed in all regions of the Russian Federation with the view to give objective coverage of events in Tatarstan.

Tatarstan President Likely To Run for Parliament

MK1401134094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 2

[Dmitriy Lukashev report in the "Tataria" column: "Repeat Elections Will Be Held in March If a Treaty Between Tataria and Russia Is Signed"]

[Text] The Russian Central Election Commission has ruled that repeat elections in Tataria will be held on 13 March.

The republic's citizens are to elect deputies to the State Duma in five single-seat constituencies and to the Federation Council in a two-seat constituency. Under the current election statute, the candidates are to raise the requisite number of signatures for registration again.

Local observers believe that this time the republic's leadership has no reason to block the elections: After 12 December, when 12.9 percent of the electorate turned out at the polling stations, the local authorities had grounds to say that "the people are with us, not with Moscow." It is even accepted that someone from among the supreme leadership in the republic may want to run for the Federation Council, possibly President Shaymiyev himself.

Furthermore, it is not ruled that the ongoing reformation of the representative and executive bodies in Tataria will end with the calling of elections to the local National Assembly, also on 13 March. This option is being discussed in the lobbies of the republic's Supreme Soviet and it will possibly be submitted to the deputies at the Supreme Soviet session scheduled for the second half of January.

As for Mintimer Shaymiyev himself, he attended the Federation Council session on its first day as an observer. In an interview with SEGODNYA the Tatarstan president said that the repeat elections will be held in the republic provided the treaty between Russia and Tataria is signed before 13 March. "Otherwise the people of Tatarstan will simply have no reason to go to the polls," Mr. Shaymiyev said.

'Ural Republic President' Rossel Fired

PM1401125194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 2

[Unattributed report from roundup by correspondents A. Yevtushenko, Yu. Yepenchintsev, S. Kuzmin, V. Sanatin, and R. Zaripov, ITAR-TASS, and LOGOTIP-KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "In the 'Ural Republic'...."]

[Text] Eduard Rossel, bankrupt president of the Ural Republic, has been replaced as governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast by Aleksey Strakhov, who recently worked for the Yekaterinburg administration. Eduard Rossel described Yeltsin's decision to fire him as the "latest wheeze." He has not tired of saying that the Ural Republic exists "de facto."

Resigns From Sverdlovsk Cabinet

MK1501121094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 15 Jan 94 p 1

[Irina Vladykina report from Yekaterinburg: "Resignation of Eduard Rossel's Cabinet"]

[Text] The Cabinet of the Sverdlovsk Oblast government, which was formed by Eduard Rossel and worked for a few years under him, has resigned in full strength. It was pointed out at a press conference that the decision was not related to the executive branch representatives' unwillingness to cooperate with the new chief of administration, nor was it a protest against his appointment. The government did so proceeding from generally applied standards: Once a chief is gone, his cabinet goes, too. The new governor has asked all members of the oblast administration to stay on until February, when a new Sverdlovsk Oblast government will be formed.

Yeltsin Appoints Samara Oblast Representative

LD1701105494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1008 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, 17 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Yuriy Borodulin has been appointed as the Russian president's representative in Samara Oblast by a decree of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. This was reported by the president's press service.

Moscow Blast Injures Businessman, Kills Passerby

PM1701161794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Arkadiy Zheludkov report: "Businessmen Blown Up. Passersby Die"]

[Text] Explosions in the center of Moscow are a lamentable tradition. This time the latest explosion boomed out on Ostuzhev Street—a homemade explosive device was planted beneath the apartment window of Dmitriy Tsyn, director of the "'Alternativa' Trading House" Joint-Stock Company. One man died and three were injured as a result of the explosion.

A chance passerby died—Sergey Plamenevskiy, a fitter from the local Rayon Housing Administration, who was doing the rounds of Nos. 16 and 17, Ostuzhev Street. He died from his injuries an hour after the explosion—at 1000 hours in the Sklifosovskiy Emergency Hospital. The three other victims—Dmitriy Tsyn, the presumed target of the explosion, outside whose window the bomb went off; his bodyguard Yuriy Dukayev; and driver Mikhail Strukov—suffered shrapnel wounds. Only the businessman is now fit for work.

The explosion also blew out the windows in Nos. 16 and 17.

An explosion outside the apartment of a trading house director can hardly be regarded as commonplace—the investigation has not yet ascertained the motive for the crime. Dmitriy Borisovich claims that in 34 years he has not made any enemies, no one has threatened him, but what is most offensive and incomprehensible is that no one had warned him, even anonymously, about any of his actions, as criminals and terrorists are wont to do. What is more, Tsyn admits that even if the bandits had demanded money from him, he would not have been able to pay up—in 1993 the "'Alternativa' Trading House" invested all its money in developing and setting up enterprises: It set up two insurance companies and several branches from Estonia to Magnitogorsk, and expects to receive the profit in a year at the earliest. At the moment all it has is debts.

The investigation into the explosion will take two directions at once: A headquarters has been set up, where highly competent specialists from the City Internal Affairs Administration will work on several scenarios. They are not ruling out the idea that the explosion outside the businessman's apartment was a warning to one of his partners or apartment block neighbors, nor are they ruling out the idea that the bandits' demands might be made after the event, which Dmitriy Borisovich himself does not deny. As well as the official investigation, the case of the explosion will be tackled by the "'Alternativa' Trading House" security service, which comprises two retired top-class specialists—Colonel Kotov, former head of Moscow Criminal Investigations Department, and KGB General Ryabov—as well as a staff of over 50 people armed with regulation weapons issued under City Internal Affairs Administration license. Who will be the first to clear up the crime?

Petersburg City Assembly Election Rules Viewed

MK1501114094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 15 Jan 94 p 2

[Aleksandr Pozdnyakov report under the "Public" rubric: "Elections to Petersburg City Assembly Will Be Watched. Mayor Decides To Introduce 'Presidential Qualification' for Deputies"]

[Text] Eight St. Petersburg political parties and the city branches of all-Russia parties (among them are the Regional Party of the Center, the Russian Federation Communist Party, the "Civic Union" association, and the regional branch of the Democratic Party of Russia) have formed a Public Committee to monitor the elections for City Assembly. The founders of the committee have sent an appeal to the electoral commission suggesting that regulations for the elections for the City Assembly confirmed by the city mayor should be amended to match the Constitution of Russia and the presidential laws defining general rules for elections for local bodies of representative power.

According to the leader of the Regional Party of St. Petersburg, former city soviet deputy Aleksandr Belkin, who drafted the appeal to the electoral commission, the regulations for the elections for the City Assembly contain "a mass of violations" of the Constitution and presidential laws. In particular, the rights of electoral associations are infringed upon by the demand to secure at least 35,000 voters' signatures in electoral districts for the nomination of their candidates.

The leaders of a number of political parties are going to protest in court against the most apparent violation of the Constitution—the introduction of a five-year "residential qualification" for candidates. In their opinion, this restriction curtails the equality of citizens of Russia, which does not depend on their place of residence—this is established by the Constitution.

The founders of the Public Committee for monitoring the course of elections for the City Assembly have declared their organization open to political organizations that agree with its objectives and tasks. So far there has been no one wishing to join it, however, despite the fact that many politicians share the founders' point of view. They are probably deterred by the membership in the committee of the Russian Federation Communist Party and the rather notorious near-trade union association "For Justice." The city organization of the "Greens" party, for example, having seen the founders lists, abandoned the idea of joining. "Greens" leader Yevgeniy Usov thus explained the reason: "We are not going to do any business with Communists."

International Affairs

'Text' of Tripartite Statement, Appendix

LD1801164094 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 15 Jan 94

["Text" of Tripartite Statement and Appendix signed by Ukrainian, U.S., and Russian presidents in Moscow on 14 January]

[Text] On 14 January this year Presidents Leonid Kravchuk, Bill Clinton, and Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow. The three presidents confirmed that they would cooperate as legitimate and equal partners and that relations between their countries should be built on the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each state.

The three presidents agreed on the importance of developing mutually beneficial and comprehensive relations with regard to economic cooperation. In this connection they welcomed the U.S. intention to give assistance to Ukraine and Russia with the aim of supporting the formation of an effective market economy.

The three presidents discussed the progress reached in nuclear forces reduction. The deactivation of strategic forces is already being carried out in the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. The presidents welcomed the deactivation of RS-18, SS-19, RS-22, and SS- 24 missiles that is being carried out on the territory of Ukraine by removing their warheads. The presidents wish to see ratification of the START I Treaty, including the Lisbon Protocols and other documents connected with it, and President Leonid Kravchuk confirmed his wish that Ukraine accedes in the shortest possible time to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a state that does not possess nuclear weapons.

Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin noted that the ratification of the START I treaty would enable them to demand earlier ratification of the START II treaty. In this connection the presidents discussed the steps that their countries would take with the aim of deciding certain issues in the sphere of nuclear weapons. The presidents stressed the importance of guaranteeing security and reliable storage of nuclear weapons until they are dismantled.

The presidents recognize the importance of granting compensation to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus for the value of highly enriched uranium contained in the warheads located on the territories of those countries. Agreements were worked out on granting Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus fair and timely compensation in proportion to the nuclear warheads located on their territories being removed to Russia for dismantling.

Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin voiced satisfaction with the completion of work on the contract for highly enriched uranium which was signed by the appropriate U.S. and Russian representatives. Since the agreement on highly enriched uranium envisages the processing of weapon-grade uranium into uranium which could be used only for peaceful purposes, it is an important step in the direction of achieving mutual aims by the sides in the area of nonproliferation.

The three presidents reached a decision on the use of simultaneous actions with regard to withdrawing nuclear warheads from Ukraine and granting compensation to Ukraine in the form of nuclear fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations. Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin informed President Leonid Kravchuk that the United States and Russia are prepared to give Ukraine security guarantees.

In particular, as soon as the START I Treaty is ratified and Ukraine accedes to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States and Russia will confirm to Ukraine their obligations in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act to respect independence and sovereignty and existing borders of CSCE member states and to recognize that border changes may be carried out only through peaceful means and by mutual agreement; will confirm their obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; will confirm that none of their weapons will ever be used other than for defensive purposes, or in any other way, in accordance with the UN Charter; will confirm to Ukraine their obligations, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic pressure directed at subjecting to their own interests the implementation by another CSCE member state of rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to receive some advantages; will confirm their obligations to demand immediate action on the part of the UN Security Council with the aim of giving assistance to Ukraine as a member state of the Nonproliferation Treaty that does not possess nuclear weapons, in the event that Ukraine becomes a victim of an act of aggression or is threatened by aggression involving nuclear weapons; will confirm their obligations to Ukraine not to use nuclear weapons against any other member state of the Nonproliferation Treatry that does not possess nuclear weapons other than in the event of an attack on them, their territory, or their trusteeship territories, their armed forces or their allies on the part of such a state, jointly, or in union with a state that possesses nuclear weapons.

Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin informed President Leonid Kravchuk about the consultations that were held with the United Kingdom, the third depositary state of the Nonproliferation Treaty and that the United Kingdom is prepared to give Ukraine the same security guarantees as soon as it becomes party to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a state that does not possess nuclear weapons.

President Bill Clinton confirmed an obligation from the United States to give technical and financial assistance for the reliable and safe dismantling of nuclear weapons and storing fissionable materials.

Within the Nunn-Lugar framework, the United States agreed to give Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus such assistance, amounting to around $800 million, including a minimum of $175 million for Ukraine. The U.S. Congress made a decision to give additional funds as part of the Nunn-Lugar program and the United States will work intensively with Ukraine, Russian, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to increase such help to achieve this important goal. The United States will also work toward a speedy implementation of existing agreements relating to the provision of assistance.

Appendix to the Tripartite Statement between the Ukrainian, U.S., and Russian presidents dated 14 January 1994:

The three presidents decided that, to initiate the process of granting compensation to Ukraine, for a period of 10 months Russia will give Ukraine nuclear fuel assemblies containing 100 tonnes of low-enriched uranium for nuclear power stations. In the same time period at least 200 nuclear warheads from RS-18, SS-19, RS-22, and SS-24 missiles will be transferred from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling. Ukrainian representatives will supervise the dismantling of these warheads.

The United States will pay Russia an advance of $60 million which will be subject to a deduction from the payments that Russia should receive in accordance with the contract on supplying highly enriched uranium. These funds will help to cover costs of transporting and dismantling of strategic warheads and the production of nuclear fuel assemblies. All nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine to Russia for the purpose of their subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Over the same period Russia will provide Ukraine with compensation in the form of supplies of nuclear fuel assemblies for its nuclear power engineering requirements. Ukraine will guarantee to destroy all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons, located on its territory in accordance with its respective agreements over a seven-year period.

As is envisaged by the START I treaty, and in the context of a statement by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine, all RS-22/SS-24 missiles located on the territory of Ukraine will be deactivated over a 10-month period by removing their warheads.

Russia will guarantee technical servicing and safe use of nuclear warheads and Ukraine will cooperate in creating the conditions for Russia to implement these operations in accordance with the agreements reached between Ukraine and Russia in 1993. The United States and Russia will assist in the elaboration and adoption by the International Atomic energy Agency [IAEA] of agreements placing all of Ukraine's nuclear activity under an IAEA guarantee, which will enable nuclear fuel assemblies to be exported from Russia to Ukraine without hindrance for Ukraine's nuclear power engineering.

USSR-U.S. Pact on Strategic Weapons Ratified

WS1901085994 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Yesterday, Ukrainian Supreme Council deputies ratified the USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons signed on 31 July 1991 in Moscow and an accompanying protocol signed in Lisbon in the name of Ukraine on 23 May 1992.

Foreign Ministry Briefing on Russia, U.S. Talks

LD1801192194 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1530 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, 18 Jan—At the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's regular briefing on current issues of foreign policy, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, head of the ministry's directorate for control over armament and disarmament, and Oleksandr Chalyy, head of the ministry's legal and contractual directorate, informed those present about the tripartite talks between the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia, which took place in Moscow on 14 January. A tripartite statement and appendix to the statement were signed at the meeting in Moscow.

The presidents stressed the importance of compensating Ukraine for the value of highly enriched uranium contained in warheads, and the necessity of simultaneous actions when moving warheads from Ukraine and delivering compensation to Ukraine in the shape of fuel assemblies [teplovydilyayuchi zbirky] for atomic electric power stations was acknowledged.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin expressed the readiness of the United States and Russia to give security guarantees to Ukraine when the START I Treaty comes into force and Ukraine accedes to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]. They confirmed their obligations to respect the independence, sovereignty, and existing borders of member states of the CSCE; to refrain from economic pressure, threats of force, or use of force against any state; that no weapons would ever be used, apart from in self defense; and their obligations to strive for immediate actions by the UN Security Council in rendering assistance to Ukraine as a non-nuclear state.

U.S. President Bill Clinton confirmed the U.S. obligation to render technical and financial assistance for the safe disbandment of nuclear forces and storage of fissionable materials [materialy, shcho rozshcheplyuyutsya]. The United States agreed to grant Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus approximately $800 million of such assistance, including a minimum of $175 million to Ukraine.

The signing of tripartite documents in Moscow was possible thanks to the fact that reservations set forth in the Supreme Council resolution of 18 November 1993 were taken into account, in particular reservations regarding international guarantees of Ukraine's national security, conditions of economic and financial-technical assistance in implementing the treaty obligations, and guarantees of compensation for the material value of nuclear weapons components.

The participants of the briefing noted that the "nuclear trash" (which is what nuclear weapons really are) was never weapons in the full sense of the word. After all, their entire guidance system is not located in Ukraine, as is well known. The weapons have a full term of safe storage, but after the term ends they become very dangerous. Therefore the signing of the said documents, the participants of the briefing noted, is a victory of Ukrainian diplomacy. And those who believe otherwise are mistaken.

Official: Nuclear Weapons Storage Unstable

LD1801225894 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Nuclear weapons, whose shelf life is reaching its upper limit, can now pose a threat to Ukraine. Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, head of the directorate of control over armaments and disarmament of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed this during a meeting with journalists on 18 January. He emphasized that all components necessary for the safe storage of nuclear weapons, hydrogen absorbers in particular, are manufactured in Russia and until recently were not being supplied to Ukraine. Hryshchenko noted that this led to the storage of nuclear weapons becoming increasingly unstable. The threat was gradually increasing and demanded a resolution. In the opinion of the representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after Ukraine's experience with Chernobyl it would be extremely irresponsible not to take this situation into account.

Defense Minister 'Fully Supports' Agreement

LD1801233994 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2240 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, 18 Jan—A meeting and friendly conversation between Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy and directors of Ukraine's mass media took place at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The minister talked about Ukraine's armed forces and the problems facing the Ukrainian army.

The most topical problem now is the problem of nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine. Vitaliy Radetskyy fully supports the tripartite agreement between the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on moving nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine. In his opinion, Ukraine is incapable of maintaining its own nuclear weapons at the moment and would have to get rid of them sooner or later.

Vitaliy Radetskyy reported that the elaboration of a plan for developing the armed forces of Ukraine is nearly complete. The plan envisages three stages and is intended for [the period] until 2005.

As regards military-political activity, the minister of defense of Ukraine noted that bilateral treaties on cooperation in the military sphere have been concluded with 19 states. Similar agreements will also soon be concluded with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

If there was a military grouping on the territory of Ukraine in 1991 numbering approximately 1 million servicemen, then a gradual reduction is now under way. To date, Vitaliy Radetskyy noted, there has been a reduction of over 200,000 servicemen. A reduction of another 70,000 is planned next year. As regards military technology, in accordance with international accords, there have already been reductions of 603 tanks, 630 armored personnel carriers, and approximately 170 aviation items.

Acting Premier Sees Opportunities in Accord

PM1901103394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 6

["LOGOTIP-KP" report: "Ukraine: Ordeals Await Kravchuk"]

[Text] The Ukrainian press has been widely commenting on the tripartite treaty on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament signed in Moscow by Presidents Kravchuk, Yeltsin, and Clinton. Leading Ukrainian politicians and statesmen have been expressing their views on this matter. Acting Premier Yukhym Zvyahilskyy assessed the treaty in the following way: Future opportunities for the mutual development of programs and commercial and economic cooperation are opening up. Our children and grandchildren will give their assessment of the step which the three presidents have taken. They will be grateful for it."

At the same time Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil is calling what has taken place "national betrayal." "This is a shameful capitulation by which Ukraine has received neither serious compensation nor serious guarantees for its security. By joining forces, Russia and the United States have forced Ukraine to its knees."

Defense Official on Nuclear Security Issues

LD1801200394 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Oliynyk comments recorded]

[Text] The trilateral statement by the Ukrainian, U.S., and Russian presidents on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of our state remains at the center of attention. So today we continue the topic of a nuclear-free Ukraine.

Talking with our correspondent Vitaliy Lytvynov, Colonel General Ivan Oliynyk, deputy defense minister for arms issues, speaks on the military, scientific, and technological aspects of the implementation of the trilateral statement and an appendix to it on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine:

[Oliynyk, in Russian with superimposed Ukrainian translation] The atmosphere at the meeting between the three presidents on 14 January 1994 was exceptionally friendly and benevolent. It was one of respect. The timing of the meeting was no accident. It had been predetermined by a number of factors which need airing and explaining today. Factor 1 is the technical condition of the nuclear warheads in Ukraine today. Factor 2 is our difficult economic situation. And, finally, Factor 3 is that both the president and government had to implement the decisions taken by the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

[Lytvynov] The world has reacted to this in a very positive manner. The interpretation of this issue here in Ukraine, however, is not uniform, in particular because the people are concerned about us actually becoming defenseless should we rid ourselves of our nuclear forces. This is how our collocutor answered this question:

[Oliynyk] The condition of the arms and the purpose of their use in Ukraine (?did not have any bearing) on the issues of our security. We do not control these weapons, we cannot maintain them in the technically perfect condition and we cannot but implement the decision taken by our state to become non-nuclear in future.

With regard to our security, it can be viewed from two standpoints. That is, relying on our own forces and creating non-nuclear weapons that can enable us to ensure the protection of our state; after all, we are a great rocket and space power. It should also be said that we hope the pledges that were given by the United States, the Russian Federation, and Great Britain will be carried into effect both in respect of our state and the international community.

[Correspondent] Answering the question on how long, what is the duration of the process of nuclear disarmament the Ukrainian deputy defense minister said:

[Oliynyk] This is a lengthy process which is to be determined by the technical condition and the possibility to safely move these weapons over a long distance by transporting them. Everybody today wants to hear when the first and last weapon will be removed. The state must have its own state secrets, for these are very dangerous and unusual weapons. That is why to advertise today when a train will cross Ukraine by railway over a distance of over 700 km to our western borders is unnecessary and risky. We must keep this transport a secret, to ensure safe transportation.

Kravchuk on Nuclear Arms Deal, Other Issues

LD1801233694 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1930 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Studio interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk by program announcer Matvey Ganapolskiy; date not given; from the "First Hand" program—recorded]

[Text] [Ganapolskiy] Good evening. Author's Television presents another program from the "First Hand" series. I will recall that in this program famous politicians, artists, scientists, and culture figures give their view, first hand, of the problems that are particularly important for them at present.

Naturally, the signing of the trilateral agreement on reducing Ukrainian nuclear weapons will remain the most important topic for a long time to come. Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk is our guest and he seems to be smiling, or not even seems—he is smiling! Hello, Leonid Makarovich. Can I say that if the president of Ukraine smiles, it means that everything is all right? What is in your smile?

[Kravchuk] There is indeed a reason to smile today because very important documents have been signed, documents that have opened a path toward nuclear disarmament, that is, toward destroying the most terrible weapons. This is a historic page for the entire human race, and I am happy that, having signed this document, Ukraine has not become a barrier in the path of nuclear disarmament. It has joined the process and will be its active participant.

[Ganapolskiy] You are returning to Kiev, to the Ukraine, or to Ukraine if we are to speak correctly. No doubt, you will immediately hear not only words of approval, but also words of disagreement and simply categorical protests regarding the documents you signed.

[Kravchuk] Naturally, these objections are already in evidence. They were heard at the Supreme Council before. But we must be guided by the interests of Ukraine's entire people and of all mankind, not only by the interests of those who raise objections. That is the opposition, and an opposition always objects and exists for raising objections, whereas we should be guided by supreme interests. Nuclear disarmament is my supreme and global interest. I am convinced that what we have done is right and in the interests of Ukraine, especially as, looking at the strictly factual side, we have managed to implement the provisions included in the Supreme Council's decision, and they are reflected in the documents.

[Ganapolskiy] Sometimes, while going home after a working day, I think—how long will I last? I am quoting your words. So how long will President Kravchuk last? I ask this in the following sense: For me personally, President Kravchuk has the following connotations, for example, the absence of borders between Ukraine and

Russia, no passport controls when traveling by train, absolutely calm communication between two major countries which, if things went wrong, could separate and erect lines of watchtowers. How long will Kravchuk last, how long will I be able to visit my parents in Ukraine calmly, without fear?

[Kravchuk] This is an interesting topic, let us elaborate on it a little. For 340 years Ukraine and Russia—incidentally, in January, somewhere on 20 January, the 340th anniversary of the Pereyaslavl Agreement will be marked—it took place in 1654 and we are now in 1994—for 340 years we, Russia and Ukraine, have been together, correct?

[Ganapolskiy] Yes.

[Kravchuk] But here the question arises: How can we live on without knowing the feeling of being the master of one's own land? So Ukraine has decided to familiarize itself with this feeling and to become the master of its land, its fate, as they say in Ukraine, but it has not set itself the goal of distancing itself from Russia or fencing itself off. The president of Ukraine has never set such a goal, although such a goal is imputed to him.

[Ganapolskiy] Today Leonid Kravchuk is president, tomorrow another person could become president. Are there guarantees—we know that personalities cannot serve as guarantees, although at the initial stage they do. The guarantees are in the mechanism...

[Kravchuk, interrupting] And in people.

[Ganapolskiy] Absolutely right.

[Kravchuk] Well, today we went our separate ways in order to build the Russian state and the Ukrainian state. We went our separate ways, but we should not encourage negative attitudes to each other because negative attitudes will be inherited by our children and grandchildren, and then it will be very difficult to stamp them out. Therefore, we should build our policy in a very clever and patient manner today—Russia toward Ukraine and Ukraine toward Russia. I am striving for this.

And now regarding the borders—the purpose of borders is not only to ensure the possibility of visits. First of all, borders necessarily represent economic guarantees, guarantees that are linked with the movement of different processes across the border, for instance, valuables, drugs, people, and so on. If there is a state, borders are necessary. But it is another matter—what kind of borders? So the economic question is the main issue today. If for instance, we could agree with Russia on the same prices for goods, same tariffs, same custom houses, and so on, then borders will not be necessary. But if a kilogram of meat costs 100 rubles in Russia today, while in Ukraine—two rubles, which way will the meat go?

[Ganapolskiy, interrupting] Well, I can guess, on the whole, and we understand...

[Kravchuk continues] Perhaps you have seen meat and products from Ukraine at the railway stations.

[Ganapolskiy] Yes, I have.

[Kravchuk] So this is the question. So in this situation the border is not Kravchuk's or somebody else's good wish. Agreement is needed. Why is it that the European Community does not have these problems? Because they find agreement on everything. But in our case Russia has its own prices, Ukraine its own, and they do not agree them, even by telephone.

[Ganapolskiy] Can I interpret the things that you, Leonid Makarovich, told me now as a certain grudge against Russia—I am putting this very cautiously, please do not take these words literally—for the failure to agree up to now?

This is not meant to offend. The point is, that we have set up the CIS and we talk a lot about it, but we are unable to resolve many simple problems. When will Ukraine become rich? There is this stereotypical picture of Ukraine—granary—is just one of the many words that can be used to describe it; you arrive there and it is overflowing with milk and honey, as it were. When will Ukraine become such an abundant country? I know your answer: Let Russia become an abundant country first and then we can talk about us. But I would so much like this to happen! Instead, the coupon exchange rate is falling, and all these terrible things. What is the viewpoint of Leonid Kravchuk, the president?

[Kravchuk] Of course, I would like this to happen more than anyone else. But I realize, and everyone should realize this too, that the transition from one structure of life to another, a painful transition that combines the building of a state, the building of our own economic system—that is, transforming a small particle into an entity—all this involves enormous difficulties. In addition to that, Ukraine does not exist in isolation. It is not an island in the middle of a sea—on the contrary, it is surrounded by other states and all this affects it. When we begin to interact, when people understand one simple thing, that neither the president, nor the czar, nor anyone else can give them wealth and prosperity, but only work and work alone; when the administration is organized accordingly and the foundations of our life correspond to the civilized principles tried and proven by humankind, then Ukraine and all the other countries will be rich. Russia is richer than Ukraine. [conversation interrupted by a short passage of music]

[Ganapolskiy] You are a very emotional person, and this seems to me to be one of your most remarkable qualities, that enables you to persuade people—for example, from the rostrum of the Ukrainian Supreme Council. But we know that all emotional people take offense easily. What makes the Ukrainian president take offense? I understand you may be offended by certain people screaming about annexing territory. But I am talking about something different now. What offends or hurts you as a human being?

[Kravchuk] Lack of respect for Ukrainians, lack of will to understand our mentality and our desire to build our own state, a friendly state, a state of partners, but at the same time, our own.

Sometimes I notice in the media and in remarks by some politicians—including Russian politicians—that they still see Ukraine as a small part of their country. We have a similar language. If we spoke Chinese...[pauses]

No, it is not the language, it is the mentality. A Russian democrat—just put a Russian democrat side by side with his Ukrainian counterpart...

[Ganapolskiy, interrupting] Find them for me first, please, and then I will try to put them side by side.

[Kravchuk] Well, what you said is right but I was taking a philosophic point of view.

[Ganapolskiy] Then you are welcome.

[Kravchuk] So, if you put them side by side, the Russian one will look down on the Ukrainian one and the Ukrainian one will look up to the Russian one.

[Ganapolskiy] A Russian democrat will look down on the Ukrainian one, a democrat?

[Kravchuk] Yes, a democrat.

[Ganapolskiy] Leonid Makarovich, in this case he is no democrat. [passage indistinct, both speak at once]

[Ganapolskiy] If you are speaking about the powers that be, then this is possible.

[Kravchuk] Well, I am speaking in general. I cannot fail to see democrats among the Russian intelligentsia, but sometimes even they in their pronouncements—I follow this, they are democrats in essence, but as regards Ukraine they show a kind of patronizing attitude [zverkhnist] as they say in our country—I cannot translate this word into Russian.

[Ganapolskiy] I understand. Of course, Russian-Ukrainian relations represent, first and foremost, a room behind which two presidents are hiding from outsiders, hiding in the good sense of the word, and a tete-a-tete conversation is under way. Do you have rapport with Boris Nikolayevich, and can we say that your talks with him, rather, your conversations with him, not talks, are successful and that you see eye to eye?

[Kravchuk] I will frankly say the following: If Boris Nikolayevich and myself met together and stayed together, the two of us—this is hypothetical—if he did not have his entourage and I did not have mine, we would understand each other absolutely clearly and precisely. But the thing is that there are very many left-wingers, right-wingers, and centrists around us, and information that is beneficial or not creates such an atmosphere that it is sometimes very difficult to make decisions that you feel are part of your inner self. The environment has to be taken into account.

[Ganapolskiy] Thank you for this conversation that I would like to conclude with a Ukrainian saying that I have known since childhood. There is a wonderful Ukrainian saying [pronounces the saying in Ukrainian] which, you will agree, is very difficult to translate into Russian, but in principle it can be translated in the following way, although it will not be as succinct: Let us have respect for ourselves because we deserve it. As I see it, Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk is doing everything possible to ensure that this saying retains its meaning.

[Kravchuk] Since we are in Moscow, this is something I reiterate everywhere and will continue to do so: As an independent state, Ukraine can be a success only on condition that it finds friendly and good relations with Russia. And there is another thing: If Russians, as you have put it, both democrats and non- democrats—I will continue to separate them anyway—if Russians understand that Ukraine as a state is a very important factor in Russia's international policy, not a simple entity that can be joined or rejected at will, but a very important factor in Russia's life. If our two states find such a formula of mutual relations, this will be extremely necessary, extremely useful and, from a political viewpoint, extremely advantageous to both Russia and Ukraine, hence to the whole world, because we make up more than 200 million [people], taking account of our potential. In other words, we can solve all problems, all that needed is a greater striving.

[Ganapolskiy] Thank you for this conversation, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, president of Ukraine. Thank you and see you viewers in a week.

Moscow Paper Cites Mixed Reaction to Accord

PM1901120394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 3

[Grigoriy Nesmyanovich report: "Leonid Kravchuk Signed. But Will Ukrainian Parliament Complete Process?"]

[Text] Kiev—It was hard to tell beforehand what documents the Russian, U.S., and Ukrainian presidents would sign at their tripartite meeting in Moscow, or whether any would be signed at all. It was far easier to predict that, in the event of the Ukrainian president's confirming with his own hand that Ukraine is renouncing ownership of nuclear weapons, the reactions of the various political forces within Ukraine would not coincide.

That is in effect what has happened. Stepan Davimuka, head of the Lvov Oblast State Administration, and Nikolay Horyn, chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, for instance, largely supported the stance that Leonid Kravchuk took at his meeting with the Russian and U.S. presidents in Moscow. In the opinion of the Lvov leaders, Ukraine will derive tangible material and moral benefit from the agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The opposite view was expressed by the leadership of the Conservative Republican Party, led by Ukrainian People's Deputy Stepan Hmara, who is well-known for his radical views. A statement by the party leadership claims that President Kravchuk acted contrary to Ukraine's national interests in Moscow.

We also know of the statement made by Ukrainian opposition leader Vyacheslav Chornovil, who described the actions taken by Kravchuk in signing the Moscow agreement as "national betrayal and a shameful surrender."

The Supreme Council has once again come to life. In this case following the tripartite signing of the disarmament documents it will be easy to follow all the subsequent steps taken by those against and those in favor of keeping nuclear weapons. The next session of the parliament, the first sitting of which is scheduled for 20 January, will not be easy for the president since it is one thing to explain your position to journalists at a news conference and quite another to do the same to hard-line oppositionists. And the background to the discussion is not one of the best: An all-Ukraine strike has begun. Yet another reason for charges to be leveled against Kravchuk as head of the state executive....

National Affairs

Accident at Atomic Plant of 'Local' Significance

AU1801144094 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 15 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by the DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA News Service: "Zaporizhzhya: An Accident at the Atomic Electric Power Station"]

[Text] As reported by the Information Center of the Zaporizhzhya Atomic Electric Power Station [AES], on 12 January at 1000 [local time], [radioactive] contamination was revealed in a compressed-air pipeline in one of the auxiliary technological buildings. No contamination of the plant's territory, irradiation of the personnel, or discharges into the environment took place. There is no danger either for the population or for people working at the plant.

It has been tentatively found that radioactive water entered the compressed-air pipeline from the fourth power unit due to the lack of tightness in one of the locking valves in the compressed-air line, which is used for processing the ion-exchange resins in filters of the special water-purification installation.

Work on decontaminating the compressed-air pipeline has already been completed. Therefore, the incident was local in character and had no effect upon the plant's operation.

A commission is investigating the causes of the accident.

Kravchuk Urges Amendment on Crimea's Status

LD1801212894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1936 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Mikhail Melnik—TASS]

[Text] Kiev January 18 TASS—The Ukrainian parliament plans to consider an amendment to the constitution at one of its upcoming sessions to clarify the status of the Crimea.

A proposal to this effect was made by President Leonid Kravchuk at a meeting with representatives of local councils in Kiev on Tuesday. The proposal was supported by parliament Chairman Ivan Plyushch.

The amendment would state that bodies of state power in the Crimea are to be formed and act on the basis of the Ukrainian Constitution and laws and the constitution of the Republic of Crimea. The latter should not run counter to the Constitution of Ukraine.

Kravchuk stressed that no one wants to infringe upon the rights of the Crimean people because the Crimea is part of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Crimea held presidential elections over the weekend to elect its first ever president. Officials in the Ukrainian capital Kiev pinned hopes on Nikolay Bahrov, speaker of the Crimean parliament and the sole candidate calling for Crimea to remain in a federal Ukraine.

However, 38.5 per cent of those who took part in the elections voted for Yuriy Meshkov of the Nationalist Russia bloc, and 17.5 per cent—for Bahrov. These two candidates will be put up for the runoff elections to be held on January 30.

Crimean Candidate Holds News Conference

LD1901114194 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0903 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Simferopol—Yuriy Meshkov, leader of the "Russia" bloc and candidate for president of the Republic of Crimea, gave a news conference yesterday. He received 38.5 percent of the vote on 16 January in the first round of elections. Yuriy Meshkov told journalists that the persuasive results of the voting in Crimea testify to the possibility of improving relations between Crimea and Ukraine and put relations with Russia on a qualitatively new level.

Responding to a question about a possible reaction from official Kiev toward new Crimea, Yuriy Meshkov expressed confidence in the ability of Leonid Kravchuk, as one of the outstanding politicians of the present time, to regulate the political situation in Ukraine and beyond. In the words of Yuriy Meshkov, the Ukrainian president stated earlier that the dislocation of forces in Crimea ruled out a forcible intervention from outside, since it would lead to unforeseen consequences. "I have no grounds for not trusting Kravchuk," Meshkov stressed.

In spite of the fact that the central point of Yuriy Meshkov's electoral program is the holding of an all-Crimean referendum on the status of the peninsula, the presidential candidate refrained at the news conference from stating the act of will by the Crimeans, but noted that this will, which was expressed during the elections on 16 January, should be given legal form. [Words indistinct] that the referendum will be held on 27 March.

Yuriy Meshkov confirmed his position regarding the nonacceptance of quotas in the Supreme Council of the Republic of Crimea for deported peoples, noting that quotas for Crimean Tatars in the future parliament would be a violation of the norms of international law. The candidate for president of the Crimean Republic described the Assembly of the Crimean Tatars as a real civil and political force. He also said that Crimea has enough state attributes but not enough state content: "What we need are not the outward signs of statehood but the possibility of resolving all economic, political, and sociocultural issues by taking into maximum account the Crimean Republic's interests."

'Politically Motivated' Attack on Crimean Deputy

WS1901122694 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] A terrible tragedy happened last night near the home of Crimean People's Deputy Iskander Mamedov, adviser to the Crimean Supreme Soviet chairman. When Mamedov and some colleagues were entering his house and being met by members of Mamedov's family, the sounds of assault rifles and grenades were heard. The firing came from two sides. As a result, 11 people—including Mamedov's son and daughter—were wounded and two people were killed. Iskander Mamedov was brought to the hospital in critical condition. In the opinion of Lilya Budzhurova, a well-known activist of the Tatar movement in the Crimea, whose report on the case was broadcast today on Crimean radio, the attempted murder of Mamedov, one of organizers of Mykola Bahrov's election campaign, was politically motivated.

If anyone has any information on this case, please contact the police in Simferopol.

Belarus

U.S.-Brokered Uranium Deal With Russia Sought

PM1901131194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report on interview with Valeriy Tsepkalo, adviser to the chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet on foreign economic issues; date not given: "After Ukraine, Belarus Claims Its Share of Uranium"]

[Text] Minsk—The Belarusian leadership is concerned about the agreement signed in Moscow by Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk. And during the U.S. President's visit to Minsk the extremely delicate question of Belarus's share of the materials from the elimination of warheads was raised. IZVESTIYA's correspondent asked Valeriy Tsepkalo, the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet's adviser on foreign economic questions, to comment on this situation.

"The question of the share of the uranium in the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons being withdrawn from Belarusian territory has been discussed in talks between ourselves and Russia," Valeriy Tsepkalo explained.

"Moscow and Washington formerly prepared an agreement on the sale to the United States of the uranium released as a result of the elimination of the nuclear warheads on strategic offensive weapons. At that time the United States reassured Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine that the agreement would not be signed before the question of the distribution of revenue from the sale of the uranium was settled. Nevertheless, the United States and Russia did sign the agreement. But the United States has assured us that the agreement will not come into force until agreement is reached on the distribution of the revenue. The United States is buying 500 tonnes of uranium over 20 years at a cost of $5.5 billion.

"The agreement between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine contains provisions which establish Ukraine's share of uranium sales, either in money or in kind—that is to say, through the delivery of industrial uranium for Ukrainian nuclear power stations. And most important of all, Ukraine has succeeded in resolving the problem of tactical nuclear weapons; in other words Russia has agreed to recognize Ukraine's right to the fissionable materials in the tactical weapons and count their number when determining the profit from the sale of uranium.

"For us this is very important. Russia has not recognized our right to that quantity of fissionable materials in the nuclear weapons withdrawn from Belarus through 27 April 1992. But after all, almost half of all the tactical nuclear weapons of the former USSR were situated on the republic's territory.

"Russia has claimed that the lion's share of the revenue from the sale of uranium will go toward covering the expense of destroying the weapons. However, this does not correspond to reality, since Russia has received considerable sums for these very purposes from the United States.

"We consider it possible to begin talks with Russia about our share of the profits with the mediation of the United States—that is to say, to prepare an agreement similar to the one signed in Moscow."

Kebich on Prospects for Ties With Russia

LD1801171494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1454 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] By 238 votes for and 7 against, the 345-member [figures as received] parliament in Minsk ratified the CIS Charter on Tuesday [18 January].

However, the opposition People's Front abstained, its leader, Zenon Pozniak, said.

State Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs Vladimir Zalomay said the ratification "will be of huge importance for shaping the country's foreign policy and become a new step by Minsk on the way to consolidating the CIS and raising its efficiency."

For his part, Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, who also supports the ratification of the CIS basic agreement, dwelt upon the prospects of relations with Russia and a monetary union with Moscow. He said that "despite all difficulties, Belarus has an economic potential enabling it to negotiate with Russia on equal terms."

The Prime Minister said that some of the Russian politicians who see the union as a handout to Belarus were wrong. He said Belarus had never lived at the cost of others and that the monetary union would not resolve its problems but create an economic environment for removing artificial barriers to bilateral cooperation.

Kebich strongly attacked Zenon Pozniak's accusations of Russian imperialism carried by the parliament-sponsored NARODNYA GAZETA newspaper. The Prime Minister said that an overwhelming majority of Belarusians opposed to the country's self-isolation wanted a union with Russia.

Shushkevich Views Monetary Union With Russia

LD1801172594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1454 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] The head of the Belarusian parliament, Stanislav Shushkevich, thinks that the joining of Belarusian and Russian monetary systems should not be viewed as the solution to all difficulties. "Our economy should be reformed by ourselves, not by Russia," he declared in a televised statement Monday evening.

Nevertheless, Shushkevich conceded that a monetary union with Russia is capable of considerably improving the economic situation in Belarus.

According to him, to ensure normal working of the proposed monetary union it is necessary to fix equal prices for fuel and basic raw materials and establish a customs union between Belarus and Russia.

With reference to the possibility of his resignation during the current parliamentary session, Shushkevich said he is aware that a group of deputies intended to "raise this issue." He would resign on his own, if he believed that the next speaker will induce legislators to fix a date for early parliamentary elections, Shushkevich said.

Views Political, Economic Problems

LD1801194694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1247 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By BELINFORM correspondent Valentina Menshikova]

[Text] Minsk, 18 Jan (TASS)—"I hope that Yegor Gaydar's resignation will not affect relations with Russia," Belarus Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushevich stated in the evening of 17 January in a live broadcast of Belarusian television, replying to viewers' questions.

He described the situation in Belarus as complicated and contradictory, having noted that it should be fundamentally changed and that this can be done only through a new composition of parliament by early elections, which he is advocating.

Having touched on a possible monetary merger with Russia, the Supreme Soviet chairman stated that if the merger of monetary systems produces merely a parity of prices for fuel, one could hope for an improvement of the economic situation. "However, no one will establish order in our house for us. It is for us to decide how we are going to go on living," he stressed.

Deputy: Shushkevich 'Gambling' With Security

LD1801191394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1805 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] Parliamentary Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, speaking on national television late on Monday, said he knew that a group of deputies was planning to try to force his resignation during a parliamentary session opening in Minsk on Tuesday.

Shushkevich said he would have stepped down of his own accord if given assurances that the new Speaker would be able to get the parliament to set the date for an early election.

For his part, coordinator of the large Belarus faction uniting more than 120 deputies, Gennadiy Kozlov, told INTERFAX that on a motion from regional groups, more than 100 signatures were collected in support of demands for a no-confidence vote against Shushkevich.

Kozlov says his faction is opposed to the Speaker's "gambling around the CIS collective security agreement or his interpretation of a monetary union with Russia."

He said that despite his verbal declarations of support for a full scale economic union with Russia, Shushkevich "starts raising concern about a possible loss of the country's independence when it comes down to business."

In his words, the key issues facing the second round of the parliamentary session include the ratification of the CIS founding agreement until January 23, the adoption of a new constitution and election law and a concept of the country's foreign policy. If the session fails to adopt the new basic law, says Kozlov, the Belarus faction will insist its main provisions such as presidency and the status of the Russian language be put for a nationwide referendum. The faction also wants a national verdict on the legitimacy of the Belovezh accords overhauling the former Soviet Union, which is a highly sensitive issue on the ground, he said.

In the meantime, the morning session was focused on the ratification of the CIS Charter. State Secretary for CIS Affairs Vladimir Zalomay, presenting the paper, said its ratification "will be of huge importance for shaping the country's foreign policy and become one more step by Minsk on the way towards beefing up the Commonwealth and raising its efficiency."

For his part, Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich, also supporting the ratification of the document, spoke of the prospects of relations with Russia and a monetary union with Moscow. He said that despite all difficulties, Belarus had an economic potential enabling it to negotiate with Russia on equal terms.

He said "some of the Russian politicians who consider such a union as a handout to Belarus are mistaken." Kebich said Belarus had never lived at the cost of others. Although the union will not solve all of the country's problems, it will help create an economic environment clearing many of the stumbling blocks on the way towards bilateral cooperation, he said.

The Prime Minister mounted strong criticism of opposition leader Zenon Pozniak, who accused Russia of imperialism in an article carried by the parliament-sponsored newspaper, NARODNAYA GAZETA. Pozniak called Russia "a country of God's fools building its relations with other states on the traditions of Mongol hordes." For his part, Kebich said that an overwhelming majority of Belarusians were opposed to the country's self-isolation preferring a union with Russia instead.

Shushkevich himself in a televised interview on Monday said that a monetary union with Moscow could help towards a dramatic improvement in the country's economic plight. At the same time, he warned that such a union should not be seen as a panacea against all troubles.

"It is up to us, not Russia, to reform the country's economy," Shushkevich said. In his view, to make the union work, the two countries must establish equal prices for fuel and raw materials and sign a custom union.

On the possibility of forming his own party, Shushkevich made it clear he had pondered over the problem but there was no need for one at the moment. "Some politicians in Russia formed their own parties, but they did so in the run up to general elections," he said.

Shushkevich stressed that he would be "physically unable" to lead a party because of the huge amount of work he was having to cope with as Parliamentary Chairman.

It is now known that the Belarusian parliament has ratified the CIS charter by a vote of 238 votes for and 7 against. Opposition leader Zenon Pozniak said his faction had abstained.

Moldova

Tension Increases; 14th Army Issues Statement

AU1901101894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Report by correspondent Mircea Dascaliuc from Chisinau]

[Text] The Military Council of the 14th Russian Army yesterday adopted and published a toughly worded statement in which the authorities of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic are warned that decisive retaliatory measures will be taken, including the use of arms, if the denigration and attacks on the personnel and military objectives of the Russian Federation's Army continue.

Likewise, the statement calls on the president of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic, Igor Smirnov, and the leader of the Supreme Soviet, Grigore Maracuta, to investigate in a principled manner the illegal actions committed against soldiers of the Russian Army and inform the 14th Army Command of the steps taken.

This quasi-ultimatum attitude is the result of the increasing tension in Tiraspol, where, for some time, the Dniester leaders, on the one hand, and General Lebed and Colonel Mihailov Bergman, on the other, have been engaged in a real duel of mutual accusations.

After General Lebed's recent meeting with directors of schools and presidents of the trade union committees of these institutions, to whom he suggested civic disobedience, and at which meeting the Tiraspol leadership was harshly criticized, the Russian officer was accused of plotting the overthrow of the government. University Professor Vasiliy Yakovlev, leader of a group of civic organizations, described the general as an agent of the Moldovan Republic. Regarding the general's participation in a meeting convened by the Tiraspol Town Educational Directorate, the same Yakovlev accused General Lebed of being an accomplice in the Romanization of education in the Dniester region by recognizing the right of Moldovan children to study in Romanian in Latin script.

Likewise, in a statement adopted recently, the aktiv of the Interior Ministry expressed its determination to defend the statehood of the so-called Dniester Republic, no matter from where the threats may come. Deputy Interior Minister Nicolay Medveev called for the two Russian officers to be declared persona non grata and expelled from the Dniester region. All this has increased tension in Tiraspol alarmingly. As the local correspondent of the National Radio Network of the Republic of Moldova reported, in a way, a certain duality of power has been established in the town. Both sides have sufficient and well-equipped military and paramilitary forces.

Yesterday, General Aleksandr Lebed, writing in IZVESTIYA, proposed a solution, quote: to eliminate all odious elements—certainly he was referring to the Tiraspol leaders—organize new elections, and put certain credible persons in power.

Lebed, Borovoy Accused of Preparing 'Coup'

PM1801135994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Svetlana Gamova report: "General Lebed Has Urged the Dniester Region to Civil Disobedience"]

[Text] Chisinau—"There is daylight robbery taking place in the Dniester Region," General Lebed, commander of the 14th Army, stated at a meeting with public education workers in Tiraspol. "That is why there have been no positive changes in the negotiation process." In Lebed's words, he sees a "peaceful solution to the question" through "civil disobedience and a polite request to the authorities to clear off."

Accusations of corruption addressed to top officials of the region's administration are heard virtually every week on television, as well as at the commander's meetings in labor collectives. The purpose of Gen. Lebed's tour of the people, in his words again, is "to get rid of all the odious figures, hold repeat elections, and bring to power people who command respect."

A scandal was caused by recently published documents on intrigues involving fuel delivered to the Dniester Region from Russia. The main figure in this story is A. Bolshakov, chairman of a commission of the Dniester Supreme Soviet and a leader of a small enterprise who, according to the documents in question, is "KGB agent Berzin." These documents, which had been handed over to the security organs of the Dniester Region, soon went missing and the region's prosecutor informed the 14th Army's commander that "criminal proceedings have been instituted regarding the loss of personal and official documents relating to agent Berzin of the former KGB." In connection with all these events Lebed has stated: "The uncontrolled crime wave in the city forces me to take the path chosen by the Black Sea Fleet's men and adopt resolute measures to establish public order."

Lebed's comments have provoked a response, in particular from the workers' committee in Bendery which dubbed the commander "the black general." Leaflets have appeared in Tiraspol informing citizens that the republic is in danger and that a military coup is being prepared under the leadership of Lebed and Economic Freedom Party leader Borovoy.

In the opinion of certain officials of the Dniester Region, the general's aim is to retain the Army's hardware and remove it without the knowledge of the local authorities. To which Lebed commented that the Army is carrying out planned reductions and the disbandment of certain units and that the negotiating process is the basis for the withdrawal of the 14th Army from the Dniester Region.

Armenia

Karabakh Foreign Minister Returns From Serbia

NC1801170994 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1414 GMT 18 Jan 94

[All Serbian names and titles as published]

[Text] Yerevan, 18 Jan (ARMENPRES)—Arkadiy Gukasyan, the foreign minister of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR], returned today from a visit to the conflict zone in the former Yugoslavia. The purpose of the visit was to gather first-hand information on the UN peacekeeping force's operations in the region.

The NKR Foreign Ministry reported that Gukasyan met with First Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia Danilo Markovic in Belgrade and with Serbian President Radovan Karadzic and Foreign Minister Aleksa Bukha in Pale. They exchanged views on ways to achieve a peaceful settlement similar to the ones existing in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Edict Changes National Security Agency Structure

LD1801204894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1835 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No. 11 (501)]

[Text] President Levon Ter-Petrosyan has signed a decree changing the command structure of the National Security Agency, dissolving the operative services and suspending the activities of its personnel other than the border guards and technical, financial and other services.

Davil Shakhnazaryan, 38, Armenian parliament deputy who was presidential special envoy, has been appointed acting agency chief replacing Eduard Simonyan.

Shakhnazaryan has three months to screen the agency personnel and draft the charter, structure and personnel requirements for government approval.

Aram Abramyan, the president's spokesman, told Interfax that the National Security Agency needed an overhaul to deal with the challenges facing an independent state.

U.S. Allegedly Offers To Buy Fuel From Baku

NC1801135194 Yerevan SNARK in English 0946 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, January 18 (SNARK)—The trustworthy sources told SNARK the USA official representative offers to solve the humanitarian kerosene deliveries problem by purchasing the fuel from Azerbaijan.

It's known the great amount of kerosene is in the Batumi port and it's impossible to deliver it to Armenia because of the situation at the Georgian roads.

So, Azerbaijan has an additional chance to earn using the situation.

According to the data SNARK News Agency possesses, the price for the Azerbaijani kerosene is in 1.5 times more than the price for the fuel which could be brought by planes from Russia and in 2 times more than the Irani kerosene price. Azerbaijani could use the acquired currency to go on with the military actions in Karabakh, so, can this way be considered as the accepted one. Besides, such deliveries are the violations of the "Freedom Defense Law", accepted by the USA Congress which prohibits the USA Government to finance Azerbaijan because of the blockade course he accepted in respect to Armenia and Karabakh.

Small Amount of Gas Arrives Via Temporary Pipeline

NC1801165494 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1414 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, 18 Jan (ARMENPRES)—The laying of a temporary pipeline in Georgia where the pipeline entering Armenia was last blown up has been completed. The government's press service has reported that for the time being only an insignificant amount of gas is coming in.

Azerbaijan

Defense Ministry Communique Reported 17 Jan

NC1701204094 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 17 Jan 94

["Text" of Azerbaijani Defense Ministry communique issued on 17 January; read by announcer]

[Text] The Armenian military units launched an attack against the Fizuli sector of the front line at 0100 today. Azerbaijan's military forces counterattacked and forced the enemy units to retreat to their positions, after suffering several casualties.

According to the information received from the occupied areas, the Armenian military command has involved the militia units in the fighting to achieve its occupationist objectives in Khankendi [formerly Stepanakert] and the other occupied areas in Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, helicopters continue to urgently transfer reinforcements and military equipment from Armenia to Daghlyk Karabakh. They transfer the wounded Armenians back to Armenia after unloading their cargo. The dead bodies of Armenian conscripts from Armenia are transferred in trucks from Daghlyk Karabakh to that Republic through the Lachin corridor every day.

More than 1,000 enemy troops have been killed in the recent clashes. That has been concealed from the Armenian people. It seems that the dissemination of such reports will not be in the interest of Armenia's leading circles and those who wage the bloody war.

Hostilities Continued

LD1401202794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1702 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] Despite great losses in personnel and military equipment, the Azerbaijani army still makes attempts to break positions of the Karabakh forces along the whole line of confrontation, the press service of the Karabakh army told INTERFAX.

According to the press center, in the morning of January 14 the Azerbaijani army resumed its offensive after intensive artillery preparations. It was on the border of Karabakh's Martuni and Azerbaijan's Fizuli regions that the Karabakh formations managed to seize several strategic heights on Thursday [13 January]. As of 15:00 on Thursday hostilities were continuing in this region. There have been no substantial changes on other sections of the front over the previous 24 hours.

The day before, supported by three tanks and five armored vehicles, 250 Azerbaijani infantrymen attacked positions of the Karabakh army on the section Madagiz-Akop-Kamari in Nagorny Karabakh's Mardakert region, reports the press center. The Karabakh forces were a success while inflicting a flank strike against a concentration of Azerbaijani forces. As a result of a three hour fight the Azerbaijani detachments appeared encircled, and 76 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed. According to preliminary information, the Karabakh party has only 11 soldiers wounded.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry asserts that the Armenian but not Azerbaijani formations are waging the offensive, particularly in Karabakh's north and southeast. All attempts by the Armenians to counterattack were fruitless.

The ministry rejected Armenian reports about the seizure of several villages in the north of Karabakh's Mardakert region by the Karabakh formations. It pointed out that the village of Akop-Kamari (its Azerbaijani name - Lyulyasaz) and Madagiz were under control of Azerbaijan's armed forces.

The ministry also reports that the air defense forces had been ordered not to bring down Armenian helicopters heading from the Karabakh village of Gadrut to Armenia despite the fact that they violate Azerbaijan's air space. Baku believes that wounded soldiers are being evacuated on these helicopters. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry indicated that the number of these flights had greatly increased over the last time.

Heavy Losses on Both Sides

LD1601193294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1743 GMT 16 Jan 94

[Text] At about 7:30, January 16, following an intensive artillery preparation, the Azerbaijani troops assumed an offensive in two directions—the Matagis-Akop and Kamari section in the Mardakert Region, and the Askeran-Agdam direction, informed sources in Stepanakert told Interfax.

By 10:00, the Azerbaijani attacks were rebuffed by Karabakh forces in the Northern direction. One Azerbaijani tank was destroyed and 30 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed. The Azerbaijani army had to retreat to the earlier assumed positions.

By midday, heavy fighting continued at the eastern limits of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both sides are sustaining losses. Local fighting continues in the other sections of the front.

The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry announced, meanwhile, that on Sunday morning, well-equipped Armenian units assumed an offensive in the Fizuli Region, moving towards the Iranian border. Attacks are being made on the villages of Goradiz and Derdchinar.

During fierce combat operations the Azerbaijani army rebuffed the Armenian attack, throwing Armenian units back to the initial positions. A source in the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry announced that two Armenian tanks, one armored vehicle and 1 artillery piece had been destroyed. Armenians suffered great losses.

The same source reports, that in December and January, more than a thousand Armenian soldiers were killed or wounded.

Further Details of Fighting

LD1801135894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1148 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] After the night's lull, Azeri troops launched an offensive at 10 a.m. on January 18, in the north of the Martuni region of Nagorno-Karabakh, INTERFAX was told by a spokesman for the Karabakh Defense Ministry. Reports say fierce fighting continues at that section of the front.

On Tuesday morning there was a relative lull at other sections of the front.

In the morning of January 18 an Azeri war plane attempted to drop bombs on Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh air defenses forced the plane away from the city.

Meanwhile, a source in the Azeri Defense Ministry spoke about attempts by the Armenian forces to attack the strategic railway station at Goradiz, but were recently beaten off by the Azeri army. The station is situated near the Azeri-Iranian border. Two attacks to re-capture the station were thwarted. A Karabakh tank was put out of action.

The source also spoke about fighting on Monday evening to the east of the Azeri regional center of Agdam, which is under Armenian control, as well as at the approaches to the village of Novruzlu, where, the source says, a Karabakh armored personnel vehicle was put out of action.

In the early hours of Tuesday, the fighting at this section of the front, as well as in the north part of the conflict zone, was restricted by sporadic artillery shelling.

The source says four local inhabitants were wounded as a result of the shelling of Azeri settlements bordering on Armenia.

Stepanakert Residential Areas Bombed

LD1501173994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1648 GMT 15 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow January 15 TASS—Two assault aircraft of the Azeri Air Force bombed Stepanakert residential areas last night, sources at the Karabakh Information and Press Department told ITAR-TASS over the telephone. The number of victims is being specified.

According to the Karabakh defence army headquarters' press center, the Azeri national army resumed offensive on south-eastern and southern front sections at 7 a.m. today. Position fighting is reported from other areas.

Karabakh units are deterring the offensive. The Azeris lost up 50 men killed, three tanks and an APC [armored personnel carrier] on Friday. The Karabakh side lost one man killed, nine wounded and one tank.

'Intensive Shelling' Reported

LD1701131294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1248 GMT 17 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Barykin]

[Text] Moscow January 17 TASS—The intensive shelling of Nagorno-Karabakh positions began today in the morning by the Azeri National Army at the eastern and south-eastern sections of the Nagorno-Karabakh front. According to the press service of the headquarters of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army, units of the Nagorno-Karabakh Army are fighting defence battles along the whole of the front line.

At 10.00 in the morning Azeri assault planes made five attempts to bomb Stepanakert, a spokesman for the Nagorno-Karabakh press and information department told ITAR-TASS by telephone. However, anti-aircraft defence units made them retreat. The population is being warned in time about the coming air raids.

According to the press service of the defence army headquarters, the fighting was especially fierce at the eastern and Askeran-Agdam sections. Dozens of Azeri armoured vehicles took part in it. The Nagorno-Karabakh troops destroyed a tank, an armoured personnel carrier and killed 60 enemy soldiers, forcing the Azeri troops to retreat to their initial positions. In the Nagorno-Karabakh units two men were killed and seven wounded.

Aliyev Blames Former Leaders for Troop Presence

LD1801203694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1809 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Azerbaijani President Gaydar Aliyev declared that introduction of Soviet forces on January 20, 1990, would have been impossible if Baku's former leadership had not permitted forces to be introduced.

As many as 132 people were killed during those January days and more than 700 were wounded.

The president voiced his remark during the report of Azerbaijan's attorney general Ali Omarov. Omarov, in particular, pointed out that the purpose for forces being introduced into Baku at that time was primarily to rescue the leadership of Azerbaijan's communist party.

As the attorney general believes, Azerbaijan's former leaders Abdurakhman Vezirov, Ayaz Mutalibov, Viktor Polyanichko, Elmira Gafarova, and former leader of the republic's KGB Vagif Gusaynov should be made answerable for the January 1990 events along with the former Soviet leadership at that time and its power ministers (Gorbachev, Yazov, Kryuchkov, Bakatin, Primakov).

Omarov reported that he had ordered the National Security Ministry to institute proceedings against Vagif Gusaynov due to the January 20, 1990, events in Baku.

Observers do not rule out that criminal charges against Vezirov and Mutalibov can be brought as well.

The discussion is being continued.

Meeting With Armenian President Uncertain

NC1701222094 Baku TURAN in English 1656 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January 15 (Turan)—As a reliable source at Azerbaijani President's staff told TURAN news agency, a supposed meeting of Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents is being worked out. Russian capital Moscow is the most prominent place for this meeting. Azerbaijan's ambassador to Russia Ramiz Rizayev also did not excluded the possibility of the meeting.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov told the press in Baku recently, that "Armenian party's approach to this meeting is of a non-constructive character".

To his mind, serious documents have to be prepared to be signed by the end of the meeting. Gasanov said that the Armenian side neither proposes such documents, nor accepts Azerbaijan's proposals.

Touching upon the recent interview of Robert Kocharyan, the leader of Armenian community of

Nagorno-Karabakh to the Russian TV, Gasanov said, that "this interview again proved that the Republic of Armenia arms Nagorno-Karabakh separatist fighters. It has become clear, that Armenian side tries to solve the conflict by all means forcibly".

Such position, Mr. Gasanov considers, cannot be the basis for the negotiation process on regulation of the conflict.

To Meet in Moscow 25 Jan

NC1801223794 Baku TURAN in English 0820 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow. January 17 [date as received] (TURAN)—The meeting between Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents has been planned for January 25 in Moscow with the Russian side serving as mediator, a reliable source at the Russian Foreign Ministry told TURAN's reporter.

According to information available, Moscow has organized the talks at the request of the Armenian side. Another attempt to bring about a change in the political regulation of the Armenian-Azeri conflict will be made at the meeting with the participation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

A pre-meeting dialogue by the heads of foreign offices of Azerbaijan and Armenia will take place in Moscow as well.

The questions discussed by the foreign ministers will be the same for the presidents.

Diplomatic experts believe that Moscow and Yerevan will try to force Baku to agree to a plan that has been worked out by the adviser of the Russian president, Andranik Migranian [name as received]. According to this plan, Azerbaijan will have to guarantee the granting of status of broad self-government and the according political status to Nagorno-Karabakh. The plan's terms also include the creation of the so-called "humanitarian corridors" from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh through Lachin and Kelbadzhar in exchange for peace.

Moreover, this plan envisions the creation of a "demilitarized zone" along all the perimeter of Nagorno-Karabakh."

The proposal also envisages measures providing regular transport of energy and free flow of communications in the Transcaucasian region. In particular, the plan also sees the creation of a railroad command post that would provide strict management of the railways.

Russia's Peace Plan Draws Mixed Reaction

MK1401122094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "Baku Not Yet Ready To Accept Russia's Plan for Karabakh Problem Settlement, but the Document's Main Provisions Have Already Been Determined"]

[Text] The talks of Azerbaijani authorities with Vladimir Kazimirov, special representative of the Russian Federation president, that ended 12 January in Baku, were held in a constructive atmosphere and enabled the sides to agree on the main principles of a peaceful solution to the Karabakh problem. This is what Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov said in an interview for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. He emphasized that the draft agreement on the peaceful settlement proposed by the Russian diplomat drew a mixed reaction from the Baku authorities. According to the Azerbaijani minister, the draft does not include provisions on the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from all occupied territories, on which Baku has been insisting. Instead, the two sides were invited to sit down at a negotiating table to discuss all contentious matters. Gasan Gasanov asked the Russian diplomat to make substantial adjustments to the peaceful settlement draft. "Azerbaijan insists on a phased solution to the question," he told your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. "We will give security guarantees to the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, but in exchange the Armenian side must create all requisite conditions for a return of more than a million Azerbaijani refugees to the areas of their permanent residence." When asked by the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent about Baku's attitude to Moscow's proposal for the Iranian-Azerbaijani border to be protected jointly, the Azerbaijani minister said: "This proposal may be a matter of discussion after Azerbaijan and Iran sign a treaty "On the Regime of the Azerbaijani-Iranian Border." During my visit to Tehran we reached agreement on setting up a working group for drawing up this document."

Russia Proposes Joint Free Economic Zone

NC1401161494 Baku TURAN in English 1102 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Text] Baku (January 13) TURAN—TURAN's Moscow correspondent reports that the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a message to Baku concerning its initiative for regulating border control between Russia and Azerbaijan.

Azim Yarahmedov, the adviser Baku's Russian Embassy to confirmed this report. He said that first Vice-Minister of the Russian Foreign Ministry Valeriy Churkin sent to Baku's Russian Embassy with a letter requesting the start of consultations with the Azeri Foreign Ministry concerning the creation of the free economic zone between Dagestan and Azerbaijan.

Yarahmedov said that in this case the issue is the creation of the joint-ventures, joint-stock societies and trade across the border.

During the meeting of the Russian embassy officials and the first vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Mahmud Mamedkuliyev, an agreement on informing the Azeri vice-premier, Abbas Abbasov, about the request by the Russain Foreign Ministry was reached.

The Russian side proposes to create commissions which will flesh out and implement the proposals. Russian ministers and the prime- minister of Dagestan will be members of the commission.

Yarahmedov said that solving of Russian initiative positively will be advantageous for Azerbaijan and Dagestan as well since about 75,000 Azerbaijanis live in the Derbentskiy region of Dagestan and scores of thousands of Lezghins, Avars, and Laks live in the northern regions of Azerbaijan. "The creation of the free economic zone serves to maintain historical and cultural relations between the two people, as well as the respective relations between the people living along both sides of the frontier", Yarahmedov said.—

Aliyev's Meeting With UN Representative Reported

NC1701204194 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] President Geydar Aliyev received Mahmud al-Sa'id, UN representative in Azerbaijan, on 17 January. Aliyev briefed his guest on the serious situation in the Republic and Azerbaijan's recent gains on the front lines. Stressing that Azerbaijan's troops control Fizulinskiy, Agdamskiy, Agderinskiy, and Kelbadzharskiy Rayons, Aliyev noted that the world has to be accurately informed on the situation in Azerbaijan. He also recalled his meeting with President Levon Ter-Petrosyan in Ashgabat and stressed that he wishes to find a peaceful solution to the dispute.

President Aliyev said: We want to find a peaceful way to retrieve our territory. However, we shall not allow Armenia's occupationist forces to continue to tread on even an inch of Azerbaijan's territory.

Later, Aliyev thanked al-Sa'id for the UN aid to Azerbaijan's refugees and said that he appreciated his visit to the front lines to meet with the refugees.

Mahmud al-Sa'id said that the UN organization plans to maintain its humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan in 1994. He also said that UN aid will be maintained until the dispute is resolved.

State Adviser Vefa Gulizade attended the meeting.

Aliyev, Iranian Envoy Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh

NC1501165694 Baku AZERTAC in English 1522 GMT 15 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January 15, (AZERTAC)—Settlement of the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh was the principal issue during todays negotiations between President Aliyev and Mr. Bank, the Iranian foreign ministers personal representative, the head of administration of Foreign Ministry for Caucasian affairs. The Iranian diplomat arrived in Baku after he had been on peacekeeping missions to Yerevan and Nakhivan in accordance with wishes of the leaders of the two Transcaucasian countries.

President Aliyev has stressed again that the Azerbaijani leadership adheres to peaceful resolution of the conflict. At the same time, the President Aliyev has stated that the Armenian party as ever before counts on force and ignoring the UN Security Councils resolutions does not hurry to leave the earlier occupied Azeri territory. President has stressed that in these conditions Azerbaijani party has to undertake measures in order to defend its territory. The Azeri armed forces has control over a part of the occupied Azeri territory including a 40 km. long sector of the frontier between Azerbaijan and Iran.

Issues concerning protection of the frontier between Azerbaijan and Iran, development of bilateral relations in the field of joint oil extraction and sale and goods in transit were also discussed during the talks.

Aliyev Meets Iranian Ministry Representative

LD1501195994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1649 GMT 15 Jan 94

[By AZERTAC correspondent Natig Abdullayev for TASS]

[Text] Baku January 15 TASS—A meeting of Azeri President Geydar Aliyev and a personal representative of the Iranian foreign minister and director of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's Caucasian department was held here today to discuss settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict.

The Iranian diplomat came to Baku after visiting Yerevan and Nakhichevan on a peace-making mission in accordance with wishes of the two Transcaucasian leaders.

Geydar Aliyev confirmed the Azeri stand favoring peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. At the same time, he said "the Armenian side continues to stake on force and does not hurry to free occupied Arab lands despite resolutions of the United Nations Security Council."

"Bearing this in mind, the Azeri side had to take measures to free and protect its lands," stressed the president. He said part of the occupied lands, including 40-kilometer section of the Azeri-Iranian border, are under control of the Azeri Armed Forces.

The interlocutors also discussed the protection of the Azeri- Iranian border and development of bilateral relations in joint extraction and sales of oil and transit transportation.

Slovene Foreign Minister Visits Azerbaijan

AU1701163694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] As part of his tour through the Central Asian states, Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle is visiting the Azerbaijani capital city of Baku. The hosts told him that the Azerbaijani parliament will discuss the recognition of Slovenia that very day and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states is to follow soon thereafter.

Azerbaijani leaders expressed interest in economic cooperation with our country, particularly in the sphere of industry. They spoke in favor of reaching some basic interstate agreements.

Deals With Latvia Signed; Post Contested

MK1401131094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 4

[Report by Mekhman Gafarly: "Establishment of Trade-Economic, and Diplomatic Relations with Latvia. Changes in Republic's Government Imminent"]

[Text] The measure of stability that has come to Azerbaijan after a prolonged period of power changes has begun to attract new economic partners to the republic. One piece of evidence of this is the signing in Baku the other day by Latvian Vice Premier Ojars Kehris and Azerbaijan Vice Premier Samed Sadykhov of an agreement on trade and economic relations between the two countries. In addition, Mr. Kehris signed with Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov a protocol on the establishment of diplomatic links.

The Latvian vice premier announced after the ceremony that under the agreement on economic and trade cooperation, Azerbaijan would deliver to Latvia mainly fuel and petroleum products, and would receive vehicles, in particular locomotives, rail cars, and instruments.

In the meantime, Azerbaijan's leadership has begun behind-the-scenes discussions about a coming reshuffle. It is not ruled out that Lala Gadzhiyeva, Azerbaijan's secretary of state, will be appointed the republic's ambassador to the United Nations in the near future.

Lala Gadzhiyeva, doctor of medicine, took the office of secretary of state last summer after Geydar Aliyev came to power. Before that she lived and worked in Moscow, engaged in political activities, and was one of the authors of the scenario of Geydar Aliyev's return to power. She is still regarded as the current Azerbaijan president's right-hand person. The reason for such an influential figure quitting the political center stage were Lala Gadzhiyeva's bad relations with Prime Minister Surat Guseynov. Using all his influence, the latter demanded that Aliyev remove Gadzhiyeva from the office of secretary of state. Mrs. Gadzhiyeva tendered her resignation on 16 December but the president would not endorse it before he could find her a suitable position.

The vacated position is contested by Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov and Arifa Ragimzade, state counselor for administrative-territorial administration. Your SEGODNYA correspondent has learned from a completely trustworthy source that this position will most probably be filled by Gasan Gasanov, who was prime minister under Ayaz Mutalibov and who even at that time did not hide his sympathy for Geydar Aliyev.

People's Front Men Arrested; Newspapers Banned

MK1801134094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 5

[Report by Aleksandr Sokolov under the "Azerbaijan" rubric: "Mass Arrests of People's Front Activists Begin. Opposition Newspapers Suspended"]

[Text] According to the People's Front of Azerbaijan (PFA)'s press service, local Internal Affairs Ministry officers in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic have been carrying out mass arrests of PFA activists since 12 January. Yadygar Mamedli, chief of the PFA press service, said that "at 0500 on 12 January officers of the Nakhichevan Internal Affairs Ministry were put on alert and were ordered to search the apartments of the local PFA branch's activists." Within an hour, PFA members D.Gasanov, I.Salakhov, V.Asadov, I.Mamedov, A.Mamedov, and N.Agayev were arrested. A few days later, another two PFA activists were detained in Babek rayon. All the detainees are currently held in custody at the Nakhichevan Internal Affairs Ministry's investigatory confinement block.

During Abulfaz Elchibey's stay in power they fought at the Saderak front (in the western sector of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border—A.S.) as members of a volunteer battalion of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry. Following Abulfaz Elchibey's overthrow they all left the battalion and expressed their loyalty to the former president. Your SEGODNYA correspondent was told at the PFA press service that no charges have yet been brought against the detainees.

The chief of the PFA press service said in a telephone conversation with a SEGODNYA correspondent that "PFA leaders assess the arrests as political reprisals and see them as preparations for Abulfaz Elchibey's arrest." According to Mamedli, "It cannot be ruled out that following the suit of their Georgian counterparts the Azerbaijani authorities are planning to destroy the former president physically," because the other day Azerbaijani General Prosecutor Ali Omarov said on republican television: "As long as two former presidents—Ayaz Mutalibov and Abulfaz Elchibey—exist, the threat of political destabilization in the republic remains."

Aside from the arrests, the opposition is threatened with a newspaper ban. In the new year a number of opposition publications, such as MUKHALIFET, DZHUMKHURIET, YENI MUSAVAT, KHURRIYET, ISTIGLYAL, and others, have already been suspended. At present only 20 out of 600 registered newspapers are being published in the republic. While previously officials at the "Azerbaijan" printing house, which was resubordinated to the presidential staff upon Geydar Aliyev's arrival to power, attributed this to a lack of printing equipment, after the newspapermen themselves found everything they needed, the printing house's chiefs refused to sign a contract with opposition newspapers. Opposition leaders say that this runs counter to the republic's Law on Anti-Monopoly Activity, which was passed last year by the Azerbaijani National Assembly.

Georgia

Yeltsin Postpones Visit; Patsatsia in Moscow

LD1801100894 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0900 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Yesterday Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin had a telephone conversation with Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian parliament and head of state.

The Russian president, who telephoned Tbilisi, announced that he had been planning to pay an official visit to Georgia at the end of January 1994. However, since he understood full well the importance of Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to France [beginning 20 January] not only for Georgia and the CIS member countries, but also for the international community, he decided to postpone his visit until February.

As agreed, a meeting of the Russian and Georgian prime ministers will be held ahead of Boris Yeltsin's visit.

Today, Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia starts a three-day working visit to the Russian capital. The main objective of the Georgian prime minister's visit is to conclude the preparation of a comprehensive friendship and cooperation treaty between Russia and Georgia.

It is expected that this treaty will be signed during Boris Yeltsin's visit to Tbilisi set for 3-4 February.

The final details of the treaty will be agreed on Wednesday or Thursday at a meeting between Otar Patsatsia and Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Russian Peacekeeping Force for Abkhaz Conflict

LD1801184594 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Gennadiy Dolgachev, head of the press center of the Russian troops in Georgia, has said that units of the Russian army in Transcaucasia will be used as a peacekeeping force in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. He said that everything is ready to start this measure.

The agreement to deploy a peace-keeping force in the conflict zone was reached at talks between Georgian and Abkhaz delegations in Geneva. This force will supervise the return of the refugees to Abkhazia, whose number, as you know, exceeds 200,000. The return of the refugees is due to start on 10 February.

Shevardnadze Appraises Government 'Negatively'

LD1801130694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1148 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze has assessed the performance of Georgia's government led by Otar Patsatsia extremely negatively. As INTERFAX learned from well-informed sources in Tbilisi, he criticized the Cabinet on Monday at a session held by the parliamentary majority behind closed doors. The parliamentary majority had been formed by Shevardnadze's supporters to ensure more coordinated backing for his reforms.

Addressing the session, Shevardnadze expressed dissatisfaction with the work of some ministers, and even raised the issue of forming a new government.

Security Minister on Gamsakhurdia's Exhumation

LD1801113094 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Georgian authorities know where former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who committed suicide in a village in Western Georgia in the early hours of 1 January, is buried.

INTERFAX reports this was stated by Igor Giorgadze, the Georgian minister of security, at a news conference in Tbilisi yesterday evening.

He said that a group of specialists from Russia, Germany, and the United States was due to depart for Western Georgia today to exhume and inspect Gamsakhurdia's body.

Only a visual inspection will be carried out, in keeping with what was requested by the former President's family.

Further Details

LD1801143694 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Late at night on 17 January, Georgian Security Minister Igor Giorgadze gave a news conference in Tbilisi in connection with questions of the death of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Nikolay Mamulashvili reports:

[Mamulashvili] At the meeting with journalists most attention was focussed on the awaited exhumation and identification of Gamsakhurdia's corpse, which according to some information is buried in a village in West Georgia. Let me remind you that a group of experts from Russia, Germany, and Great Britain is completely ready to go into these questions.

The security minister reported that on 17 January a telegram was sent from Chechnya to the head of the Georgian state. It was couched somewhat in the form of an ultimatum, in which members of Gamsakhurdia's family and his closest associates demanded guarantees of the unobstructed removal of the body of the former president from Georgia and immunity for those accompanying it. On 18 January, in reply to the telegram from Chechnya, a telegram was sent to Groznyy in which the Georgian leadership confirmed guarantees of unobstructed removal of the body and also proposed to Gamsakhurdia's family that it should include its own representatives in the group of international experts.

It is worth drawing attention to a report by the Georgian Security Ministry, also based on indirect information, or more precisely on the testimony of a certain doctor who examined Gamsakhurdia on 2 December, that the former president was seriously ill, having being diagnosed as suffering from a tumor in the region of the bladder. Igor Giorgadze also said that one of the residual groups of the former president's armed formations was still in operation in the area where Gamsakhurdia was allegedly buried. We do not want bloodshed and casualties, the minister emphasized, and therefore we shall not enter the area by force of arms but will hold talks.

Finally, a delegation from Chechnya is expected to arrive in Tbilisi on 18 January.

Parliament Extends State of Emergency

LD1801181894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1723 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] The Georgian parliament extended by one month the state of emergency imposed in the country on September 20, 1993.

It was Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze who proposed extending the emergency at the parliament session on January 18. He said it was needed to enforce law and order in the country.

Opposition deputies who agreed with the head of state on most points demanded that he give up the "services" of the Defense Ministry in enforcing the emergency and lift censorship of mass media.

Shevardnadze responded by saying that there was not censorship in the country while the emergency was being enforced by the police and interior troops.

The emergency was extended in a 112 to 23 vote with 15 abstentions. There are 220 deputies in the Georgian parliament.

Shevardnadze on Extension

LD1801193994 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Excerpts] As you know, a session of the Georgian Parliament was held today. The first report in our program tells you about the work of this session.

[Correspondent] Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian Parliament and head of state, delivered a report on the extension of the operation of the state of emergency on the territory of the Republic of Georgia.

Our main task is to restore order in the country. Therefore, the address by the chairman of parliament started with a call for an improvement of the work of the supreme legislative body. He said that it is necessary to introduce a principle of coordination in the work of the parliament and to exclude spontaneity. Among other central problems Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze listed an improvement of the rules of procedure and the necessity to step up work in commissions and to listen to their reports.

Our public, said the head of state, has a great desire that fruitless confrontation in the work of the parliament be overcome.

The main result of the introduction of the state of emergency is that Georgia has averted a major civil war which was about to engulf western Georgia. But for the emergency rules, the country might have been in a more serious condition. Unless order is established in the country, nothing will save either the economy or culture and science, and the country will not be able to emerge from the crisis, the head of state stressed. He also said that unless order is restored, all achievements and agreements reached during talks with other countries will remain on paper. We should be guided by this principle in our work.

As for an extension of the emergency rules, it was said that they should be extended for a month—of course, provided that the parliament agrees. [passage omitted]

Mr. Jaba Ioseliani presented to the parliamentarians a comprehensive report on the results of the Geneva talks. He began by criticizing the press, or, rather, the official press. Mr. Jaba Ioseliani said that the talks in Geneva finished five days ago and almost all international newspapers comprehensively covered and assessed this important event. Meanwhile, the Georgian population has not been offered even a single report.

We will not repeat today the assessment of the talks by the head of the Georgian delegation, since Georgian television has broadcast several times a long interview covering these issues. We will point out that there was a difference of opinion regarding the assessment of the results, which is customary for some deputies.

The significance of the results of the talks will become clear to all of us only after their implementation, which is expected to start in the immediate future.

And that was the end of the Parliament's work today.

[Announcer] We would like to add that the republic's parliament decided today to extend for another month the state of emergency on the entire territory of the republic.

Shevardnadze Orders Apartment Return to Russians

LD1801205594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1723 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze on Tuesday [18 January] ordered the republic's Military Prosecutor's Office to take measures to return to Russian Armed Forces officers in Tbilisi and other cities apartments from which they have been forcibly evicted.

According to Shevardnadze's press service, there are 104 such apartments, most of which have been seized by Georgian military officers, who threaten to use arms if any attempt is made to evict them.

A source in the press center of Russia's Armed Forces Group in the Transcaucasus told Interfax this was the first time the Georgian authorities had taken up the matter. If Shevardnadze's orders to give back the apartments were ignored, relations between Russian and Georgian troops could deteriorate, the source said.

Estonia

'Rough Ideas,' 'Themes' for Response to Kozyrev

WS1901094494 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release in English 18 Jan 94

["Rough ideas and themes to help formulate letters to the editor, comments, etc. on the Kozyrev statements today" concerning a continued Russian military presence in states of the former Soviet Union; "These are not necessarily Estonian Foreign Ministry positions": "Ideas for Response to Kozyrev"—received via Internet]

[Text] Big bully terrorizing smaller, weaker neighbors

Russia's image has been seriously hurt by these statements. The only way for Russia unambiguously to demonstrate its respect for Estonia's sovereignty and independence is to meet its international commitments, specifically by meeting the provisions of the July 1992 CSCE final document in which Russia pledged to complete the unconditional, rapid and orderly withdrawal of its troops from Estonian territory.

It is clear from these and previous Russian statements that Russia does not take continued Baltic independence very seriously. Baltic independence is viewed as a temporary annoyance.

[Russian Foreign Minister] Kozyrev has again expressed the Russian policy of "eminent domain." Balts have long warned about the practical implications of concepts such as "near abroad," "special interests," "sphere of Russian interests for centuries." When Hitler announced his plans, the world powers did not take him seriously at first. The West set out on a path of appeasement which led to world war. Are we really doomed to repeat history? A bite of Baltics will not fill the bear's stomach—it will merely whet his appetite.

Clinton has turned into Bush and Kozyrev turns out to be Zhirinovskiy.

Kozyrev: "Certain elements in those regions (CIS and Baltics) constitute a major threat to those (Russian) interests." Is Kozyrev referring to the democratically elected governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania? Will we now hear demands for the resignation of some or all of the Baltic leaders to be replaced by individuals more "friendly" to Russia???? When have we heard things like this before?!?

Russia has not lived up to its international commitments and obligations, especially on the issue of withdrawing troops (Helsinki Final Document, 1992). In a form of appeasement, the West has not exerted enough pressure to bring this about. As a result, Russia, instead of behaving as a responsible partner in the world community, is now making expansionistic, destabilizing threats.

Clinton's message was fuzzy and seemed to allow conditions to be attached to troop withdrawal, the Russians have now been emboldened.

Russia has no real concern for the Russian-speaking residents in other nations. Those poor people are merely being used as a political tool. The tragic aspect to all this is that resentment may grow against these people since Russian threats will cause them to be viewed as a potential fifth column wherever they reside.

IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO MAKE RUSSIA STOP. A CLEAR, SHARP REACTION FROM THE WEST TO THIS LATEST MOVE WILL MAKE RUSSIA PULL BACK AND SAY, "NO, NO, YOU'VE MISUNDERSTOOD. THAT'S NOT WHAT WE MEANT AT ALL."

Laar Says Gaydar Resignation 'Turn Backwards'

LD1801205694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1837 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No. 11 (501)]

[Text] Prime Minister Mart Laar believes that Yegor Gaydar's resignation from the Russian government means "a turn backwards" in the reform policy pursued by Russia.

In his interview with Interfax the premier voiced a supposition that certain moods to turn away from shock therapy and increase state expenditures for social needs spreading in Russia have played a certain role here.

"It's a pity that shortage of funds for these purposes could result in the refusal of reform policy and very hard consequences for all Russia's neighbors, as their successes in economic development depend upon their eastern neighbor," underlined Laar.

"It's strange to hear optimistic statements against such a background stating that nothing has changed in Russia and after the elections everything is continuing as before," he said.

Lithuanian Premier Meets Laar, Views Summit

LD1801225794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1924 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] During his unofficial visit to Estonia, Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius met with his Estonian counterpart, Mart Laar, in Tallinn today.

After the meeting was over, the Lithuanian premier told INTERFAX that the main goal of his visit was to look into Estonia's experience in the transition to local sources of fuel. He pointed out that his meeting with the Estonian prime minister focused on the expansion of bilateral cooperation and the preparation for the meeting of the prime ministers of the three Baltic states scheduled for January 19 in Jurmala.

Slezevicius said that the Latvian and Estonian prime ministers intend to put forward the question of extending the trilateral agreement on free trade concluded in 1993 over agricultural products left outside the scope of the agreement, consular protection of the three states' citizens abroad, etc.

The Lithuanian prime minister said that during his stay in Estonia he examined the weapons the republic purchased from Israel. However, he said that Lithuania did not consider purchasing arms as the acutest issue leaving it out of the agenda.

On Wednesday, Slezevicius and Laar will leave for the meeting of the prime ministers of the Baltic states in Jurmala.

Dual Citizenship Seen as Security Threat

WS1801162994 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0742 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From 18 January RAHVA HAAL, p 1]

[Text] Tuesday, January 18—Estonian-Russian dual citizenship would present a major threat to Estonians national security, Minister for Ethnic Affairs Peeter Olesk warned.

"The introduction of the dual citizenship is an element of the Russian national policy that all the leading Russian ideologists have been calling for. It would enable a hidden restoration of the former Soviet Union," Olesk warned.

There are approximately 41,000 Russian citizens in Estonia, but it is difficult to establish, whether they have dual citizenship, since Russia is hiding the information, Olesk said. If the Estonian authorities do not know who the Russian citizens are, Russia can always consider any act directed against such persons as a provocation, the minister warned. These persons will be used as tools in case Russia needs to prove violations of human rights in Estonia, Olesk predicted.

Legislators Pass Health Care Law

WS1801183494 Tallinn BNS in English 1630 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 18, BNS—The Estonian parliament today adopted the law on the health care system with 45 votes for, 11 votes against and six abstentions. The law establishes the legal status of the country's medical institutions and the basis of financing of the health care system.

The law defines medical aid as the activity of doctors with a higher medical education to protect people's health, prolong their lives and improve the quality of life. Medical aid is arranged on three levels: general and specialized aid at the local government level and specialized medical aid on the national level.

A national Health Care Council is to be set up under the government. General administration and supervision of health care will be placed in the hands of the Social Affairs Ministry. County medical officers are going to shape the state's health care policy on the regional level. They will be appointed for a term of five years by county elders, who coordinate the nomination with the Social Affairs Ministry.

The law on the health care system takes effect on Feb. 15.

The legislators amended the law on the relation between the local and the state budgets, and continued the second reading of the surveillance bill. Also Jaan Luik, a member of the State Court, was sworn in.

Latvia

Kozyrev Ideas on Baltics Seen as Threat

LD1801221094 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 2000 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Report from press center of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Latvia]

[Text] According to reports in the Russian media, at a discussion meeting of Russian foreign ministry organizations, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev made a speech of a conceptual nature touching on relations with the Baltic countries. The report expresses ideas that are contrary to Russia's previous official position, and which are to be regarded as threats to Latvia's sovereignty. The Baltic states, including Latvia, are named as a region in which Russia's most important interests are concentrated, and from which the greatest danger to Russia's interests comes. Thus it is important that Russia should not leave, and should not withdraw its troops from these regions.

The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Latvia is analyzing the new situation. Latvia will also propose discussing this issue at tomorrow's meeting of the three Baltic prime ministers in Jurmala.

Birkavs Notes 'Serious Change'

LD1801213194 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] In connection with the statements by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on a change in Russian foreign policy relating to the CIS states and the Baltic region, Latvian Council of Ministers President Valdis Birkavs has commented as follows:

[begin Birkavs recording] Mr. Kozyrev has announced that the CIS and the Baltic countries [words indistinct] regions in which quite important Russian interests are concentrated, and from which the main threat to these interests [words indistinct]; speaking of the military presence in this region, complete withdrawal from this region, that is, the (?complete lack) of military presence in this region is extremely [word indistinct]. There is no need to withdraw from those regions which for centuries have been in the Russian sphere of interest, and there is no need to be afraid of these words. A security vacuum will start to form if Russia's troops are withdrawn from here. Rather than fleeing, supplementary forces are being brought in, which are always threatening, in some cases hostile to Russia.

In my opinion, this announcement in fact indicates a serious change in Russia's position. Moreover, I cannot but associate this position with the recent meeting of U.S. and Russian leaders. Latvia must, therefore, absolutely reinforce its position, and in my view security policy has become a state priority [words indistinct]. [end recording]

Ulmanis Regrets Gaydar's Resignation

LD1801211594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1805 GMT 18 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" No. 11 feature]

[Text] President Guntis Ulmanis, at the briefing Monday, said that he regrets Yegor Gaydar's resignation, since he believes that Gaydar's economic policies are rational and concrete.

Latvia's Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs believes that Yegor Gaydar's resignation will not influence Russian-Latvian economic relations.

He told Interfax that over the past two years the volume of economic contacts between the two countries had decreased so much that it would not be serious to talk about any further deterioration.

He believes that whenever possible the Latvian government will continue economic dialogue with the Russian government irrespective of the changes in it.

He described Gaydar's resignation as "Russia's inner political games" which will have no decisive impact on the neighboring states."

Kasatonov Arrives for Naval Withdrawal Talks

LD1901111094 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1000 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Igor Kasatonov, chief of staff of the Russian Navy, and Vladimir Yegorov, commander of the Baltic Fleet, arrived in Liepaja today. They are accompanied by several high-ranking officers of the Russian Navy.

The delegation of the Russian Navy Headquarters is visiting Liepaja to discuss issues concerning the Russian Navy withdrawal from Latvia by June this year. Gaidis Zeibots, commander of the Latvian naval forces, will meet the heads of the Russian Navy later today.

Ulmanis Calls Russian Army Decision 'Uncivilized'

LD1801141394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1148 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis has described as uncivilized the decision by the command of Russia's Northwestern Army Group to authorize the use of arms for the defense of Russian servicemen and army property on Latvian territory.

Following the incident with two Russian generals on January 10, the command of the Northwestern Army Group authorized servicemen to shoot to kill to rebuff attempts to seize any army facility.

Briefing newsmen on January 17, Ulmanis described the decision as an uncivilized response to the civilized moves he made on January 10. He reminded newsmen that action had been taken immediately on his orders for the release of the Russian generals, subsequent investigation and punishment of those responsible.

Ulmanis saw the decision as provocative and a show of force.

He hoped it would have no far-reaching repercussions. He also saw it as a signal for the Latvian authorities to show more caution in what they choose to say or do.

Russia Considers 10 Jan Incident Closed

LD1801172694 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] At a meeting with Olgerts Pavlovskis, Latvian state minister for foreign trade and European Community affairs, and Aivars Vovers, deputy secretary of state of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Valeriy Nesterushkin, counsellor of the Russian Embassy in Latvia, reported that Russia considers the 10 January incident [detention of two Russian army generals] as closed, following the Latvian apology. Nesterushkin termed the action by Latvian officials as sufficient. During the talks Nesterushkin expressed hope that Latvian authorities will not allow a recurrence of such situations.

Answering a previous request by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain the Russian presidential press secretary's statement on this incident, Nesterushkin said that the statement's aim was to stress the danger of the situation. The sharp tone of the statement was related to the fact that all the circumstances of the matter and the stance of the official Latvian authorities on this issue were not yet known at the time it was made.

Takeover Methods Criticized

WS1801183594 Tallinn BNS in English 1630 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, Jan 18, BNS—The Latvian Saeima (parliament) should judge the Cabinet's record in taking over the Russian military property and amending municipal laws, the Riga Vidzeme District Council of People's Deputies said Monday [17 January].

The statement advises the Saeima to abstain from interstate agreements with Russia if they grant Russia rights to keep any military bases or other property in Latvia.

Lawmakers should check whether the Cabinet and lower administrative structures take into account the viewpoint of local governments when carrying out municipal reforms.

The local deputies reproached the government for its reluctance to help them take over Russian military property. The government also does not reprimand the local governments that do not perform their duty of property takeover.

The government has not adopted any normative acts to regulate the actions by takeover commissions in situations when Russian military persons exert non-violent or armed resistance, or threaten with armed resistance, the local council said.

The government has not done anything to prevent plunder and unlawful sale of former military property, the group added.

The local deputies are also displeased with the government's reform policies. The reforms primarily target the expansion of Cabinet's powers, thus, nearing Latvia to an authoritarian model of state administration, they said.

As reported, the Vidzeme District Council endorsed the Jan. 10 actions by its former Chairman Andrejs Rucs. Rucs acted "correctly and reasonably," when detaining the two Russian generals, it said.

Security Council Favors Partnership for Peace

LD1701175994 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis told a news conference that at a session today, the Latvian State Security Council valued proposals expressed in the framework of the NATO program Partnership for Peace. Ulmanis added that an official letter to NATO would also be prepared, in which the wish of the Latvian side to participate in the program will be expressed. The issue of Latvia joining NATO is, however, to be considered only in a more distant future.

Ulmanis believes initial cooperation with NATO can be in the way of training and consultations. The first step toward this cooperation from the Latvian side would be working out a unified concept for material and technical supplies for the state armed structures.

The cooperation program also includes the request to be very objective and loyal in the issues of human rights, which Latvia perceives with great responsibility. Ulmanis added that in the framework of the proposed partnership, it would be very important to form balanced relations with Russia.

U.S. Official, Ambassador Hold News Conference

LD1701140394 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Text] [Name indistinct], a U.S. national security representative, and U.S. Ambassador to Latvia Ints Silins held a news conference at the U.S. information center today on the Partnership for Peace cooperation plan proposed by NATO. It was again stressed at the news conference that this NATO program is open for all East European states, irrespective of whether they have expressed the wish to be involved in NATO.

Representatives of the Latvian Government have agreed to that program. Latvia would also feel more secure if it participates in it.

Asked why the United States has not reacted to Russia's increased military readiness [reference to 10 January deportation of two Russian generals], Ambassador Silins noted that not all tensions in interstate relations warrant a special U.S. statement.

At the end, it was once again indicated that the United States favors a speedier withdrawal of the Russian Army from Latvia.

Environmentalists Worry About Radioactive Waste

WS1801163694 Tallinn BNS in English 1050 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, Jan 18, BNS—Latvia may face problems with radioactive waste because of shortfall of store containers, said Andrejs Salmins, a nuclear safety specialist at the Environmental Protection and Regional Development Ministry.

Financial and managing hardships hamper repairs in Latvia's sole nuclear waste depot in the Radons enterprise while its exisiting storing capacities are exhausted, Salmins said.

To solve the problem, the ministry will consult the Finance Ministry's experts to calculate the sum needed to finish the reconstruction and find a building organization to complete the works.

The approximate sum is 150,000 lats, but the state budget earmarked only 50,000 lats for the enterprise's reconstruction.

In addition, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Inspectorate has until Jan. 24 to draft a program for ecological research in Radons and its vicinity.

The Riga Radioisotopic Research Institute also nears the brink of bankruptcy. This institute, like Radons, stores radioactive waste. The institutes' scientists are commissioned to forward proposals on the use and storage of radioactive substances. They should also determine which substances to keep and which to sell.

The National Environmental and Social Health Center will compile a resolution on work with radioactive waste and prepare a program for monitoring the residents' health in Radons' vicinity.

Lithuania

Ministry Concerned Over Kozyrev's Remarks

LD1801210194 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2000 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry has voiced concern about Russia's attitude toward the Baltic states, which it calls the near abroad. Lithuania does not agree with such a term and is concerned, because Russia is again reproaching for infringements on human rights in the Baltic countries, which does not correspond to reality, says the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry document.

Lithuania's reaction followed a statement made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on Tuesday on Russia's vital interest in the CIS countries and the Baltics, which says that the Baltic states are the zone of Russia's most important interest and Russia need not withdraw its troops from the region.

The Russian foreign minister also demanded to legalize double [as heard] citizenship. Only people of the independent Lithuania and power structures supported by them can decide what way of granting citizenship is to be opted for. And any pressure [words indistinct] (?as interference in the Lithuanian internal affairs), according to the statement of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry.

The document says that Russia apparently has not given up its military influence in the Baltic states.

Brazauskas: Talks on Kaliningrad Issue To Resume

LD1801125894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1148 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas has declared his administration is assigning priority to cooperation with other Baltic republics, integration into the political, economic and defense structures of Europe, and the promotion of neighborly relations, primarily with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

The President announced this Monday [17 January] to the Vilnius-based chiefs of diplomatic missions.

He said he was planning to visit Belarus and invite his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kravchuk to visit Lithuania. Treaties on cooperation and neighborly relations were likely to be signed as a result of those visits.

Algirdas Brazauskas felt relations had improved between his republic and Russia. The discussion, he said, would soon resume of an agreement on military transits from Russia to the Kaliningrad region via Lithuanian territory.

The Lithuanian President told diplomats that calls for the revision of the Pottsdam conference's decision on the Kaliningrad region had nothing to do with his administration's official foreign policy line. The calls were coming from certain members of the Lithuanian parliament.

Brazauskas Comments on NATO Membership Request

LD1401214094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1740 GMT 14 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas declared that his republic decided to seek membership in NATO least of all because it wants to separate itself from Russia by "an iron curtain."

"We have not set such a task and are ready to live in friendship and mutual understanding with Russia, Belarus, and other CIS states," Brazauskas stressed in an exclusive interview with Interfax.

Commenting on a recent statement by the Russian President's Spokesman, Vyacheslav Kostikov (who was puzzled by such a hasty step of the Lithuanian leadership and warned that "the expansion of NATO to include the countries situated close to Russia's borders can in the long run lead to military and political instability in the region so important for the fates of peace"), Brazauskas said that Vilnius would stay away from polemics with Moscow on the issue. Noting that Kostikov's statement was taken into account, the president called for careful analysis of Lithuania's decision to understand it properly.

"In our step, there is no element of confrontation with Russia or an attempt to organize confrontation along with other Baltic states," Brazauskas stressed.

He reported that he had addressed to NATO's Secretary General Manfred Woerner an application for membership after consulting all Seimas (parliament) factions, which backed up the move. "I must respect the parliament's view," he said.

Brazauskas warned against making a big stir of Lithuania's decision to send an official letter to Woerner. "We realize that such an application cannot be approved in Brussels soon or as an exception. Writing a letter to NATO today and expecting it to grant membership tomorrow would be naive," he noted.

The president welcomed the "Partnership for Peace" concept, endorsed at NATO's summit in Brussels earlier this month and stressed that through it Vilnius was going to promote cooperation with the alliance.

He disagreed with those who fear that the success of nationalists at the elections in Russia on December 12 was the decisive factor that prompted Lithuania's application to NATO. He recalled that Vilnius had taken the first steps in this direction as early as the beginning of last year.

"I do not see in our step any demonstration and desire to isolate ourselves. We are neighbors with Russia and we'll live side by side, all the more so since there is a unique situation with the Kaliningrad region of Russia," Brazauskas said. Although the region borders with Lithuania and Poland, it has no common border with the main territory of Russia.

"It is conceivable that a collective security system should cover the whole of Europe, and it seems to me that all states, Russia included, should come to realize that. All of us want peace rather than confrontation on the European continent," the Lithuanian president noted.

In his words, Lithuania's attitude towards Russia remains unchanged, "and we hope that Moscow will not change towards Vilnius either," Brazauskas said.

At the same time, he warned that if the Russian leadership fundamentally changed and so did its policy in the Baltic states, Vilnius would have to correct its actions.

Brazauskas, Kravchuk Discuss Nuclear Security

LD1801130994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1130 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius January 18 TASS—Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas told the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk by telephone on Tuesday that Lithuania welcomes a tripartite agreement on the liquidation of nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory recently signed in Moscow, the press-service of the Lithuanian president reported.

The Ukrainian and Lithuanian presidents expressed the hope that this agreement would increase security in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and be an important step towards general nuclear disarmament, the same source said.

During the conversation the two presidents discussed bilateral relations and prospects for signing a treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

Brazauskas invited the Ukrainian president to pay an official visit to Lithuania in february, 1994. The invitation was accepted with gratitude, the press service said.

Defense Minister Talks With Swedish Counterpart

PM1801114394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Valeriy Gromak under the "News" rubric: "Lithuania Asks Sweden for Help"]

[Text] Sweden—Lithuanian National Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius and his deputy Sarunas Vasiliauskas are visiting Sweden. A meeting between the Lithuanian national defense minister and Swedish Defense Minister Anders Bjork took place. The Lithuanian National Defense Ministry Press Service has reported that a "new security structure in Europe and the Baltic countries" and Sweden's and Lithuania's security policy were discussed at it.

Deputy Minister Vasiliauskas also held talks with representatives of the Swedish Armed Forces Support Service [sluzhba obespecheniya] on help in controlling Lithuania's state borders.

Polish Ministry Responds on Status of Poles

WS1801165294 Tallinn BNS in English 1434 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 18, BNS—The Polish Foreign Ministry released a statement in response to a letter signed by 72 Polish lawmakers, who expressed concern about the status of Poles in Lithuania and the course of talks between the two countries.

The letter, addressed to the Polish president, the prime minister, the foreign minister and the Polish parliament's speaker, appeared in the Lithuanian press last week. The 72 demand that Poland observe 5 principles when signing an agreement on friendship and cooperation with Lithuania. The agreement has been under negotiation since last summer.

In its statement, the Polish ministry assures lawmakers that it is no less concerned about the interests of Poles in Lithuania than the Polish parliament. According to the statement, the Polish Foreign Ministry holds that Lithuanian Poles must be guaranteed equal rights in Lithuania.

As previously reported, 72 Polish lawmakers, mainly members of the parliamentary majority, demanded to create a cultural autonomy of the predominantly Polish-populated Vilnius and Salcininkai regions, to return nationalized property to Polish social organizations, to exclude history from the main agreement with Lithuania, etc.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735,or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.